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3 
Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses how and why the recurrent costs of water services are shared between 
different actors in the rural local government areas in Mali which are supported by the 
international NGO WaterAid. This analysis of the financing arrangements for rural water 
services is used to critically assess theory, policy and practice in three areas: the 
community-based management approach to service delivery, the role of decentralised local 
governments in supporting community management, and the ability of external 
organisations to influence institutional change. Empirical evidence is presented for the 
period 2008-2011, drawing on research fieldwork undertaken in collaboration with 
WaterAid and its partners in 2010 and 2011, as the organisation introduced its own 
Sustainability Framework to help understand and address the challenges to delivering 
sustainable rural water services.  
 
The thesis argues that approaches to understanding local institutions for natural resource 
management based on ‘critical institutionalism’ (Cleaver 2012), which emphasises the 
importance of improvisation and adaptation across different scales, should be placed within 
broader political economy analysis frameworks for assessing challenges in public services 
delivery from national to local levels. The use of such a framework shows how WaterAid and 
its partners adopt a ‘critical institutionalist’ perspective at community levels to support 
users in developing ways of raising funds for water services which draw on both traditional 
practices and NGO influences. However at local government and national levels their 
approach is based on ideas of ‘best practice’ rather than ‘best fit’ (Booth 2012): although 
the costs of local government support to communities under the model promoted by 
WaterAid lie within international benchmarks, it is unclear over what timescale this 
approach could be scaled up in Mali without donor support. This demonstrates the limited 
ability of local governments to ensure the delivery of decentralised public services without 
additional external resources and support themselves.  
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Glossary 
 
Acronyms and abbreviations 
 
Note: translations by the author are given in square brackets, where applicable. 
 
3Ts tariffs, taxes and transfers 
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AMEPPE Association Malienne pour l'Education du Public et la Protection de 
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[Integrated Light Household Survey] 
EMEP Enquête Malienne d’Evaluation de la Pauvreté  
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FCFA Franc Communauté Financière Africaine  
[West African CFA franc] 
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JMP Joint Monitoring Programme (WHO/UNICEF) 
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[Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Business] 
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OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) 
ODHD Observatoire du Développement Humain Durable et de la Lutte Contre la 
Pauvreté  
[Observatory of Sustainable Human Development and the Fight Against 
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OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OECD-DAC Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development 
Assistance Committee 
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[Programme for Economic and Social Development] 
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PDSEC Plan de Développement Social, Economique et Culturel  
[Social, Economic and Cultural Development Plan] 
PEA political economy analysis 
PNAEP Plan National d’Accès à l’Eau Potable  
[National Plan for Access to Drinking Water] 
PPI Progress out of Poverty Index 
PROSEA Programme Sectoriel Eau et Assainissement  
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PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
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[Sector Development Plan] 
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SNLP Stratégie Nationale de Lutte contre la Pauvreté  
[National Strategy for the Fight against Poverty] 
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[Sub-Regional Service for Water and Energy] 
STEFI Suivi Technique et Financiere  
[Technical and Financial Monitoring system] 
SWAp Sector-Wide Approach 
TRDL Taxe de Développement Régionale et Locale  
[regional and local development tax] 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund 
WASH water, sanitation and hygiene 
WHO World Health Organisation 
WMO World Meteorological Organisation 
WSP Water and Sanitation Programme (World Bank) 
 
 
Malian terms 
 
commune The lowest level of government in Mali, equivalent to a municipality. 
cercle The level of government above commune in Mali, equivalent to a district. 
région The level of government above cercle in Mali, equivalent to a region. 
ton Traditional collective-work or age-group association in Mali. 
tontine Traditional savings group and/or credit association in Mali. 
point d'eau 
moderne 
"Modern water point": a water point which meets national norms for 
providing drinking water in Mali and can do so year-round. In rural areas this 
can be a borehole fitted with a handpump, a small piped system with 
tapstands, or a "modern well" (DNH 2007).  
puits 
moderne 
"Modern well": a concrete-lined well, usually hand-dug, with a wellhead at 
reaching at least 0.6m above the ground (DNH 2007). A cover is not specified.  
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
1.1. Sustainability and financing of rural water services 
 
In 2012, it was announced that the Millennium Development Goal drinking water target - to 
halve the proportion of the global population without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water between 1990 and 2015 - had been met in 2010, five years ahead of schedule. 
However, over 780 million people worldwide remain without access to water from 
improved sources, 650 million of whom live in rural areas (WHO/UNICEF JMP 2012b). 
Furthermore, problems of the sustainability of water services remain. The term “sustainable 
access” in the MDG target has yet to be adequately defined and measured, as the JMP 
acknowledges,1 but figures suggest that at any one time 30% or more of all rural water 
systems in developing countries are non-functional (Baumann 2009; RWSN 2010). Therefore 
many services are failing to achieve sustainability in terms of the broad definition of 
continuing to work and deliver benefits over time (Abrams et al. n.d., in WaterAid 2011b). 
As coverage increases but problems of sustainability persist, there is a high risk of ‘slippage’: 
coverage stagnating or even falling, in spite of new investment, because old infrastructures 
fail at least as fast as new ones are built (Reddy et al. 2010). As the title of UN-Water’s 
Global Annual Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-Water (GLAAS) 2012 report states, we 
face “the challenge of extending and sustaining services” - or, more succinctly, we must 
work out how to reach “everyone, forever” (Water for People 2013). 
 
These concerns are not new; the difficulty of achieving sustainable water services in 
developing countries, especially rural drinking water supplies, has been known since at least 
the 1980s. Yet false assumptions and myths about how to deliver rural water services have 
persisted in policy and practice (Carter et al. 1999a; RWSN 2010). One of these is unrealistic 
optimism concerning the ability of the widespread community-based management 
approach to address these problems (WaterAid 2011b). The limits to the typical model of 
voluntary water committees, who are usually responsible for organising day-to-day 
operation and maintenance, tariff-collection and arranging minor repairs, are widely 
documented (e.g. Schouten and Moriarty 2003; Lockwood and Smits 2011; WaterAid 2011b). 
Therefore the rural water sector is gradually shifting away from a reliance on community 
                                                 
1
 “Use of an improved water source” was instead agreed as a proxy indicator for the purposes for the 
MDGs. 
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management towards a more holistic approach of local service providers (whether 
community-based, public or private operators) supported by a combination of local 
government, NGOs and the private sector, within a sufficiently enabling national policy and 
planning environment (Lockwood and Smits 2011). 
 
An essential element of such an approach is the development of adequate frameworks for 
financial planning, which include all costs involved in providing rural water services and 
identify how these costs will be shared between different actors. Particular issues include 
defining and financing the recurrent costs of rural water supply: at local levels these are 
operation and minor maintenance expenditure, capital maintenance expenditure, and the 
costs of ongoing support to service providers (Fonseca et al. 2011). However, financial 
planning for recurrent costs is a common weakness in the rural water sector (Lockwood and 
Smits 2011), and a better understanding of costs and cost drivers in different contexts has 
been identified as one of the key areas where the sector requires greater evidence (DFID 
2012). 
 
In this thesis I use a case study of the work of the international NGO WaterAid and its 
partners in Mali to understand how the recurrent costs of rural water services are shared 
between different actors, including the users themselves, local and national government, 
and WaterAid and other NGOs. WaterAid was the official non-academic collaborating 
partner in the research, which enabled me to work closely with the organisation and its staff 
in Mali and the UK throughout the process of researching cost-sharing and service delivery 
approaches.2 I analyse how these cost-sharing arrangements have emerged, assess the 
associated levels of service received by users under current levels of expenditure, and show 
the gaps between actual expenditure and the costs likely to be necessary for delivering 
sustainable basic rural water services.  
 
From the analysis of this empirical evidence I draw out the implications for 
community-based management as a service delivery model for rural water supply and for 
decentralised local government as a means of supporting community management. I try to 
understand what role NGOs such as WaterAid can play in promoting pro-poor sustainable 
financing approaches for rural water services. Moving the debate beyond the water sector, I 
                                                 
2
 The research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council as a Collaborative Award in 
Science and Engineering (CASE), a scheme which promotes partnerships between universities and 
non-academic organisations through financing collaborative PhD studentships. 
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then place this research in the context of other work on the role of external organisations in 
influencing institutional change and the delivery of public services in developing countries. 
In the rest of this chapter I introduce these wider debates about politics and institutional 
change, explain why Mali and the work of WaterAid represent a relevant case study for this 
research, summarise the key research themes and questions, and set out the structure of 
the thesis. 
  
 
1.2. Understanding politics and institutional change 
 
Throughout this thesis I argue that the issues of sustainability and financing of rural water 
services must be analysed within their wider political contexts, and particular attention 
must be paid to understanding the role of external organisations such as NGOs in 
influencing institutional change. As Lockwood and Smits (2011: 145) argue, it is essential to 
address “what can be termed the political economy of rural water … a complex backdrop of 
powerful interests, competing agendas and dynamics, many of which are never formally 
captured in sector documentation or evaluations.” Academics have also concluded that 
there is a growing need for political economy perspectives which can help water sector 
policymakers and practitioners (Mollinga 2008; O'Meally 2009; Welle et al. 2009; Cleaver 
2012). 
 
Therefore in this research I develop an analytical framework which draws on two areas of 
work: forms of “political economy analysis” (PEA) used by international donors and think 
tanks, and academic literature on analysing institutional change for managing natural 
resources and delivering public services. The aim of this approach is to develop a framework 
which helps analyse the complexities of political economy and institutional change in a way 
which is both academically rigorous and can provide useful guidance for practitioners and 
policymakers.  
 
My argument is that existing donor-supported political economy analysis approaches 
provide two useful starting points. Firstly, such forms of political economy analysis can 
provide a systematic approach to analysing the relationships between key actors, 
institutions (defined as formal and informal rules, norms and arrangements, which can also 
exist or be represented in the form of organisations) and structural factors (such as 
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historical processes, demographic trends and environmental issues) in a given country or 
sector context. Secondly, political economy analysis approaches also emphasise the roles of 
external organisations such as donors and NGOs themselves, and the need for these actors 
to adopt ‘best fit’ or ‘good fit’ approaches. This means working with existing institutions in a 
way that is sensitive to the realities of the particular country and sector rather than trying to 
import ‘best practice’ institutions which may not fit the context (Booth 2012).  
 
However, I extend these political economy analysis frameworks using further work by 
academics which draws on a variety of fields including geography, anthropology, sociology, 
political science, economics and management. The areas of literature that I use share a 
concern with how different parts of academia, policy and practice understand institutions, 
institutional change and the influence of external actors. As Booth (2012: 92) comments on 
the approaches of international donors and NGOs: “rejection of one-size-fits-all remedies, 
and the will to replace ‘best practice’ with ‘good fit’ approaches to institutional design, is at 
least a decade old … yet the new thinking still looks a lot like the old thinking.” Therefore I 
combine the work by donors and think tanks on political economy analysis with more 
in-depth academic approaches to analysing institutional change which can help understand 
how such processes of change really happen.  
 
In particular, I use three areas of literature concerned with the role of external actors in 
institutional change in developing countries (summarised in Cleaver 2012; Booth 2012; 
Andrews 2013), which focus in turn on community-based natural resource management, 
decentralised local governance and the delivery of public services, and national-level public 
sector reform. All three of these areas are crucial to the issue of rural water services, and 
provide theoretical insights which help explain how approaches to service delivery evolve at 
community, local government and national levels. By linking these different areas of 
literature I respond to Cleaver’s (2012) suggestion to place detailed analysis of institutional 
change within a broader framework which helps bridge different scales. 
 
 
1.3. The Mali context and WaterAid's approach 
 
Mali is a useful case study for this research because it fits into the category of countries 
identified by Lockwood and Smits (2011) where access to rural water supply has reached 
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between 50% and 70% and is expanding, but where there is also a high risk of ‘slippage’ 
(Reddy et al. 2010) if the challenge of sustaining services is not adequately addressed. Mali’s 
average coverage in rural areas is 71% according to figures from the national water 
directorate (DNH 2010), but 51% under JMP figures (WHO/UNICEF JMP 2012a), which are 
based on usage rather than coverage. Taking these figures as upper and lower bounds 
shows that Mali is in this challenging ‘danger zone’. Estimates of the functionality of rural 
water points in Mali are that about 30% of handpumps (which represent the most common 
improved water source in rural areas) are non-functional (DNH 2008a; WaterAid Mali 2010), 
highlighting the challenge of sustainability. As Lockwood and Smits (2011: 148-9) argue, 
countries in this situation experience “an in-built tension between pursuing increased 
coverage (with inadequate budgets and growing populations), while at the same time 
addressing sustainability in a more structured way.”  
 
Mali is also one of many countries where community-based management of rural water 
supplies is a core element of national policy, accompanied by decentralisation reforms that 
emphasise the role of local governments in ensuring that communities are adequately 
supported. This scenario corresponds to that shown in Figure 1.1 (adapted from WaterAid 
2011b: 7), which highlights the need for some form of ongoing external support to 
community management. One of the key issues in Mali is what this support entails and how 
it can be provided (World Bank 2008; USAID 2010), a question that WaterAid directly 
addresses through its work at municipal level. 
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Figure 1.1. The need for external support to community management of rural water supply 
and WaterAid’s approach to working with local governments in Mali to ensure this support 
(adapted from WaterAid 2011b: 7) 
 
 
WaterAid has been active in Mali since 1999, and by 2012 had spread its work to a total of 
23 urban and rural municipalities. During its second official country strategy from 2006 to 
2011, the organisation developed its focus on decentralisation and local governance of 
water and sanitation (WaterAid Mali 2010). This included, from 2008, beginning to set up 
water and sanitation Technical Units within selected municipal governments as a means of 
helping expand coverage and provide external support to community management, a model 
that I analyse in detail in Chapter Six. This approach involved direct budget support from 
WaterAid to these municipalities to fund the staff and overheads of the Technical Units 
(with its other partner municipalities, WaterAid works with local NGOs and the 
municipalities in a ‘tripartite’ arrangement, where funding from WaterAid goes to the local 
NGO rather than the municipality).  
Ongoing day-to-day 
operation, 
management and 
maintenance of rural 
water infrastructure 
 
 
Usually by a 
voluntary water 
management 
committee or other 
community-level 
body, with limited 
capacity 
 
Ongoing external support 
to management issues and 
physical infrastructure 
 
Municipal governments 
have responsibility for 
ensuring that rural water 
supplies function (by 
supporting communities 
directly or arranging for 
other actors to do so), but 
it is unclear exactly what 
activities and mechanisms 
of support should be used 
Initial external 
intervention to set 
up management 
system and rural 
water supply 
infrastructure  
 
Usually by a 
combination of 
national and local 
government, NGOs 
and private 
contractors 
Direct budget support and capacity-building from 
WaterAid to municipal governments 
 
Since 2008 WaterAid has begun to set up, fund and 
support municipal water and sanitation Technical Units 
(composed of 1-2 paid municipal staff working with 
existing local elected officials and civil servants) as a way 
for local governments to fulfil their responsibilities, 
including the provision of support to communities 
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Figure 1.2 shows Mali’s nine regions, including the capital Bamako. WaterAid works with a 
total of 15 rural municipalities (highlighted in blue) in the regions of Koulikoro, Segou, Mopti, 
Tomboctou and Gao, as well as urban municipalities in Bamako. 
 
Figure 1.2. WaterAid’s areas of work in Mali and case study municipalities for this research3 
 
 
 
 
As explained in detail in Chapter Four, this research focused predominantly on four 
municipalities in the Koulikoro region (Dialakoroba, Kolokani, Tioribougou and 
Yelekebougou) and one municipality in the region of Mopti (Dandougou Fakala). Three of 
the selected municipalities are the first three examples of WaterAid’s direct partnership 
approach to working with local government, and all of the chosen municipalities have 
                                                 
3
 Map of Mali adapted from IOM (2013), Mali Admin Level 1 Boundaries, retrieved 25 June 2013, 
<http://cod.humanitarianresponse.info/search/field_country_region/mali>. 
21 
relatively high levels of coverage compared to the Mali rural average, so may be at the stage 
where sustainability becomes an increased concern for local stakeholders in addition to 
expanding coverage to new users. As shown in Figure 1.2, additional research on pilot 
projects promoting water provision by households themselves (‘self-supply’) was conducted 
in some municipalities outside WaterAid’s areas of intervention. 
 
The research for this thesis was undertaken during 2010 and 2011, which included the 
period in mid-2011 when WaterAid introduced the organisation’s new Sustainability 
Framework (WaterAid 2011). The framework is based on an expanded version of the upper 
three boxes of Figure 1.1 which specifies in more detail the key factors required for 
sustainability, in terms of real need and demand on the part of the users, the essential 
aspects of the programme design and implementation stage, the elements of the 
community-based management system itself, and the components of long-term external 
assistance. As can be seen from considering Figure 1.1 and the description of WaterAid’s 
work above, the organisation’s approach already emphasises the importance of external 
support to community management. The Sustainability Framework was therefore used by 
WaterAid and its partners as a tool to analyse in greater detail the strengths and 
weaknesses of their work at municipal levels against each element of the framework, in 
order to identify the aspects which posed the greatest challenges to sustainability. The 
arrangements for sharing recurrent costs were identified as one key challenge. 
 
This research was set up from the start as a collaborative project, with WaterAid as the 
non-academic partner, and so the activities emerging from the introduction of the 
Sustainability Framework provided an opportunity to deepen this collaboration, which I 
discuss in Chapter Four. Throughout the partnership with WaterAid my aim has been to 
support action research which engages as closely as possible with those - such as 
communities, local governments and NGOs - who have key roles in learning about what 
works and acting upon this knowledge. In this approach I have tried to follow Carter’s (2013) 
argument that research in water, sanitation and hygiene should focus less on the 
quantitative impacts of improved services (why WASH is important) and more on the 
practical challenges of how to deliver such services “more effectively, cost-effectively, and 
above all, sustainably” (Carter 2013: 4).  
 
The evidence in this thesis is therefore based on data from the period of WaterAid’s work 
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between the introduction of the direct partnership approach with some municipal 
governments in 2008 and the use of the Sustainability Framework to reflect on its approach 
in 2011. However, in 2012 Mali suffered a coup d’état and subsequent political and 
humanitarian crisis, forcing WaterAid to adjust its priorities and approach and preventing 
the completion of all the research planned as part of this project. At the time of writing in 
early 2013, I argue that the evidence presented still provides useful lessons for Mali and 
WaterAid which will become more relevant again in future provided the country is able to 
return to some level of peace and stability. 
 
 
1.4. Research themes and questions 
 
This thesis addresses questions under three key themes. The first theme concerns the 
empirical investigation of how the recurrent costs of rural water services are shared 
between different actors where WaterAid works in Mali and what levels of service are 
received by users. The second theme, building on the first, assesses the implications of 
these cost-sharing arrangements for current approaches to delivering rural water services. 
In particular, this theme concerns the ability of the model of community management 
supported by decentralised local government to deliver sustainable services. The third 
theme is the role played by NGOs such as WaterAid in promoting sustainable approaches to 
financing and service delivery. Underlying all these themes is the conceptual debate 
introduced in Section 1.2 about institutional change and the role of external actors. This 
literature is used to help explain the empirical findings under the first theme and to support 
the analysis in the second and third themes of the potential and limits of current service 
delivery approaches and the role of NGOs.  
 
Cost-sharing and service levels 
 
Firstly, how and why are the recurrent costs of rural water services at community and local 
government levels shared between different actors where WaterAid works in Mali? 
Secondly, what are the levels of services received by users which are associated with these 
cost-sharing arrangements? More specifically: 
• What are the respective contributions of users, local government, WaterAid and other 
NGOs, and central government to the different components of the recurrent costs of 
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rural water services? 
• How and why have these cost-sharing arrangements emerged? Following a political 
economy analysis framework, what are the influences of structural factors, institutions 
and actors at different scales? How have these institutions emerged? 
• What are the levels of functionality of the infrastructures in question - do they work or 
not? 
• What water points do people actually use? Are these improved or unimproved sources? 
 
Approaches to service delivery 
 
What are the implications of the cost-sharing arrangements and service levels observed for 
community-based management as a service delivery model for rural water supply and for 
decentralised local government as a means of supporting community management? More 
specifically: 
• If there are gaps between the finances that community management bodies and local 
governments are intended to mobilise in policy and what they actually achieve in 
practice, what are the prospects for overcoming these gaps?  
• What are the limits to what users are able and willing to pay?  
• Should alternative models of service delivery be considered instead of community 
management? 
 
The role of NGOs 
 
How can NGOs such as WaterAid promote sustainable financing approaches? More 
specifically: 
• What are the opportunities and constraints related to influencing national sector policy?  
• What is the influence of WaterAid and its partners on institutional change at community 
and local government levels? 
• Are the approaches promoted by WaterAid at community and local government levels 
feasible for wider scaling-up? 
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1.5. Thesis structure 
 
In this section I summarise how the remainder of the thesis is structured. Chapters Two, 
Three and Four review the literature to show how the research questions were developed 
and set out the analytical framework and research methodology adopted to answer the 
questions. Chapters Five, Six and Seven present the results, analysis and discussion in line 
with the research themes and framework. Chapter Eight concludes by summarising the 
evidence, highlighting the key findings and messages for theory, policy and practice, and 
proposing directions for future research. I now set out the key contribution of each chapter 
to the overall argument of the thesis.  
 
Chapter Two reviews the literature to explain why the research questions are important and 
to place this study within the context of wider practical and theoretical debates about how 
to deliver sustainable and equitable rural water services in low-income countries. The 
chapter begins with a historical perspective on the challenges of sustainability and financing, 
and then examines in more detail the role of users in relation to the issues of tariffs, cost 
recovery, affordability and willingness to pay. I then widen the scope of the review to 
discuss the role of decentralised local governments in the delivery of rural water supply and 
other public services. The chapter ends by discussing the national enabling environment, the 
role of central governments, and the influence of NGOs and civil society. Throughout the 
literature review I highlight the key questions arising and the importance of analysing 
politics and institutional change.  
 
The argument developed in the literature review - why politics and institutions matter for 
the sustainable financing of rural water services - leads into Chapter Three, which sets out 
an analytical framework for addressing these issues in relation to the research questions. I 
argue for an approach which is both sensitive to the complexities of the processes involved 
and can help develop practical guidance for practitioners and policymakers. The framework 
developed therefore draws both on political economy analysis approaches used by 
international donors and more theoretical academic work on analysing institutional change. 
I conclude this chapter by summarising the key conceptual questions of the research and 
showing how the analytical framework is used to link the results, analysis and discussion 
presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
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Chapter Four presents the research methodology and the partnership with WaterAid. In 
particular, I discuss the challenge of balancing the need for the research to contribute to 
policy and practice as well as academic knowledge, drawing on a framework developed by 
Cleaver and Franks (2008) for considering the tensions experienced by researchers in the 
water sector in responding to these different demands. This section includes a reflection on 
the influence of my own personal and professional motivations on how the research 
developed. In this chapter I also address the limitations of the research and the implications 
for the subsequent results. This includes a discussion of the effect on the research of the 
coup d’état that Mali suffered in 2012, which prevented my return to the country for the 
final periods of fieldwork that had been planned.  
 
In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I examine the evidence from the research in relation to the 
research questions and the analytical framework. Chapter Five focuses on the relevance of 
the national and sector-level context in Mali to policy and practice concerning sector 
financing. I discuss in particular the structural factors of aid dependency and the influence of 
donors, the history of decentralisation reforms and the state of civil society in Mali. I then 
focus on the historical evolution of the rural water supply sector itself and how the national 
policies and institutional framework concerning financing water services have emerged. I 
also discuss key actors in the sector and the particular role of WaterAid in national-level 
advocacy. This chapter begins to address the issue of how the financing policies that exist on 
paper actually work in practice, drawing on the work of Andrews (2013) concerning policy 
reform and institutional change at national and sector levels. This question is developed 
further with evidence from municipal and community levels in Chapters Six and Seven.  
 
Chapter Six is where I address municipal-level issues in detail. Although this thesis focuses 
on the issues of sustainability and the financing of recurrent costs, in this chapter I also 
consider planning and capital investment for new infrastructure. These are key elements of 
the role of municipalities for rural water supply, and help highlight general challenges faced 
by municipal governments in obtaining financing, and the role of WaterAid in helping to 
address these. I then examine the role of decentralised local governments further through 
an analysis of how the recurrent costs of rural water services are shared. This includes a 
comparison of the approach promoted by WaterAid to another model proposed for 
supporting community management, which provides evidence for discussing different 
interpretations of the role of local government in ensuring support to communities. The 
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cost-sharing arrangements observed also act as a starting point for discussing how 
WaterAid’s partners interpret national policies in their local contexts, a theme which is 
explored through further detailed case studies in Chapter Seven. 
 
The focus of Chapter Seven is the role of users themselves in financing rural water services, 
using evidence from community and household levels. I examine the differences between 
policy and practice at these levels, and develop further the analysis of the role of WaterAid’s 
partners in supporting different approaches to local financing. I draw on the idea of 
“institutional bricolage” (Cleaver 2012), set out in the analytical framework, for 
understanding how village-level institutions for financing water services emerge from a 
mixture of different influences, including traditional community practices and more formal 
or modern ideas from NGO and local government staff. I also place the evidence on how 
water services are financed within the context of wider issues of household and community 
expenditure, and present the levels of service received by water users associated with the 
approaches analysed. Finally, I consider evidence from initiatives for promoting ‘self-supply’ 
in Mali, where individual households or small groups of households are encouraged to 
develop or improve their own water supplies as an alternative or complement to 
community-based sources. 
  
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by drawing together the evidence in the analytical 
chapters related to each theme in order to answer the overall research questions, both 
practical and conceptual. I first summarise the quantitative and qualitative findings 
presented concerning how and why costs are shared between different actors. I then move 
from a position of using theory in order to help explain the evidence observed, to using the 
findings of this research as a way of extending existing theories of institutional change, 
highlighting the conceptual contributions that this thesis makes to the academic literature. I 
summarise the contributions of this research to practice and policy debates about how to 
deliver rural water services, and include recommendations for WaterAid and other 
organisations working on this issue in Mali and elsewhere. Finally, I identify possible 
directions for future research that could build on the work undertaken here, including the 
application of the extended political economy analysis framework to the post-coup context 
in Mali.  
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Chapter Two - Literature review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I review the literature to set out the background to the key research themes 
introduced in Chapter One. I highlight how the questions posed under each theme build on 
and contribute to existing knowledge and debates. I first provide further context to the issue 
of sustainability and financing of rural water services by reviewing key historical trends in 
the sector and the need to move towards approaches which include planning and financing 
for all life-cycle costs (Section 2.2). In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, I then discuss in more detail the 
respective roles of users and local governments in service delivery and financing. These 
sections demonstrate the relation between the research themes of cost-sharing 
arrangements and approaches to service delivery. I also review the importance of national 
policy environments and the roles of central governments and donors (Section 2.5). Finally, 
Section 2.6 addresses the role of NGOs and civil society in influencing these other actors in 
moving towards sustainable financing mechanisms and service delivery approaches.  
 
In each section of the literature review I briefly explain the relevance of each topic to rural 
water supply in Mali, and why the country is a useful case study to contribute to these 
debates. However, I undertake the detailed analysis of the Mali context and the work of 
WaterAid as part of the empirical work in the later chapters of the thesis. Throughout this 
literature review, it becomes clear that it is essential to analyse how systems for delivering 
public services might change and to address issues of political economy beyond the water 
sector. However, I place the detailed discussion of how to approach such an analysis in 
Chapter Three, where I set out the overall analytical framework for the research. 
 
 
2.2. The problem of the sustainability of rural water services 
 
Sustainability and community management in historical perspective 
 
The difficulty of achieving sustainable water and sanitation services in developing countries, 
especially rural drinking water supplies, has been noted since at least the 1980s (for 
example Feachem 1980; Carter et al. 1993; Katz and Sara 1997; Davis and Iyer 2002; RWSN 
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2011). In this section I provide a historical perspective to this problem by summarising the 
key shifts in practice and policy in the rural water sector since the 1960s (i.e. since the end 
of colonialism and the move to independence in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa). I 
focus on those changes which have been closely linked to discussions on sustainability. 
 
In the colonial era, prior to the 1960s, most formal water systems developed were designed 
to serve the colonisers rather than the indigenous populations and as a result there were 
few engineered water systems in rural areas (Mader 2012). There were some examples of 
initiatives by colonial administrators to promote and support community self-help to 
improve water access, which bore a resemblance to ideas of community participation that 
also emerged later (Page 2005), but otherwise rural communities were entirely self-reliant 
(Cleaver and Toner 2006). Post-independence, the general emphasis was on the 
development of piped urban infrastructure, implemented by central governments and 
managed by urban municipalities (e.g. in small towns). There were the beginnings of some 
implementation of new infrastructure for rural areas but otherwise rural communities 
typically continued to rely on self-provision (e.g. Thompson et al. 2001). 
 
By the 1970s, there was a growing recognition that the vast majority of the poor, especially 
in rural areas, were unserved by existing approaches and there was a need for something 
different (Black 1998). At a similar time, an ‘appropriate technology’ movement was 
emerging, along with the development of lower-cost infrastructure options proposed for 
rural areas such as standardised handpumps (e.g. the India Mk II). In 1977, the first 
global-scale water conference was held in Mar del Plata, at which international public health 
experts had as their “behind-the-scenes” objective (Black 1998: 4) the aim of getting 
governments and donors (especially the World Bank) to move away from their focus on 
expensive conventional urban water schemes which did not reach the poor. The potential of 
lower-cost approaches using ‘appropriate technology’ and increased community 
involvement therefore seemed to provide an alternative proposal that donors might be 
willing to fund (ibid). The Mar del Plata conference led to the declaration of ‘Water and 
Sanitation for All’ and the 1980s as the UN International Drinking Water Supply and 
Sanitation Decade, with a target of universal access by 1990. Community participation was 
adopted as one of the principles of the Decade (Schouten and Moriarty 2003), despite 
scepticism at the time. For example, Feachem (1980: 15) concluded that community 
participation was a concept that "diverts attention away from the fundamental political and 
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administrative realities that primarily determine the success or failure of rural water and 
sanitation programmes."  
 
During the 1980s, rural water services were still often supply-led in practice, both in terms 
of implementation and management (Black 1998; Nicol et al. 2012). However, centralised 
maintenance schemes for rural water infrastructure such as handpumps were often unable 
to cope, resulting in long downtimes and failed infrastructure (Black 1998; Colin 1999). 
Communities themselves were supposed to play an increasing role in delivering water 
services, partly in hope that this would improve the effectiveness of service delivery, but 
also for wider reasons related both to promoting community empowerment and replacing 
state capacity lost during the structural adjustment programmes of the time (Schouten and 
Moriarty 2003). The rise of community participation and then community-based 
management therefore reflected both pragmatic and ideological reasons (Harvey and Reed 
2007). By the end of the 1980s the idea of community participation was well-established in 
practice, and community-based management was widespread by the mid-1990s (Lockwood 
and Smits 2011).  
 
The early 1990s then saw a series of high-level international conferences reflecting on the 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. Nicol et al. (2012: 5) argue that 
these meetings represented the rise of “a global high politics of water” which became 
increasingly disconnected from realities on the ground. The 1990 New Delhi statement 
(UNDP 1990) tried to emphasise “some for all, not all for some” to acknowledge the failures 
of the Decade, and suggested that demand-responsive approaches, community 
management and user fees should be further promoted to help address the problem of 
sustainability.  
 
However, the New Delhi conference and statement were “eclipsed” (Nicol et al. 2012) by 
the 1992 International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin which placed an 
even stronger emphasis on viewing water as an economic good, in order to promote its 
efficient and sustainable use (WMO 1992). As Black (1998: 55) put it, the logic behind this 
consensus was that “only if people attached to [an engineered water supply] a quantifiable 
value which could be factored into costs would there be any kind of guarantee that an 
engineered service would be sustainable - and sustained.” However, critics argue that this 
shift represented part of the international financial institutions’ wider ‘Washington 
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Consensus’ of promoting the increased role of the market and the reduced role of the state 
in providing public services, rather than an approach based on empirical evidence of what 
worked for delivering services in different contexts (Budds and McGranahan 2003; Goldman 
2007; Nicol et al. 2012). 
 
By the 2000s there was increasing evidence of the limits to what communities were able to 
do by themselves or with limited support, and there were growing arguments in the sector 
for placing greater focus on what long-term support from other actors was needed by 
community management bodies and how this support could be provided. Terms such as 
“post-construction support”, “community management plus”, “direct and indirect support” 
and “external support” became common (Kleemeier 2000; Lockwood 2002; Baumann 2006; 
Lockwood and Smits 2011; WaterAid 2011b). However, there is not yet consensus on what 
support is needed and how important it is (see Whittington et al. 2009; Smits et al. 2011). I 
discuss this further in Section 2.4 in the context of the decentralisation of public services. It 
is also important to note a caveat to the sustainability and community management debate: 
although community management is now the dominant approach it is not the only 
management model for rural water supply (Harvey and Reed 2007; Lockwood and Smits 
2011). I discuss an alternative model of self-supply in Section 2.3. 
  
Whether rural water services are delivered through a form of community management or 
not, it is clear from the history of debates outlined above that attempting to analyse and 
understand the relation between the forms and outcomes of service provision and the 
relevant political economy context is crucial. The links between water, politics and power 
have long been of interest to academics, and have in recent years become more prominent 
in international policy debates (Mollinga 2008); the 2006 Human Development Report 
Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis (UNDP 2006) is perhaps the 
most high-profile example. Given the importance of addressing political economy, I dedicate 
Chapter Three to reviewing how these issues might be analysed and developing my own 
framework for doing so. In the rest of this chapter I review the specific literature relevant to 
the other key aspects of delivering rural water services that I introduced above.  
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Matching life-cycle costs to sources of financing 
 
For rural water services to be sustainable, the full costs of providing the services must be 
matched to sufficient sources of financing, indefinitely. This is not a new or surprising 
statement. However, most countries still lack adequate frameworks for financial planning 
which can cover all the long-run costs of rural water services (Lockwood and Smits 2011; 
WaterAid 2011b). Responsibilities are usually defined for financing capital expenditure for 
new infrastructure and basic operation and maintenance of existing infrastructure. However, 
there are further categories for which the actual costs involved are often poorly understood, 
and the responsibilities for financing these costs are poorly defined.  
 
Different approaches exist to classify these costs (see for example Waughray and Moran 
2003; Harvey and Reed 2004; Baumann 2006; Harvey 2007). This thesis uses the definitions 
for the different cost components of water services proposed by the WASHCost project 
from the IRC Water and Sanitation Centre, referred to as the “life-cycle costs approach” or 
LCCA.4 These categories are summarised in Fonseca et al. (2011) and shown in Table 2.1. 
Fonseca et al. (2011) refer to these as the “life-cycle costs” of services, but in contrast to 
common usage of the term ‘life-cycle’ the phrase is not used in the sense of 
“cradle-to-grave”. Instead, Fonseca et al. use “life-cycle costs” to mean the overall costs 
required to maintain sustainable services rather than just the life-cycle of a particular asset. 
 
                                                 
4
 This approach has become increasingly recognised as a useful framework for the sector to analyse 
costs (DFID 2013). For example, as I discuss in Chapter Three, six other WaterAid country 
programmes started research on the sustainable financing of WASH services during the course of this 
research project, based on the principles of the WASHCost life-cycle costs approach. 
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Table 2.1. Component costs of water services (Fonseca et al. 2011) 
 
Capital expenditure – 
hardware and software 
(CapEx) 
Expenditure on fixed assets such as physical infrastructure (for 
initial construction or system extension), and the accompanying 
‘software’ such as capacity-building. 
Operating and minor 
maintenance 
expenditure 
(OpEx) 
Expenditure on labour and materials needed for routine 
maintenance which is needed to keep systems running, but 
does not include major repairs. 
Capital maintenance 
expenditure 
(CapManEx) 
Renewal, replacement and rehabilitation costs which go beyond 
routine maintenance. 
Expenditure on direct 
support 
(ExpDS) 
Costs of ongoing support to users and local stakeholders, for 
example on local government or district support staff. 
Expenditure on indirect 
support 
(ExpIDS) 
Costs of higher-level support, such as government planning, 
policymaking and regulation. 
Cost of capital (CoC) Costs of servicing capital such as repayment of loans. 
 
 
It is important to note the distinction between financial costs - used here - and wider 
economic costs. Economic costs can be thought of as the wider opportunity and 
environmental costs to society (Cardone and Fonseca 2003). For example, over-extraction of 
groundwater via a borehole has an environmental cost to others even if the immediate 
financial costs of pumping are recovered (Waughray and Moran 2003). However, there may 
also be wider economic savings from a water and sanitation project, for example due to 
improved health and lower spending required on healthcare services (Cardone and Fonseca 
2003). Although work has been done on economic cost-benefit analysis in the water and 
sanitation sector, in this research I focus on financial costs only.  
 
The possible sources of financing for the life-cycle costs of rural water services are 
commonly referred to as “the 3Ts”: tariffs, taxes and transfers (OECD 2009, building on 
Winpenny 2003). ‘Tariffs’ is used in this sense to describe all contributions from the users 
themselves, including informal payments which might not usually be thought of in the strict 
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sense of tariffs. ‘Taxes’ refers to financing from domestic taxation in the country concerned, 
and highlights the importance of understanding the roles of local and central government. 
‘Transfers’ represents financing from external donors, such as bilateral or multilateral 
organisations or NGOs.  
 
In the subsequent sections of this chapter I examine the literature on the role of different 
actors and sources of financing. As I explained in Chapter One, this research focuses on the 
recurrent costs of rural water services that occur at community and local government levels, 
rather than the costs of indirect support and cost of capital at national levels. The WASHCost 
project itself found that:  
 
Little data was available on indirect support costs [i.e.] the costs at national and 
regional level of developing a legal and policy framework for rural water services 
delivery and of relevant staff and training at those levels. The cost of capital remains 
an important concept as countries move towards financing water services themselves, 
but [in the research areas] there were virtually no loans to finance the services 
sampled, which were financed from government allocations or transfers from donors 
or by NGOs, and to some extent by user fees. (Burr et al. 2012: 5-6) 
 
It is necessary to consider costs in relation to the actual level of service received by water 
users. The WASHCost project proposes a set of service levels and indicators for water supply 
to permit comparison of the costs involved in delivering a certain level of service in different 
contexts and through different approaches (Moriarty et al. 2010). The service levels are 
based on criteria of quantity, quality, accessibility (time taken to obtain water) and status of 
the source (improved or unimproved). For each criterion, the framework is designed to be 
adapted to national norms in the relevant country. For the purposes of international 
comparison, a “basic” level of service is defined as: 
 
…when all the following criteria have been realised by the majority of the population 
in the service area: People access a minimum of 20 litres per person per day, of 
acceptable quality (judged by user perception and country standards) from an 
improved source which functions at least 350 days a year without a serious 
breakdown, spending no more than 30 minutes per person per day (including waiting 
time). (WASHCost 2012: 1) 
34 
 
This definition is roughly equivalent to the national standards for access to drinking water in 
Mali. These norms are based on 20 litres per person per day of acceptable quality within 
500m (DNH 2007), although reliability is not defined.  
 
 
2.3. Users and their role in financing and service provision 
 
Tariffs and cost recovery 
 
As explained in Section 2.2, the term ‘tariffs’ in the 3Ts framework refers to all user 
contributions, whether these are through a formal system of payment (for example, per 
volume of water consumed or on a monthly or annual basis per user or per household) or 
more informal approaches (such as users collecting money for a repair in a more ad hoc 
fashion after a breakdown has already occurred). The term ‘cost recovery’ has sometimes 
been used to refer in general to the costs of water supply which are financed through tariffs 
(McDonald and Pape 2002). However, this definition is unhelpful if it is used just to refer to 
what is paid by users, without considering what costs this contribution actually covers and 
how it fits with other sources of financing (Cardone and Fonseca 2003). Therefore a 
distinction should be made between “full cost recovery” and “sustainable cost recovery” 
(Winpenny 2003; OECD 2009).  
 
“Full cost recovery” occurs when all costs of water services are financed through user tariffs, 
i.e. the sector’s financing is ringfenced and does not receive subsidy from other sources of 
revenue such as taxes (McDonald and Pape 2002; Bayliss 2003). Full cost recovery does not 
preclude cross-subsidies between users within the sector itself (Cardone and Fonseca 2003; 
Waughray and Moran 2003). These typically take the form of increasing block tariffs, where 
the price per unit of water increases with increasing consumption levels. The price of the 
lowest ‘block’ will be below the marginal cost of supply (or even free – known as a ‘lifeline’ 
tariff) so that higher consumers effectively subsidise lower consumers. In theory, those who 
can afford to pay more do so, and are also discouraged from wasting water, while the poor 
are still able to access basic amounts of water at an affordable price. This approach is more 
common in urban areas where formal tariff systems with metering and billing are in place. 
However, similar ideas are sometimes adopted even for rural water points, for example by 
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setting different fees for different types of use, such as lower fees for water for drinking and 
higher fees for higher-consumption uses such as watering animals (Jones 2010). 
 
Many of the controversies around the debate regarding water as an economic good centre 
on the issue of cost recovery from users, and the extent to which this clashes with the 
human right to water. Some have argued that the international policy debates since the 
2000s have essentially been about people arguing from each of these two paradigms 
(Mader 2012). Those arguing from a rights perspective highlight the inequity in stating that 
“full cost recovery from users is the ideal long-term aim”, as the so-called Camdessus report 
- the Report of the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure (Winpenny 2003) - put it.  
 
However, even those who have argued that full cost recovery is the ideal long-term aim 
recognise that there are many cases where this is not currently feasible or desirable 
(Winpenny 2003: 19). Instead, “sustainable cost recovery” is seen as more realistic “as a way 
of giving the water sector the financial assurance it needs, while acknowledging affordability 
problems and the case for subsidies in certain cases” (ibid). This means that a mix of the 3Ts 
is used to finance capital and recurrent costs (OECD 2009). In practice, the most common 
scenario is that users are responsible - whether in policy or by default - for the recurrent 
costs of operating and minor maintenance expenditure and capital maintenance 
expenditure (WaterAid 2011b). However, it is not always clear whether users should or can 
pay for capital maintenance expenditure as well as operating and minor maintenance 
expenditure, and where the distinction lies between these two types of costs (Harvey and 
Reed 2004). Therefore despite a widespread acknowledgement that “sustainable cost 
recovery” through a mix of the 3Ts is required in principle, it is often not agreed exactly 
what parts of these costs should be covered by user tariffs in practice.5 
 
For example UN-Water’s 2010 GLAAS (Global Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking Water) 
report suggests that over the life-cycle of rural water services, recurrent costs are typically 
three times greater than the capital investment costs. WaterAid’s recent international policy 
report on targeting investments in the WASH sector (WaterAid 2011a: 47) emphasises the 
                                                 
5
 An exception is where household self-supply (an alternative service delivery model explained later 
in this section) is adopted instead of community-based water services. In the self-supply approach, 
the owner of the supply is usually responsible for all capital expenditure and any interest on loans 
(unless there is external subsidy to hardware or promotional activities) and all the recurrent costs of 
operating and minor maintenance expenditure and capital maintenance expenditure (Smits and 
Sutton 2012). 
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implication of this in terms of typical cost-sharing practices: “the relatively small capital cost 
of providing an improved service is generally considered to be unaffordable by rural 
communities” and is therefore heavily subsidised by governments and donors, yet the even 
greater burden of recurrent costs is - in most policy at least - placed primarily on the users. 
In “the 3Ts” framework of taxes, transfers and tariffs, it means that taxes and transfers are 
used to pay about a quarter of the life-cycle costs, while tariffs are meant to cover the 
remaining three-quarters. This observation emphasises the importance of considering the 
affordability of what users are expected to pay, which I turn to in the next section.  
 
 
Affordability and willingness to pay 
 
In the previous section I discussed what costs the literature suggests that user tariffs are 
intended to cover. I now examine the issue from the users’ point of view, by setting out the 
challenges in analysing the affordability of water services and users’ willingness to pay.6 
Affordability is defined as the “ability of particular consumer groups to pay for a minimum 
level of a certain service”, typically defined relative to household income or expenditure 
(Fankhauser and Tepic 2007). A rule of thumb for the “affordability level” of water and 
sanitation has commonly been considered 3-5% of annual household expenditure (McPhail 
1993; Waughray and Mohan 2003; Biesinger and Richter 2007) i.e. if a household must 
spend more than 3-5% of its total annual outgoings on water and sanitation, this 
expenditure is considered to be unaffordable. However, this benchmark is recognised as 
arbitrary and often misleading (Reddy 1999; Calkins et al. 2002; Waughray and Mohan 2003). 
Yet the “5% level” persists in recent studies (e.g. Fankhauser and Tepic 2007; Nyarko et al. 
2007) and donor guidelines (Gunatilake et al. 2007; AfDB 2010).  
 
Instead, ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) is used as a concept to investigate how much households 
will pay for water and sanitation services. WTP methods can be based on either stated 
preferences (expressed through surveys, focus groups or participatory research) or revealed 
preferences (based on observed behaviours). The methods chosen tend to differ according 
to whether they are being used for academic purposes or as part of programme 
                                                 
6
 The literature dealing with these topics is focused mainly on user payments towards the recurrent 
costs of water services (sometimes considering willingness to pay the capital investment required for 
a household connection to a piped network), but later in this section I also consider the issue of users 
paying for some or all capital expenditure where self-supply is used as a service delivery model. 
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implementation. Null et al. (2012), specifically considering improvements in water quality, 
identify three key methods used in the academic literature to infer willingness to pay: 
contingent valuation (a stated preference method), discrete choice models and 
experimental methods (both based on revealed preferences). Other approaches based on 
stated preferences such as community meetings and focus groups employing participatory 
methods tend to be seen as insufficiently rigorous by academics but are more frequently 
used in project implementation (Davis and Whittington 1998; Parry-Jones 1999).  
 
However, contingent valuation and stated preference methods are difficult to use in 
practice because of the problems for the questioner in describing a plausible scenario for 
the interviewee to respond to, and for the respondent in predicting their own future 
response (Calkins et al. 2002; Whittington 2002; Gunatilake et al. 2007). Discrete choice 
methods, usually involving the analysis of cross-sectional survey data on households’ 
decisions about water access improvements, have difficulty establishing causation because 
of problems of unobserved variables and bias (Null et al. 2012). Therefore an option for 
investigating willingness to pay, without aiming to produce exact quantitative figures, is to 
try to learn something from observed expenditure and additional qualitative research for 
insights into why users make the choices that they do. This is the approach I adopt in this 
thesis, which I describe more fully in the methodology in Chapter Three.  
 
 
Household- and community-level relations and gender roles 
 
In the previous section I showed that the literature on affordability and willingness to pay 
focuses on the household as the unit of analysis. However, wider literature suggests that 
understanding the role of users in paying for water services requires considering two further 
levels of analysis: relations between different members within the household itself, and 
community dynamics at a level above the household. Extending the analysis to these levels 
draws particular attention to the issue of gender.  
 
Regmi (2005) argues that power over household finances, especially concerning the relative 
roles of men and women, is sometimes given insufficient consideration in water supply 
projects. In much of West Africa, control over resources in the household is determined by 
patriarchal hierarchies, and women tend to have less access to resources (Adams et al. 
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1998). In such cases, women may be at a disadvantage in their ability to access water if the 
tariff systems in place require payment on an individual basis (Harris 2009).7 In Mali, men 
tend to make decisions on household expenditure (Simard and de Koninck 2001) but women 
(particularly in polygamous marriages) may have some finances or other resources of their 
own to control (Castle 2004; Harris 2006). In my previous research in three case study 
villages in one municipality in Mali, paying for water (either directly or via contributing to 
repair costs after a breakdown) was viewed as a male responsibility, and fees were collected 
per married man (Jones 2011a). However, it cannot be assumed that the same applies to 
other areas of the country (Gleitsmann et al. 2007). This literature and previous research 
raises the question of which household members contribute to the costs of rural water 
services in Mali and how much they contribute.  
 
Willingness to pay can also be considered in a collective or community sense, rather than at 
the level of individuals or households. As previously explained, ‘tariffs’ in the 3Ts framework 
refers to all user contributions, not just tariffs in the typical sense of a levy per volume, per 
person or per household. Communities may also use collective methods for raising money 
for their contributions to the recurrent costs of rural water services, such as the profit from 
collective labour or community harvests (Agbenorhevi 2005; Jones 2011a). This 
demonstrates the importance of understanding existing collective community practices, 
especially community-level financial organisations: groups of people whose members 
manage some of their money together, for collective expenditure and other purposes.8  
 
A variety of different types of local financial organisation exist in West Africa and Mali. 
These include traditional collective-work or age-group associations, known as tons (Jonckers 
1994); traditional associations for saving and sometimes giving credit, known as tontines9 
(CARE 2011); and more formal savings or microfinance groups which are supported by or 
linked to external organisations such as NGOs, credit unions and banks (Chao-Beroff 1999; 
Ouattara et al. 1999; Seibel 2006). NGOs have been particularly active in promoting savings 
                                                 
7
 However, O’Reilly (2006) suggests that external actors such as NGOs sometimes use ideas about 
gender roles specifically to encourage payment for water. She uses a case study from India to argue 
that an NGO aimed to promote a “modern” image of women and improved water supply, trying to 
create a logical link between women perceiving themselves as modern and increasing their 
willingness to pay for access to a more modern water supply. 
8
 Other purposes for members can include providing savings mechanisms, using pooled deposits to 
give loans or grants and accessing credit from external sources. 
9
 The Malian version of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations or Accumulated Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs/ASCAs). 
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groups in Mali: as of 2011, five international NGOs10 had reached almost half a million 
members (CARE 2011). INGOs usually promote groups for women because women are least 
likely to have access to more formal means of saving and borrowing. Women are also 
considered to be more reliable at repayment than men and to spend the income they 
control on things that are more likely to benefit family welfare (Duffy-Tumasz 2009). In 
addition to their financial objectives, these different organisations may also promote 
increased collective action by their members, for example investing in community 
development projects such as school construction or lobbying other actors such as NGOs to 
undertake larger projects beyond the means of the community (Ouattara et al. 1999; Allen 
and Panetta 2010; Edwards 2010; Mitlin et al. 2011). 
 
The existence and activities of such organisations therefore suggest issues to address in 
relation to the role of communities in managing and financing rural water services. Given 
the possible role of financial organisations in supporting wider collective action by their 
members (especially in contributing to the provision of public goods or services), it is 
important to consider whether there are links between such financial organisations and 
community water supply management bodies. If there are no such links, then it may still be 
worth trying to understand if there are any lessons which could be learnt from how these 
financial organisations help individuals and communities manage their money, the 
relevance of gender relations on how such groups function, and the role of NGOs in 
supporting such organisations. 
 
 
Alternative service delivery models: self-supply and private operators 
 
Although this thesis focuses on community-based management of rural water services, since 
this model remains the most common in Mali and other low-income countries, two other 
approaches to service delivery should be considered.  
 
The first of these is ‘self-supply’, a concept which has been proposed as a possible 
complement or alternative to community-managed sources in rural areas. Self-supply refers 
to initiatives undertaken by individuals, households and communities to improve their own 
water provision (Carter 2006; Sutton 2009a). The term is also used to refer to approaches by 
                                                 
10
 CARE, Oxfam, Freedom from Hunger, Plan International and Catholic Relief Services. 
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external organisations to promote and support these initiatives (WaterAid 2011b). Although 
this overall definition of self-supply includes community-led initiatives, the literature on 
self-supply commonly focuses on investments by households or small groups of households 
(Harvey 2011; Kumamaru 2011; Butterworth 2012; Smits and Sutton 2012). However, 
household-owned supplies are often shared with others nearby (Sutton 2009a). Examples of 
technology options for which self-supply might be considered include rainwater harvesting, 
the construction and upgrading of shallow wells, and household water treatment (Smits and 
Sutton 2012).  
 
Arguments in favour of self-supply suggest that the approach can help extend coverage to 
those unserved and supplement water services from community-based supplies (by 
improving the overall service received in terms of quantity, reliability, ease of access or 
quality) (Carter 2006; Sutton 2009a; Smits and Sutton 2012). Therefore when the literature 
refers to self-supply as a ‘complementary’ approach to community management and other 
service delivery models, this can refer both to the use of different models within a country’s 
water sector as a whole and to the complementary nature of different models within the 
same community. Self-supply may be particularly relevant to small communities, where 
collective funds may not be sufficient for maintaining an improved community supply; to 
geographically or socially divided communities, where community management and pooling 
funds may be difficult; and to poor households within other communities, if long-term tariffs 
for community sources are greater than the costs of self-supply (Sutton 2009a). In some 
cases, self-supply may in fact become a replacement for previous attempts to deliver 
services through community-based supplies (Smits and Sutton 2012).  
 
Sutton (2009a: 3) proposes four ‘building blocks’ for an enabling environment in which 
self-supply might be able to succeed: technology options and advice, financial mechanisms 
to enable household investment, private sector capacity and enabling national policies. 
However, critics note that one of the incentives for national governments to promote 
self-supply may be as a way of increasing water coverage figures at low cost to the 
government but without paying sufficient attention to possible risks to users such as poor 
water quality (Arsano et al. 2010). Other possible concerns about self-supply include 
addressing the needs of the poorest (who may not have access to the capital required), 
long-term maintenance and environmental sustainability (Butterworth 2012; Smits and 
Sutton 2012).  
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Self-supply has apparently not been strongly considered in relation to the overall challenge 
of sustainable services in WaterAid’s country programmes to date; little mention was made 
of the approach during the process of collecting experiences to contribute towards 
WaterAid’s Sustainability Framework (WaterAid 2011b). However, there have been some 
initiatives to promote self-supply in Mali by WaterAid and others, since the country is seen 
as having high potential for the use of self-supply for upgrading existing hand-dug 
household wells, which are already used by over 5 million people (60% of the rural 
population) (Maiga et al. 2006). Therefore this research considers self-supply as a possible 
alternative or complement to community water supplies. I explain in Chapter Four how the 
research methodology explored the approaches to self-supply in Mali and present the 
results and analysis relating to self-supply in Chapter Seven.  
 
The second possible alternative service delivery model is private sector management. 
Lockwood and Smits (2011) argue that although there has been a gradual trend to 
professionalise community management, for example in water committees being registered 
as legal entities and sub-contracting some functions (such as tariff collection) to paid 
workers, a distinction should still be made between these forms of sub-contracting and full 
delegation from the asset owner to a private operator. However, formal private sector 
management is relatively recent in rural areas in low-income countries and is still much less 
common than voluntary or partially-professionalised community management (Harvey and 
Reed 2007). Where private sector operators are used, this tends to be in larger communities 
with more complicated small piped systems rather than smaller communities using point 
sources such as boreholes fitted with handpumps (Lockwood and Smits 2011). Although the 
option of delegation to the private sector exists in Mali, it is still rare and there are as yet 
few examples in WaterAid’s areas of intervention. 
 
 
2.4. Decentralised local governments and their role as service authorities 
 
As I explained at the start of this chapter, in recent years there has been increasing 
attention in the rural water sector to the support required by community management from 
higher levels, whether this is called "post-construction support", "community management 
plus", "direct and indirect support", or "external support" (Kleemeier 2000; Lockwood 2002; 
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Baumann 2006; Lockwood and Smits 2011; WaterAid 2011b). This means that support is 
needed from what Schouten and Moriarty (2003: 161) call “the vast fuzzy region that lies 
between national and local.” The widespread decentralisation reforms in developing 
countries mean that municipal or district governments should usually be the 
intermediate-level bodies who have overall responsibility for providing this support, with 
additional involvement from central government line ministries, NGOs and civil society, and 
the private sector (Schouten and Moriarty 2003; WaterAid 2011b). This local government 
responsibility for support can be considered part of a ‘service authority’ role for rural water 
supply, where the functions of a service authority include planning and coordination for 
implementing new services, as well as the ongoing functions of regulation, oversight and 
support to community management bodies and other service providers (Lockwood and 
Smits 2011).  
 
Research which is concerned with how to provide and finance the support needed by 
community management of rural water supply requires engaging with wider debates about 
decentralisation and the role of local governments in public services delivery. Therefore in 
this section I explore the typical rationale and claims in the literature for linking 
decentralisation to the delivery of public services. I illustrate the key debates about 
decentralisation with particular reference to the history of decentralisation in West Africa. I 
then consider the critiques of decentralisation and the sceptical view of the ability of local 
governments to ensure the delivery of public services for their citizens. I conclude by 
arguing that the issue of rural water supply in Mali can provide a relevant example to inform 
the debate about both the role of local governments as service authorities for drinking 
water and for public services more widely.  
 
 
Decentralisation and public services delivery 
 
Decentralisation can be understood in its broad sense as the transfer of political and 
administrative powers from higher levels to lower levels of government (Agrawal and Ribot 
1999; World Bank 2008), although as I discuss in the next section there are important 
differences between types and elements of decentralisation within this overall idea. The 
improvement of public services has been one of the common ‘promises’ of decentralisation 
(Robinson 2007), based on the idea that decentralisation can improve the efficiency and 
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equity of government action (Johnson 2001; Smoke 2003; Crook 2003; Boone 2003; Conyers 
2007). The logic underlying this idea is that decentralisation should bring the government 
closer to the people, both spatially and institutionally, making the government more 
knowledgeable and responsive regarding the people’s needs (Crook 2003). This greater 
responsiveness should in theory lead to improved public services and poverty reduction 
(Conyers 2007; Robinson 2007). 
 
However, Robinson (2007) argues that the conditions under which service delivery can be 
improved in a context of decentralisation are poorly understood. Conyers (2007) highlights 
that there is a particular lack of evidence in sub-Saharan Africa for any positive impact of 
decentralisation on service delivery, suggesting that the typical lack of power and finances 
available to local governments in practice limits the possibilities for serving the poor more 
effectively. Robinson (2007: 6) concludes that “there are fewer areas of development policy 
that are more in need of research than strengthening the evidence base to measure the 
impact of policies designed to deliver services to poor people through elected local 
governments.” This observation demonstrates the relevance of understanding the role of 
local governments in Mali in the delivery of rural water services as one example of public 
services in the context of decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
In addition to observing in practice the links between decentralisation and public services, it 
is also important to try to understand how and why the observed forms of decentralisation 
have developed. Ribot (2007) argues that the goals typically assigned to decentralisation are 
broad enough that decentralisation can appear to fit under a variety of approaches 
promoted in international development and appeal to many different groups. For example, 
the ideas of decentralisation may attract supporters of neoliberal economics seeking to 
reduce the power of central government, advocates of pluralist politics who want more 
open forms of governance, and autocratic leaders trying to acquire local support without full 
national democracy (Crook and Manor 1998). This argument highlights the need to pay 
attention to the actual form and history of decentralisation in each context of interest. 
Therefore in the next section I discuss different definitions of decentralisation and 
summarise the history of decentralisation in West Africa.  
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Types of decentralisation and its history in West Africa 
 
A distinction must be made between two key types of decentralisation. The first type, 
deconcentration, occurs when administrative responsibility is transferred to local levels, but 
these local bodies remain politically accountable to, and financially reliant on, central 
government (Johnson 2001). Deconcentration therefore usually refers to the 
implementation of local field offices of central government ministries and is sometimes 
referred to as ‘administrative decentralisation’ (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Pinto 2004). The 
second type of decentralisation is devolution, where local levels of government are 
politically accountable to their population rather than central government, and usually have 
some fiscal authority, in addition to their administrative responsibilities (Johnson 2001). 
Devolution is therefore also sometimes called ‘political decentralisation’ (Agrawal and Ribot 
1999).   
 
Aspects of each of these two types are evident in the history of sub-Saharan Africa. The 
following simplified series of different stages gives a broad overview of how the different 
types of decentralisation have evolved over time in sub-Saharan Africa (Conyers 2007): 
 
1) Pre-colonial: power was decentralised but personalised through chiefdoms. 
2) Colonial: power was centralised through colonial authorities but there were some 
elements of decentralisation through systems of indirect rule. 
3) Transition: some level of decentralisation was implemented by outgoing colonial 
powers as a way of introducing Western-style concepts of democracy. 
4) Post-independence 1: centralisation occurred, to enable development planning by 
central governments. 
5) Post-independence 2: deconcentration was implemented through local committees 
of central government ministries, with the aim of improving service delivery. Crook 
and Manor (1998) argue that this first post-independence wave of decentralisation 
failed because of interference and a lack of trust from central government, combined 
with a lack of capacity and resources at local levels.  
6) Post-independence 3: devolution (or ‘democratic decentralisation’) emerged, 
ostensibly with the goal of helping promote democratisation discussed below. 
 
The situation in West Africa has been broadly similar to the trends outlined above: 
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post-independence, deconcentration was the dominant policy until the 1990s, and its 
influences continue through local units of government ministries even in the more recent 
era of devolution (Ouedraogo 2003; Pinto 2004). As suggested in the post-independence 
description of decentralisation as ‘democratic decentralisation’, modern decentralisation 
reforms have usually been linked to ideas of democratisation, proposing to achieve 
“democratic local governance” as a combination of devolutionary decentralisation and local 
democracy (Blair 2000: 2). Democratic decentralisation is therefore defined as “meaningful 
authority devolved to local units of governance that are accessible and accountable to the 
local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and liberty” (ibid). A more sceptical viewpoint 
suggests that most central states in sub-Saharan Africa, including West Africa, have 
historically wanted decentralisation to either create or consolidate dependent local elites 
(Boone 2003; Crook 2003). Much of the literature on decentralisation in West Africa and 
Mali therefore seeks to assess to what extent decentralisation reforms have been successful 
in achieving democratic decentralisation (Cold-Ravnkilde 2012).  
 
However, as I have explained in the previous section, this thesis aims to use the example of 
rural water services as a means of contributing to the debate about decentralisation and 
service delivery, rather than the democratising potential of decentralisation.11 The relevance 
of the history of decentralisation to this research is in understanding that current 
approaches to the delivery of rural water services typically involve aspects of both 
devolution and deconcentration, and are influenced by the politics and aims of central 
government (Boone 2003; Ribot 2007). I analyse the processes of decentralisation in Mali 
and their effect on approaches to service delivery and cost-sharing in the rural water sector 
in Chapter Five.  
 
 
Decentralisation and support to rural water service providers 
 
The overview of the history and types of decentralisation in the previous section provides a 
background for understanding the different arrangements that exist in the rural water 
sector for providing ongoing support to service providers, especially to community 
management bodies. As I explained, decentralised local governments typically have overall 
responsibility for ensuring this support as part of a service authority role (Lockwood and 
                                                 
11
 For a case study more focused on the links between decentralisation, water services and the 
promotion of participation and citizenship, see Jones (2011a). 
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Smits 2011), but other actors may also play a part, such as deconcentrated parts of central 
government ministries. In this section I briefly review the types of support provided before 
considering the arrangements in place for providing the support. 
 
The key areas of support typically required by community management or other local 
service providers are technical advice; support to management processes, including both 
administrative issues (such as advice on accounting) and wider organisational challenges 
(such as mediation for conflict resolution); support to longer-term monitoring of services; 
contributions to costs, especially of capital maintenance (or help in seeking other financing 
sources for these costs); support to local supply chains; and support in the case of external 
shocks such as environmental change or conflict (Lockwood and Smits 2011; Smits et al. 
2011; WaterAid 2011b). The extent to which these forms of support are actually provided in 
any given context is a key question for research.  
 
Smits et al. (2011) also identify the most common arrangements in place for providing this 
support (even if not all the elements of support are actually provided). These arrangements 
involve different aspects of the types of decentralisation discussed in the previous section 
and are summarised in Table 2.2.  
 
47 
Table 2.2. Arrangements for providing direct support to community management and other 
service providers (adapted from Smits et al. 2011) 
 
Arrangement (Smits et al. 2011) Relevant forms of decentralisation 
Local government provides direct support Devolution 
Local government provides support by 
sub-contracting a specialised agency or 
individuals 
Devolution 
Central government provides support, either 
through its deconcentrated offices or by 
sub-contracting a specialised agency 
Deconcentration 
Associations of community-based service 
providers collectively provide support to each 
other (sometimes by sub-contracting a 
specialised agency or individuals) 
Suggests that decentralisation to 
community levels is stronger than 
devolution to local governments 
NGOs provide support, usually in an ad hoc 
manner but sometimes through more 
structured programmes 
Suggests that there is a lack of 
decentralised capacity in either devolved 
or deconcentrated forms 
 
 
This overview shows the importance of understanding what support is actually provided to 
community management and how this is arranged. In Chapter Six I present in detail 
different types of support and arrangements where WaterAid works in Mali. This review of 
the literature also raises the question of the role of local government in financing the 
recurrent costs of rural water services, especially for direct support. I turn to this question in 
the next section. The discussion of how local governments can ensure support to service 
providers also shows the need for local governments themselves to receive support and 
capacity-building. I consider this question in Section 2.5 when discussing the role of the 
national enabling environment in supporting sustainable approaches to service delivery. 
 
 
Fiscal aspects and critiques of decentralisation 
 
The fiscal aspects of decentralisation are crucial when considering the delivery of public 
services and the role of local governments in rural water supply, especially regarding how to 
finance the costs of the possible forms of direct support to service providers discussed in the 
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previous section. I briefly referred to fiscal issues previously in relation to the different types 
of decentralisation and consider this aspect of decentralisation in more detail in this section.  
 
In principle, fiscal decentralisation provides ways for local governments to increase the 
resources available to them through taxes and tariffs (in the 3Ts framework) for providing 
public services (Conyers 2007). These opportunities may include new sources of local tax 
revenue, improving the collection of existing taxes and user fees, or reducing the costs of 
service delivery and so creating surpluses. However, Conyers concludes that the evidence 
available suggests that it is difficult for local governments to raise local taxes or tariffs 
because their citizens are poor and central government often wants to retain fiscal control 
over both the levels set and how they are collected. Furthermore, the success of 
administrative efficiencies is mixed and total overhead costs may actually increase with 
decentralisation because of having government employees at multiple administrative levels 
(Conyers 2007). This challenge of a lack of resources for local governments, even when fiscal 
decentralisation has in theory provided them with ways of increasing their resources, is a 
widespread problem. As Smoke (2003) puts it, local governments in developing countries 
have an “almost universal” lack of revenue in comparison to the expenditure required to 
fulfil their responsibilities.  
 
These observations are one argument used by those critics who suggest that 
decentralisation is an aspect of the neoliberal ideology of “hollowing out” the state 
(Schuurman 1997). In the case of decentralisation, Craig and Porter (2006: 25) conclude that 
neoliberal ideas have resulted in “quasi-territorialisations” at local levels. According to Craig 
and Porter, these are “vague and ineffectual operationalisations” of territories intended to 
help address poverty such as ‘communities’, ‘areas’, ‘communes’ and ‘districts’. However, 
due to their lack of resources and authority in relation to the responsibilities assigned to 
them, these forms of decentralisation have not enabled any substantive practical 
approaches to service delivery and poverty reduction. Craig and Porter (2006) make a 
distinction between these “quasi-territorial” forms of decentralisation and “territorial” ways 
of addressing poverty, which involve some nationally-driven redistribution or support to 
areas which lack resources. This “territorial” approach contrasts, for example, with the 
neoliberal trend identified in South Africa by McDonald and Pape (2002) for municipalities 
to compete against each other for resources from private investors and tourists, with the 
redistributive role of the central state minimised.  
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These arguments are a reminder of more sceptical views on the ability of decentralised local 
governments to ensure the delivery of public services such as rural water supply. WaterAid’s 
own research (WaterAid 2007; Mehta and Mehta 2008) has highlighted the gap between 
local governments’ responsibility and resources for delivering water and sanitation services 
(although this research focused predominantly on capital investment rather than recurrent 
costs). These broad observations demonstrate the importance of two key topics to this 
thesis. The first is the role of central governments and NGOs, in terms of financing (for 
example, through national taxes which are transferred to local government or transfers of 
aid to local government), other forms of capacity support to local government, and their 
influence on national policies concerning service delivery approaches. In relation to Craig 
and Porter’s idea of “quasi-territorialisation”, the question is raised of whether aid and the 
work of NGOs can contribute to assisting increased autonomy of local government areas 
(what they call “re-territorialisation”). I review the literature on national policy 
environments and the role of NGOs in the Sections 2.5 and 2.6. The second key issue raised 
by the challenge of the lack of resources for local government is the need to examine in 
detail the actual forms of service delivery in place at local levels and how these are really 
financed, given the likelihood that these do not match the official approaches intended if 
resources are insufficient to do so. 
 
 
2.5. The enabling environment and the role of central governments and donors 
 
The ‘enabling environment’ - national-level policies, institutional frameworks and 
implementation mechanisms - is recognised as crucial for the WASH sector, including its 
influence on the financing and sustainability of rural water services (Lockwood and Smits 
2011; WaterAid 2011). Recent efforts to assess the state of the enabling environment and 
the ability of the sector to support sustainable service delivery include the Country Status 
Overviews of 32 countries in sub-Saharan Africa commissioned by the African Ministers’ 
Council on Water (summarised in WSP 2011). As explained in Section 2.2, this thesis focuses 
on the recurrent costs of rural water supply that occur at community and local government 
levels, rather than the national-level recurrent costs of indirect support and cost of capital 
(in the framework of the WASHCost life-cycle costs approach). However, in this section I 
consider two national-level issues relevant to the cost-sharing arrangements and service 
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delivery approaches in place at local levels.  
 
The first issue is aid effectiveness and the relations between national governments and 
international donors. Given the significance of aid financing to the rural water sector in 
many developing countries (UN-Water 2012), aid effectiveness issues are important in 
understanding the emergence of national-level policies and practices. Secondly, I discuss the 
role of central governments in providing indirect support in the rural water sector, which 
includes capacity support to local governments and other forms of sector learning 
(Lockwood and Smits 2011).  
 
I use the term aid effectiveness here as set out in the five principles of the Paris Declaration 
(OECD 2008): ownership of development policies by partner countries; alignment by donors 
with partner countries’ agenda and systems; harmonisation between donors; managing for 
results; and mutual accountability. In practice, for example, this means that key country 
strategies such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) should be driven by recipient 
countries, not donors, and that donors should align their support behind such plans and use 
government implementation systems to do so. At sector level, this may mean the adoption 
of instruments such as Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) to help harmonisation and 
coordination.  
 
De la Harpe (2012) argues that aid effectiveness approaches have a key role to play in 
helping enabling environments for water services to develop, and that, conversely, a lack of 
aid effectiveness leads to a vicious cycle of repeated project-based donor activities which lie 
outside country policies and systems and never support the development of sustainable 
service delivery approaches. However, Hyden (2008a) and Welle et al. (2009) caution that 
national politics and the power relations between governments and donors are more 
important in making progress on aid effectiveness than the actual specific mechanisms 
implemented for the purpose of improving aid effectiveness in any one sector, such as 
SWAps. Welle et al. (2009) therefore argue for using broader political economy analysis 
approaches in analyse water sector issues and the influence of government-donor relations. 
I discuss the development of one such approach and its application to this research in 
Chapter Three, where I consider in more detail how to analyse the relations between 
different actors and the emergence of particular cost-sharing arrangements. 
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The second issue is how actors at national level can provide capacity support to local 
governments. As introduced in Section 2.4, if local governments are to be able to act as 
service authorities and ensure support to community management and other service 
providers, they themselves require support and assistance from higher levels, for example 
from central government water ministries and their regional offices, the private sector, 
training or academic institutions, and NGOs (Lockwood and Smits 2011). This support can 
include training for local government staff, additional specialised technical assistance, 
administrative support such as help with financial planning and support to monitoring which 
might feed into national information systems. However, as Lockwood and Smits observe, 
there is usually a lack of capacity at all levels in a typical developing country’s rural water 
sectors, not just at the local level, and similar challenges affect most public services. 
WaterAid’s work with local governments in Mali, which is focused on developing 
approaches of direct support from municipalities to communities, is itself also a form of 
capacity support to municipalities. I analyse the capacity support elements of this approach 
in Chapters Five and Six.  
 
 
2.6. The role of NGOs and civil society 
 
Before discussing the roles of NGOs and civil society, it is necessary to consider the 
understandings and definitions of civil society used in development practice, especially by 
international aid donors, and in the broader academic literature. Mohan (2002) argues that 
the dominant development discourse on civil society has emerged from the ‘associational’ 
school of thought. This viewpoint sees civil society predominantly as associational life and 
political participation which keep the state in check (Hyden 1997). According to Mohan 
(building on Hyden 1997), this viewpoint makes three key claims. The first is that civil society 
is distinct from and conflicts with the state. The second claim is that civil society is key to 
promoting democratisation, in a procedural sense of democracy where civil society helps 
channel public opinion into policymaking. However, Mohan also notes that the influence of 
what he calls the ‘regime school’ of civil society - which is more sceptical than the 
‘associational’ school regarding the role of civil society in democratisation and sees greater 
need for state reform - means that most development aid aimed at promoting such linkages 
between civil society and the state has actually been directed to strengthening central 
governments. The third and final claim typical amongst donors is that NGOs are a key part of 
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civil society, sometimes to the extent that NGOs are conflated with civil society (Mercer 
2002), a move that appeals to donors since it permits them to fund NGOs and then claim to 
be promoting civil society.  
 
As I discuss in Chapter Five, assessments of the state of civil society in Mali have tended to 
evaluate it against the typical roles that the ‘associational’ school of thought suggests civil 
society might play. However, these observations in fact demonstrate the importance of 
Mohan’s (2002) argument for examining “actually existing civil society” (following Mamdani 
1996), especially concerning the overlap between state and civil society (Chabal and Daloz 
1999), and the relative extent to which civil society consists of formal NGOs and less formal 
social movements. In considering the role of NGOs and their links to social movements, 
there is a growing set of work which conceptualises two meanings of the term 
‘development’ (Hart 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2004; Mitlin et al. 2007; Banks and Hulme 
2012). One is a historical process of social change, while the other refers to specific 
interventions, particularly those that fit broadly within the post-World War Two project of 
aid and development. Hart (2001) labels these as “little d development” and “big D 
Development” respectively. These classifications are not independent: NGOs are all acting in 
interventionist “big D Development”, while also being part of “little d development” (Mitlin 
et al. 2007).  
 
This literature has led to a framework developed by Banks and Hulme (2012) which 
considers NGO approaches in three categories: service provision, advocacy on behalf of the 
poor, and empowerment i.e. enabling the poor to become advocates for themselves. For 
Banks and Hulme, service provision activities and advocacy undertaken by NGOs on behalf 
of the poor remain within the domain of “Big D Development” and depoliticised approaches. 
In contrast, approaches where the poor act as advocates for themselves should be seen as 
part of “little d development” and a way for NGOs to engage with promoting alternatives to 
“Big D Development”. There is a strong normative element - perhaps even a romanticisation 
of NGOs, social movements and civil society - in this literature, in the argument that NGOs 
should shift further towards radical, system-changing alternatives and be more aligned with 
social movements rather than merely seeking reforms within existing systems. A note of 
caution is sounded by Bano (2008), who argues from case studies in Pakistan that aid 
funding in fact damages local civil society organisations.  
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Overall, this literature on the role of NGOs and civil society highlights questions for this 
research which I return to in Chapter Five when I examine civil society in Mali, the role and 
approach of WaterAid, and how WaterAid works with civil society organisations. I analyse if 
NGOs can support improved rural water service delivery and pro-poor financing through 
reformist approaches, such as developing models of service provision and undertaking 
advocacy on behalf of the poor. I also consider the potential and limits of WaterAid’s work 
with “actually existing civil society” in Mali.  
 
 
2.7. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have assessed historical trends and the roles of different actors in relation 
to the sustainability and financing of rural water services in developing countries. This 
review has demonstrated the relevance of the key themes introduced in Chapter One and 
has highlighted where this research can contribute to these debates.  
 
Firstly, in relation to how the recurrent costs of services are shared between different actors, 
there is a growing recognition that existing approaches to defining costs and responsibilities 
are often inadequate. Empirical evidence from a country such as Mali on who pays for what, 
what amounts of money are actually spent and what the results are in terms of the services 
that users receive could help contribute to the debate about how to build on and improve 
existing approaches. To enable international comparison, this research adopts a method for 
categorising costs based on the life-cycle costs approach set out by the WASHCost project.  
 
The review of the literature relevant to the second research theme of approaches to service 
delivery shows that the ideas of community-based management and support from 
decentralised local government have emerged for a combination of pragmatic and 
ideological reasons. Given the challenges to delivering services through community 
management and local government support, alternative service delivery models such as 
self-supply by households themselves have been proposed for some situations. The 
difficulties highlight the importance of understanding what users and decentralised local 
governments are willing and able to pay and if there are ways of increasing the funds they 
can access.  
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Thirdly, this chapter has summarised the debate regarding NGOs, their role in supporting 
improved public services and their links to civil society. This has highlighted questions of 
how organisations such as WaterAid try to directly influence service delivery models for 
rural water supply, and how they engage in advocating for the wider adoption of particular 
models. A key issue regarding this possible broader advocacy is the part played by civil 
society organisations and the limits to the role of civil society in contexts where it may 
overlap with the state. The questions concerning NGOs and how they try to work with and 
influence other actors are a reminder of the importance of politics and the role of external 
organisations in public services and institutional change. In the next chapter I evaluate in 
more depth the literature on these issues and develop the analytical framework used in this 
research.  
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Chapter Three - Analytical framework 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I set out the analytical framework used in the thesis. This framework relates 
the questions raised in Chapters One and Two to a structure for analysing these issues in 
relation to the evidence gathered. The framework links work on “political economy analysis” 
(PEA) by international donors and think tanks with academic literature on analysing 
institutional change for managing natural resources and delivering public services. 
 
As I argued in Chapters One and Two, it is essential to address the political economy 
surrounding rural water services in a way which can help policymakers and practitioners 
(Mollinga 2008; O'Meally 2009; Welle et al. 2009; Lockwood and Smits 2011; Cleaver 2012). 
Recent efforts have been made, both by international donors themselves and also by think 
tanks such as the Overseas Development Institute, to develop approaches which can help 
donors or NGOs analyse the political economy context related to water and sanitation 
where they are working. In the first half of this chapter I assess these “political economy 
analysis” (PEA) approaches and argue that they provide two useful starting points. Firstly, 
such frameworks help in providing a systematic approach to analysing the key actors, 
institutions and structures involved. Secondly - in their aims at least - these approaches seek 
to emphasise the political roles of donors and NGOs themselves, and the need to adopt 
‘best fit’ approaches which are sensitive to the particular country context rather than 
imported ‘best practices’ which may not apply. 
 
However, I conclude that these forms of political economy analysis should be extended 
using further literature which includes work by scholars in fields such as geography, 
sociology, politics and management. This concerns a deeper debate about how different 
parts of academia, policy and practice conceptualise institutions and how external actors 
may be able to influence institutional change. As introduced in Chapter One, Booth (2012: 
92) observes that international aid donors have sought to move past “one-size-fits-all 
remedies” in relation to institutional reform for over ten years, but with little success. He 
argues that despite more nuanced studies of each country context, the alternative remedies 
proposed “remain well within the terms of the good governance philosophy” (Booth 2012: 
92), rather than more sensitive ideas of “good enough governance” (Grindle 2004, 2007). I 
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aim to address these concerns by combining the two areas of literature into an approach 
which is both academically rigorous and can help provide practical recommendations for 
NGOs, responding to Cleaver’s (2012) suggestion to place detailed analysis of institutional 
change within a wider framework that helps link different scales. I also explain how this 
framework relates to the structure of the remainder of the thesis, in particular the three 
chapters which form the key analysis at national, local government and community levels.  
 
 
3.2. Evaluating political economy analysis 
 
The growth of political economy analysis as a framework 
 
In this section I describe the common historical uses of the general term ‘political economy’ 
and summarise the more specific recent approaches used in the international aid and 
development literature under the specific label “political economy analysis” (PEA). I then 
discuss how the evolution of different theories of political economy relates to the 
emergence and use of these methods of political economy analysis. This also involves 
assessing how the criticisms of donor-led PEA are related to the underlying theories used in 
the different approaches within the PEA trend. 
 
Edelmann (2009) classifies three key periods of thought in political economy. Firstly, the 
classical political economy of the 18th and 19th centuries, whose most important scholars 
included Smith, Marx, Engels and Ricardo. Secondly, narrower neoclassical political 
economy of the 1860s to 1980s was concerned with rational agents interacting to allocate 
scarce resources. Thirdly, more recent institutional political economy from the 1990s 
focuses on the effect that institutions (defined in that case as both formal and informal 
‘rules of the game’) have on economic behaviour, drawing in particular on the ‘new 
institutional economics’ (NIE) of Douglass North and others (see North 1990). When moving 
from definitions of political economy to the more recent uses of the term as part of political 
economy analysis by donors, Leftwich (2007) notes in reviewing these analyses that: 
 
… there appears to be some ambiguity as to what ‘political economy’ actually refers. (i) 
Is it a method? (ii) Is it a theory and, if so, what is it? (iii) Is it simply an 
acknowledgement that it is difficult (and perhaps unwise) to detach economic issues 
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from political ones? (iv) Is it a description of a particular pattern of links or 
relationships in given countries between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ factors? If the 
latter, what is the significance of the links and what dynamics drive or shape those 
relations? (v) Or is it just a polite and economically respectable way to introduce 
‘politics’ to the analysis? (Leftwich 2007: 19) 
 
As I use the term “political economy analysis” (PEA) here, it refers to a variety of donor-led 
approaches that have been developed since 2000. These include: DFID’s Drivers of Change 
and Politics of Development (see Leftwich 2007), Sida’s Institutional Analysis and 
Development (Ostrom et al. 2002), and the World Bank’s Problem-Driven Governance and 
Political Economy Analysis (Fritz et al. 2009). In response to Leftwich’s question, I argue that 
PEA represents a range of methods, based broadly on some common elements and 
underlying ideas – although as I discuss later some of these theories may be simplistic and 
therefore require supplementing with other areas of literature. The following are the key 
elements for analysis found in most of the approaches (Landell-Mills et al. 2007; Duncan and 
Williams 2012): 
 
• Structures: A consideration of structural factors such as historical processes, 
demographic trends and environmental issues.  
• Institutions: The approaches all place a strong emphasis on institutions (defined as both 
formal and informal ‘rules of the game’), drawing heavily on the ‘new institutional 
economics’ (NIE) of Douglass North and others (see North 1990). I discuss the definitions 
of institutions in more detail later in this chapter. 
• Agents and their incentives: In particular, there is a focus on whether these structures 
and institutions lead to incentives for pro-developmental behaviour (broadly defined) 
among key agents or groups on society (Duncan and Williams 2012), particularly 
political elites (DFID 2009). 
• “Going with the grain” or ‘best fit’ rather than ‘best practice’: In contrast to previous 
governance assessments which have tended to compare a country against predefined 
indicators of “good governance” based upon idealised Western models, most of the PEA 
approaches try to reduce the normative nature of such assessments and focus instead 
on understanding the context that actually exists in order to suggest initial actions which 
are feasible within this (Harris, Kooy and Jones 2011). This is similar to Grindle’s (2007) 
idea of aiming for “good enough governance”. Kelsall (2011) calls this “going with the 
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grain”, in particular reference to working with - instead of trying to change - 
neopatrimonial systems in Africa. Others have called this ‘best fit’ rather than ‘best 
practice’ (Booth 2012).  
• Donors as political actors: Some of the forms of PEA explicitly acknowledge the role of 
donors as political actors themselves, although this varies between the different 
approaches. I discuss this further below in relation to the criticisms of PEA. 
 
How do the recent donor-led approaches of political economy analysis relate to the 
previous conceptualisations of political economy in social science? Edelmann (2009) and 
Landell-Mills et al. (2007) argue that these PEA approaches draw both on the “institutions 
matter” idea of new institutional economics plus more traditional ideas of the importance of 
structure from previous political economy. Leftwich (2005) suggests that the literature 
building on new institutional economics to reemphasise the political comes close to what 
used to be called Marxist political economy in highlighting the link between political power 
and economic institutions.  
 
However, it is important to consider to what extent these different approaches rely on the 
ability suggested by new institutional economics (NIE) for external interveners to influence 
institutions and the subsequent incentives on individuals and groups. For example, Chang 
(2002) makes a further distinction between theories of new institutional economics (NIE) 
and institutionalist (rather than institutional) political economy (IPE), where NIE focuses too 
much on using institutions and subsequent incentives to shape (boundedly rational) 
behaviour, whereas IPE acknowledges that institutions also shape underlying motivations. 
Leftwich (2006: 38) makes a similar distinction to Chang between approaches based on 
rational choice institutionalism and those which are more sensitive to structure-agent 
relationships and power.  
 
In the next section I expand on this introduction to identify the three broad criticisms that 
are made of political economy analysis approaches so far. In the second half of this chapter I 
then explore how to use other areas of literature on institutions to address these concerns 
with PEA, especially concerning the influence of external organisations on institutional 
change.  
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Criticisms of political economy analysis 
 
Although the increased use of political economy analysis has helped bring some benefits to 
aid agencies in terms of greater realism and more systematic approaches to considering 
institutions and power (Copestake and Williams 2012), I still identify three broad levels of 
criticism of these forms of political economy analysis in the literature. The first level of 
criticism relates to the basic tension between donors attempting to engage in complex 
political analysis while at the same time responding to the typical pressures of their own 
taxpayers and governments to disburse large sums of money and achieve measurable 
results. The second area of criticism relates to the problems of definitions and theoretical 
underpinnings that I have already touched upon. This part of the literature argues that much 
PEA is flawed because it rests on oversimplified understandings of development and politics. 
The final criticism takes this idea further and suggests that PEA could be considered as part 
of wider trends to promote a particular type of “advanced” or “inclusive” liberalism (Craig 
and Porter 2006; Hickey 2009a). In this section I consider the three areas of criticism in turn 
and conclude by suggesting ways forward which respond to these challenges.  
 
PEA and the basic constraints on donors 
 
The basic criticisms of the use of PEA by donors are openly acknowledged by some of those 
who have been most involved in developing and applying forms of PEA so far. The most 
prominent example is Sue Unsworth, who was the lead person responsible for developing 
the Drivers of Change approach in DFID (Unsworth 2009). Unsworth says that political 
analysis tended to be seen as an add-on rather than fundamental, and academic rather than 
practical. Furthermore, Unsworth and others highlight the inherent tensions between 
political analysis and the accountability of donors to Western taxpayers, which entails 
pressure to disburse money and demonstrate results, and to prioritise technical expertise 
rather than local political knowledge (de Haan and Everest-Philips 2007; Robison 2010b; 
Duncan and Williams 2012; Copestake and Williams 2012). PEA undertaken so far such as 
the DFID Drivers of Change studies has also been hard to operationalise in terms of leading 
to specific practical recommendations or entry points for action (Marquette and Scott 2005; 
Chhotray and Hulme 2009; Unsworth 2009).  
 
Copestake and Williams (2012) suggest that PEA could become more reflexive to include 
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analysing the incentives of the agency concerned itself and considering the biases and 
limited knowledge of the analyst(s) conducting the PEA. This also reflects Marquette and 
Scott’s (2005) concern that most PEA studies so far have been led by short-term external 
consultants and Unsworth’s (2009) observation that international donor staff often fall into 
the intellectual trap of thinking they understand politics because they know their home 
country’s political system. The challenge also remains about how open donors can be about 
their own motivations and potentially unflattering assessments of recipient country 
governments and other partners (see also Chhotray and Hulme 2009). These criticisms also 
apply to NGOs.  
 
PEA and simplified ideas of politics and development 
 
The second area of criticism relates to how the approaches of PEA used to date 
conceptualise development as a public good and use a simplified idea of "politics as a 
bargaining process rather than as a struggle aimed at reforming entrenched structures of 
power" (Hughes and Hutchison 2010: 54; see also de Haan and Everest-Phillips 2007; 
Leftwich 2007; Hyden 2008a and Robison 2010a). 
 
Robison (2010a) argues that this problem exists because the current forms of PEA are based 
on a viewpoint of pluralist political economy, where politics is considered as a process of 
negotiation between competing interests which exist due to a division of labour rather than 
power structures. In contrast, critical or structural political economy understands that the 
competing forces exist in a particular state of power relations, not just functional specialised 
roles which allow simple negotiated settlements (Robison 2010a). Hughes and Hutchison 
(2010: 46) argue that development does not simply happen “when the right political 
incentives are created”12 as suggested by Unsworth (2009) and the PEA approaches such as 
DFID’s Drivers of Change, but needs to be understood as a process of struggle.  
 
This debate around power and struggle raises two questions. Firstly, to what extent, or in 
what cases, are win-win outcomes actually possible from changes in power relations, as 
suggested by e.g. Chambers (2006)? Secondly, what role can donors or external interveners 
                                                 
12
 Leftwich (2007) describes this tendency in the existing PEA work as the trap of falling into 
“incentive reductionism” and conceptualising incentives only in terms of narrow self-interest (see 
also Fine and Milonakis 2009). But the PEAs undertaken so far generally include little actual analysis 
of how incentives and related political processes really work (Landell-Mills et al. 2007; DFID 2009). 
61 
play in promoting what Adler et al. (2009) call “good struggles”, i.e. political processes which 
involve contestation but do lead to compromise?  
 
Adler et al. (2009: 5) link these first two areas of criticism and the questions above by 
arguing that “those who overtly problematise power often find it difficult to engage with the 
operational dilemmas of development practice.” However, there are existing approaches 
which seek to conceptualise power in ways which can help suggest possibilities for action, 
and could be a way of helping PEA approaches. For example, Gaventa (2006), Chambers 
(2006) and Green (2010) all draw on Lukes (2005) to highlight different types, forms, levels 
and spaces of power. The types and forms of power are strongly related. ‘Types’ for these 
authors refers to at least four categories: power over (that one group holds over another), 
power to (the capability to act), power with (collective action) and power within 
(self-confidence and the influence of self-identity on what is considered possible). They 
argue that power can occur in forms which are visible, hidden (for example, what influences 
the topics available for political debate) or invisible (referring to the wider social norms that 
frame the debate). 
 
These ideas of power are sometimes implicit in other work, even if they are labelled 
differently. For example, Webster and Engberg-Pedersen (2002) use the term “political 
space” to describe three areas which affect how much influence the poor are able to have 
on poverty reduction. The first of these three dimensions is the channels through which the 
poor can influence policy (or not), relating to how Gaventa describes power’s ‘visible’ form 
of observable decision-making. The second area is the political discourse around poverty, 
similar to the idea of how ‘hidden power’ determines the political agenda. The third and 
final ‘space’ described by Webster and Engberg-Pedersen refers to the social practices and 
beliefs about what the poor can do themselves, which seems to draw on a similar 
understanding to the Gaventa/Lukes idea of how ‘invisible power’ shapes meaning and what 
is acceptable. These examples show that there are ways of thinking about power which can 
provide useful understanding without “problematising” the concept to such an extent that 
no feasible actions are identified, as Adler et al. (2009: 4) caution. However, these 
observations do also suggest that feasible first steps and win-win possibilities may lie where 
power and decision-making are ‘visible’, and the topics of interest are already on the 
political agenda. 
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There is also the problematic idea within some of the PEA work that donors or other 
interveners are rational actors themselves who are able to “stand separately from the 
phenomena they analyse” (Mowles 2010: 154) in order to effect change (although as I 
previously noted, Copestake and Williams (2012) observe that some PEAs are showing 
greater awareness and self-reflection on the part of donors too). There are related 
suggestions that PEA approaches should move further towards acknowledging ‘messiness’ 
and using ideas from complexity theory (Eyben et al. 2008; Mowles 2010; Copestake and 
Williams 2012). 
 
Kelsall (2011) argues that the work on PEA also tends to show insufficient consideration of 
non-Western concepts and definitions, such as different forms of accountability that may 
place greater focus on family, community or religion. However, he encounters the same 
problems as some of the PEA studies themselves that identify neopatrimonialism and 
clientelism as widespread in the countries under consideration but struggle to propose 
tangible ideas for enabling donors to engage constructively with such factors (see also 
Cammack 2007 and Chhotray and Hulme 2009, who argue that neopatrimonialism is in fact 
over-emphasised by many PEA studies). Hyden (2008a) discusses different concepts of 
power to make a similar point: aid recipient country governments may understand power as 
predominantly informal and personal, whereas donors - despite attempts within PEA to 
better consider informality - tend to prioritise formal and organisational power.  
 
However, this need to “go with the grain” (Hyden 2008b; Kelsall 2011) can also be 
interpreted as donors adapting to the status quo and in fact avoiding politics, if they trim 
their ambitions and modify what they can really expect to achieve (Hughes and Hutchison 
2010). Depending on the context, this could be a reasonable response to local challenges by 
seeking to work within the given situation towards finding useful first steps. However, this 
possibility also leads to a further argument that I discuss below, that PEA approaches 
actually contribute to donors avoiding the realities of local politics and instead promote 
other forms of politics which are more in line with the previous ‘good governance’ agenda 
rather than the ideas of “good enough governance” that PEA tries to understand. I extend 
these arguments further in Section 3.3 through a more detailed examination of how to 
understand institutions and institutional change. 
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PEA and the promotion of particular forms of politics and development 
 
There is the possibility, suggested by parts of the literature, that despite claims that PEA 
enables donors to “go with the grain” (Kelsall 2011) of existing country contexts, these 
approaches are actually part of wider moves to promote particular forms of development 
and politics. I consider in particular the idea of “inclusive” or “advanced” liberalism used by 
Craig and Porter (2006) and Hickey (2009a) respectively. Craig and Porter do not explicitly 
discuss PEA themselves. Instead they address recent donor practices more generally as an 
evolution of ideas from new institutional economics. It is Hickey who links a discussion of 
PEA emerging from new institutional economics as part of “advanced” liberalism which 
privileges certain forms of politics over others, namely technocratic state sector reform 
coupled with an idealised version of local community and civil society action (Hickey 2009a). 
Craig and Porter argue that there is an overestimation of what can actually be achieved in 
terms of pro-poor outcomes through these two areas of focus. In a related argument, de 
Haan and Everest-Phillips (2007) and Fine (2009) caution that the use of PEA as a 
development of new institutional economics could also be seen as part of attempts to 
expand the dominance of economics in development agencies, and a sign of the failure of 
other social scientists to provide alternative analyses. 
 
 
Political economy analysis in the water and sanitation sector and ways forward 
 
Examples of the use of political economy analysis in the water and sanitation sector exhibit 
some of these challenges but also provide lessons for how such frameworks might be 
extended. Plummer and Slaymaker’s (2007) paper Rethinking governance in water services, 
one of the background papers for DFID’s 2008 water policy, took existing work on DFID’s 
Drivers of Change and Capability, Accountability, Responsiveness (CAR) frameworks and 
outlined how these could be used in a form of political economy analysis for water. The use 
of these existing frameworks was partly a way to help those working on water speak the 
language of governance used in other parts of DFID (Cleaver 2012). This framework led to 
analysis of the water sector in Ethiopia (Arsano et al. 2010). Similar analysis using an 
alternative framework was undertaken in Kenya (Rampa 2011) and more recent work by the 
Overseas Development Institute has built on further PEA debates, feeding into studies on 
the political economy of scaling-up sanitation in Vietnam and water-pricing in Sierra Leone 
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(Harris, Kooy and Nam 2011; Harris, Kooy and Jalloh 2012).  
 
Both the Ethiopia and Kenya analyses struggled for concrete recommendations, tending 
towards vague proposals on increasing support to civil society, a problem identified in other 
PEAs (Landell-Mills et al. 2007). The Vietnam example is most insightful in identifying 
potential new ways for donors to work, in this case by suggesting the possibility of 
collaborating with actors apart from the government which have influence at scale such as 
associations and unions. However, there was ultimately a lack of consideration of why 
donors had not done the things suggested already. The Vietnam case study identified a clear 
example where DFID had previously recognised the problem of budget allocations being 
biased more towards new investment than recurrent financing. The authors note that “this 
line of thinking appears to have been marginalised in current DFID programming” (Harris, 
Kooy and Nam 2011: 27) but do not interrogate further why this might have been neglected. 
This represents a wider problem with these studies that they require greater attention to 
the actual “room for manoeuvre” (Grindle 2007) in terms of both external policy debates 
and the internal incentives of donors themselves.  
 
However, I argue that there is a productive way forward from the three areas of criticism 
and the applications of PEA to the water and sanitation sector so far. If we accept the first 
criticism (that international donors and NGOs are inherently constrained in the extent to 
which they act politically) then it makes sense to focus on specific problems where there 
may be some possibility of small positive steps. External organisations must still be aware of 
the second criticism: acknowledging issues of power and how they understand and engage 
with processes of institutional change, even if these are likely to be incremental rather than 
more extensive reforms. In Section 3.3 I set out how this analysis can be done to help 
suggest practical possibilities for action. I do acknowledge the final argument, that such 
approaches “merely put a social institutional mask on an otherwise persistent ‘neo-liberal’ 
(‘post Washington consensus’) agenda”, as Adler et al. (2009: 26) describe this criticism. 
However, I position this research from the perspective that using ideas from PEA with more 
nuanced views of institutional change is a useful starting point for donors and NGOs.  
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3.3. Extending political economy analysis 
 
In this section I address the question of why I use political economy analysis - a framework 
predominantly developed by and for international aid donors, with the associated 
limitations and criticisms that I discuss above - as part of a guiding framework for an 
academic research project. I argue that the nature of this research project, a collaborative 
undertaking in partnership with a non-academic organisation, demands an approach that 
seeks to understand how non-academic organisations address similar research questions, 
yet also draws on the academic literature to inform, extend and improve these forms of 
analysis. Furthermore, the political economy analysis framework employed here is flexible 
enough to allow the use of different bodies of theory from the academic literature within 
the framework to explain or extend the research topics as required, as suggested by Harris 
(2013).  
 
However, I do acknowledge and address the criticisms of PEA discussed so far. I do this by 
developing closer links to academic literature on institutions, institutional change and the 
influence of outsiders, starting from the observation that many attempts by outsiders to 
influence institutional change in low-income countries have failed to produce the intended 
outcomes. The approach developed involves a more detailed and realistic examination of 
the ability of external actors to effect change, including insights from literature which 
discusses the agency of individual development workers themselves. In this way I respond to 
the first two criticisms of PEA previously identified, which suggest a need for a more realistic 
appreciation of the constraints on international aid agencies and a more nuanced approach 
to institutional change.  
 
To do this, I draw on areas of literature concerned with institutional change in relation to 
community-based natural resource management, district-level governance for delivering 
public goods, and national public sector reform, since rural water services delivery and 
WaterAid’s work in Mali involves elements of all three themes. Each area of literature starts 
from the observation that many attempts by outsiders to influence institutional change in 
low-income countries have failed to produce the intended outcomes. However, there are 
differences between the areas of work, particularly in terms of the types of institutions and 
scales they focus on, and their relative optimism or pessimism about the role of external 
actors. This seems partially related to the backgrounds of the authors involved: all are 
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academics, but with differing levels of engagement with think tanks (such the Overseas 
Development Institute) or development agencies (such as the World Bank). I summarise the 
key areas of work and discuss each in turn to explore their strengths and weaknesses in 
more detail and how they can contribute to an extended PEA framework for the purposes of 
this thesis. However, I first briefly clarify the philosophical background to the research, and 
(given the different definitions of the term ‘institutions’ used in the literature) explain the 
understanding of the term that I adopt in this research.  
 
 
Philosophical background to the research 
 
A brief discussion of the philosophical background to the research is helpful at this point to 
clarify certain key issues. Firstly, regarding how I conceive the nature of causality, 
understanding, explanation and prediction in this study.13 Secondly, in how I understand 
individual agency, social structure and their interactions. 14  Thirdly, whether there is 
compatibility or tension between the understandings of causality and these other 
philosophical issues in the different literature that I draw upon, especially between the work 
by economists and political scientists (which comes generally from a more quantitative and 
policy-oriented background), and the literature from more qualitative social scientists such 
as geographers, anthropologists and sociologists. 
 
My overall argument is that the framework I develop fits within the philosophy of critical 
realism, even though the literature I bring together involves both work that explicitly 
identifies its own critical realist roots (e.g. Cleaver 2012) and other work which has a 
background in new institutional economics (e.g. Andrews 2013) and for which there is 
debate about the extent of its crossover with critical realism (Lawson 1997; Pratten 1997; 
Downward et al. 2002; Hodgson 2007; House 2010). Critical realism is a philosophy which 
attempts to place itself between the ontological positions of objectivism and constructivism, 
and the epistemological stances of positivism and interpretivism. In this way, critical realism 
combines ontological realism and epistemological constructivism (Forsyth 2003; Maxwell 
                                                 
13
 In referring to “understanding” and “explanation” I follow Manicas (2006) in noting that the two 
terms are frequently used interchangeably, but that “understanding” implies making something 
intelligible through the description of a mechanism, while “explanation” suggests being able to show 
how a combination of mechanisms produce a certain outcome. 
14
 I consider “institutions”, the definition of which I discuss in greater detail in the next section, as 
social structures in the sense that the agency-structure debates use the term structure. 
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2009). This means that a critical realist approach to social science accepts the existence of 
‘real’ social structures, but argues that these cannot always be observed empirically. Instead, 
theory must be used to explain the structures and causal mechanisms which give rise to 
‘actual’ events and the empirical experiences of these events (Yeung 1997; Smith 1998; Grix 
2004; Bryman 2008). Critical realism also emphasises the interplay of social structure (such 
as institutions) and human agency rather than prioritising the importance and therefore the 
analysis of one over the other. 
 
However, some are pessimistic about the potential for overlap between work based on new 
institutional economics (NIE) and that drawing from critical realism. Pratten (1997) argues 
that the emphasis in new institutional economics on operationalising its findings (a link that 
I introduced in Section 3.2 when discussing the emergence of PEA from NIE) results in a 
search for a level of predictability which is not possible in practice, and so retains the 
weaknesses of the overly deductive approach of neoclassical economics. Yet critical realism 
itself uses the label ‘critical’ at least partly for the reason that it too sees the possibility of 
contributing to real-life change (Lawson 1997; Cleaver 2012). The key differences are that 
critical realism argues that exact prediction (in the form of ‘if X, then Y, under conditions Z’) 
is rarely, if ever, possible in social science, and that individual agency influences institutions 
as well as vice versa.  
 
However, as I show in the rest of this chapter, although one of the areas of work that I draw 
on (Andrews and his collaborators) starts from the new institutional economics literature, it 
is in fact sensitive to the relation between actors and social structures such as institutions. It 
does not fall into either of the criticisms identified by critical realists of methodological 
individualism or unrealistic prediction. Booth, whose work I also discuss below, likewise 
seeks a position which takes into account both sides, arguing that rational-choice 
perspectives can have some use in debates about the formation of institutions, but do not 
validate the “bold posturing [by some economists] on topics about which they should 
consider themselves rank amateurs” (Booth 2011b: 11). Overall I too adopt a pragmatic 
position, arguing (in line with Downward et al. 2002) that critical realism should 
acknowledge that some level of observed regularity and forms of prediction are possible, if 
not in the quantitative forms suggested by deductivism. 
 
The final question is therefore how the background of critical realism is reflected in the 
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analytical framework that I use. As I make clear throughout the rest of this chapter, my 
focus is on understanding how institutions concerning the financing and delivery of rural 
water services change, considering the interactions between actors and institutions and 
how each influences the other. This is an example of critical realism’s key concern of 
examining the interplay between individual agency and social structure. In terms of the 
‘depth ontology’ of critical realism (Sayer 1984; Smith 1998), this means that in this study I 
research the observable ‘empirical’ level (e.g. perceptions of relevant actors recorded 
through interviews, data collected on the functionality of water points and participant 
observation at workshops) to try to understand ‘actual’ events and states of affairs (e.g. how 
water management committees function, water usage practices and arrangements for 
sharing costs). However, in a critical realist approach the underlying level of social structure 
and causal mechanisms, although ‘real’, cannot be observed directly and must instead be 
interpreted through theory. This step in the research is therefore the point where I use the 
concepts within the analytical framework, such as “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver 2012), to 
attempt to explain the practices observed through the empirical work.  
 
 
Defining institutions 
 
Having discussed the philosophical background to the research, it is also important to clarify 
the definition I use of the term ‘institutions’. The definitions of institutions in the areas of 
literature under discussion essentially differ according to whether: 
 
a) Institutions are understood as rules, norms and arrangements (’rules of the game’), and 
organisations are understood as actors (’players of the game’). As discussed above, the 
political economy analysis approaches that I refer to broadly define institutions and 
organisations in this way. For example, Leftwich (2011: 323) describes organisations as “the 
formally or informally co-ordinated vehicles for the promotion or protection of a mix of 
individual and shared interests and ideas … they are players of the game.” The work by 
Andrews (2013) and collaborators that I explore later in this chapter also uses this definition, 
although Andrews (drawing on Scott 2008) helpfully sets out three different elements which 
combine to form institutions as ‘rules of the game’: regulative mechanisms, normative 
mechanisms and cultural-cognitive mechanisms. Regulative mechanisms, such as laws and 
formal rules, often involve sanctions from external third parties. Normative mechanisms, 
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including norms and values, relate to what is considered socially acceptable and therefore 
typically create incentives to comply through internal feelings of shame rather than external 
third party actions. The idea of cultural-cognitive mechanisms refers to beliefs and 
ideologies which frame the way actors interpret the world and what is possible, and 
therefore inherently limit their actions.  
 
b) Institutions are understood as rules, norms and arrangements, which can exist or be 
represented in the form of organisations. I argue that Cleaver (2012) and the ‘critical’ 
institutionalist literature which she draws upon, discussed later in this chapter, base their 
work on this definition. For these authors, institutions are “arrangements between people 
which are reproduced and regularized across time and space and which are subject to 
constant processes of evolution and change” (Cleaver 2008: 8) or “social arrangements that 
shape and regulate human behaviour and have some degree of permanency and purpose 
transcending individual human lives and intentions” (Merrey et al. 2007: 196).  
 
c) Institutions are understood as organisations, which are held together by and produce rules, 
norms and arrangements. This definition appears less common in the literature, but it is 
nevertheless important to note that it is used by some authors who otherwise are 
undertaking similar work to those discussed here on aspects of informality, hybridity and 
bricolage, such as Lund (2006) and Cold-Ravnkilde (2012).   
 
By setting out these three different interpretations, I suggest that the key issue is actually 
one of labelling; in all cases, the scholars concerned are actually interested in rules, norms 
and arrangements and their formation and interplay with different actors, regardless of 
which combination of these are called ‘institutions’. Therefore I argue that the definitions 
are compatible, provided what comes under the different labels is made clear. I adopt an 
understanding based on (b) for the purposes of this thesis; while I acknowledge that 
organisations are indeed actors or ‘players of the game’, in the case of bodies such as water 
management committees they are also representations of the relevant institutions, i.e. both 
the formal rules and informal local norms surrounding water management. The crucial point 
to examine is the similarities and differences in understandings in these sets of literature 
regarding how the processes of evolution and change of institutions occur, so it is this idea 
that I focus on next as I consider the three areas of literature in greater depth. 
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Natural resource management, critical institutionalism and institutional bricolage 
 
The first area of literature I discuss is that set out by Cleaver (2012),15  concerned 
predominantly with community-based natural resource management and the problems of 
approaches which focus too much on formal institutions and the search for and application 
of general ‘design principles’. Cleaver (2012: 16) sets out the differences between two 
schools of thought on institutions by terming these schools “mainstream institutionalism” 
and “critical institutionalism”. Although in this thesis I refer predominantly to the work of 
Cleaver when considering critical institutionalism (and, as introduced below, the idea of 
“institutional bricolage”), I recognise as she does that this approach also shares many ideas 
with and draws upon the work of others who also aim to distinguish themselves from 
mainstream thinking on institutions for natural resource management, even if they use 
different terminology to Cleaver.16 However, I draw most strongly on Cleaver’s work due to 
its strengths, which I explain below, in analysing the details of institutional change, agency 
and bricolage at the micro-level.  
 
The key features of the two approaches are shown in Table 3.1 below (taken from Cleaver 
2012: 16). To summarise, critical institutionalism refers to the body of literature which 
understands institutions as context-specific, dynamic and evolving, blurring across scales, 
and shaped by local history and politics. In contrast, Cleaver argues that mainstream 
institutionalism, which includes the literature on common property resources inspired by 
the work of Elinor Ostrom and the ideas of new institutional economics of Douglass North 
and others, seeks to identify common ‘design principles’ which can be applied across 
contexts and places too much emphasis on the local level without considering wider 
structures. 
 
                                                 
15
 Cleaver’s (2012) book Development through Bricolage: Rethinking Institutions for Natural Resource 
Management also draws on her previous work including Cleaver (2000, 2002), Cleaver and Toner 
(2005, 2006), and Franks and Cleaver (2007). 
16
 These include Mosse (1997) on sociological-historical institutionalism and Mehta et al. (2001) on 
post-institutionalist thinking. 
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Table 3.1. Key features of institutional thinking (Cleaver 2012: 16) 
 
Features Mainstream institutionalism Critical institutionalism 
Nature of 
institutions 
Formal/public institutions in 
nested layers with horizontal 
and vertical linkages. 
Blurring of boundaries and of scales, 
blending of institutional logics and 
forms (e.g. formal/informal). 
Formation of 
institutions 
Institutions formed through 
crafting; design principles 
characterise robust 
institutions. 
Institutions pieced together through 
practice, improvisation, adaptation of 
previous arrangements. 
Nature of 
decision-making 
Decision-making and 
negotiations mainly conducted 
in public fora. 
Decision-making and negotiations 
embedded in everyday life, shaped 
by history and politics. 
Models of agency ‘Bounded rationality’ models 
of agency as strategic and 
purposeful – individuals as 
resource appropriators. 
Agency as relational, exercised 
consciously and non-consciously – 
individuals with complex social 
identities and emotions. 
Factors shaping 
human behaviour 
in institutions 
Information, incentives, rules, 
sanctions and repeated 
interactions. 
Social structures and power 
dynamics, relationships, norms, 
individual creativity.  
Outcomes Institutions can be crafted to 
produce efficient resource 
management outcomes. 
Institutions evolve to ‘socially fit’: 
functioning may result in access to or 
exclusion from resources.  
 
 
A key point to note is that Cleaver (2012) and other authors in the critical institutionalist 
school (e.g. Merrey 2013) acknowledge that at times they slightly caricature the work of 
Ostrom and other proponents of mainstream institutionalism. They argue that they do so in 
order to emphasise the differences between the two approaches and ensure that attention 
is drawn to key areas which are somewhat neglected by mainstream institutionalism. A 
further argument could be made (following Booth 2012) that even if the literature by 
Ostrom is more nuanced and context-sensitive than sometimes presented by Cleaver, the 
application of this work to common property problems in practice has often failed to 
demonstrate this sensitivity and has tried to apply ‘design principles’ in an overly 
mechanical way.  
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I do not argue for completely replacing mainstream institutionalism with critical 
institutionalism as part of a PEA framework. Instead I assess if it is possible to shift more 
towards an appreciation of critical institutionalism in both understanding and action, 
focusing on how institutions emerge rather than strict principles of what they should be. 
While parts of the work on PEA approaches so far do draw strongly on mainstream 
institutionalism, I argue that examples of PEA in the water and sanitation sector do also 
emphasise the importance of different scales and understanding how institutions evolve in 
particular contexts (e.g. Arsano et al. 2010; Harris, Kooy and Nam 2011; Rampa 2011). 
Therefore I suggest using PEA in such a way as to enable productive overlap between ideas 
of critical institutionalism and mainstream institutionalism. I agree with Cleaver (2012: 24) 
when she argues that the challenges for scholars aiming to better understand institutions 
are to develop analyses of complex processes which are also “legible” to policymaking, and 
to understand community-level issues of natural resource management within their wider 
geographical contexts. By comparing the features of the two schools of thought on 
institutions described in Table 3.1 I argue that it should be possible to develop political 
economy analysis approaches which bridge these. 
 
Firstly, Cleaver’s observations on how each school of thought sees the nature and formation 
of institutions are a useful reminder that these issues must be considered when analysing 
institutions as part of a political economy analysis framework. This is the reason why I 
carefully examine the different definitions of institutions in the literature and why I draw on 
further work in subsequent sections which covers a range of scales and issues, all of which 
accept how institutions blend across levels and forms and focus on institutional change. 
Most recent PEA approaches already suggest that development interventions “work with 
the grain” (Kelsall 2011) regarding the formation of institutions, acknowledging that 
institutions are adaptations of previous arrangements. It is inherent in the process of donors 
and NGOs using PEA for guidance that there is a belief in the possibility of external actors 
having some influence on institutions which might support moves towards “good enough 
governance” (Grindle 2007). But this does not mean that they subscribe to strict design 
principles for doing so. 
 
The second key lesson from Cleaver’s comparison of mainstream and critical institutionalism 
relates to the areas of decision-making, agency and the influences on actors’ behaviour. As I 
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explained in Section 3.2, PEA approaches have been criticised in relation to the nature of 
decision-making for containing little actual analysis of how incentives and related political 
processes really work (Landell-Mills et al. 2007; DFID 2009). PEA approaches have also 
shown weaknesses in terms of their models of agency and factors shaping human behaviour 
for sometimes lapsing into “incentive reductionism” and conceptualising incentives only in 
terms of narrow self-interest (Leftwich 2007; Fine and Milonakis 2009). These are areas 
where I argue that political economy analysis approaches should adopt insights from critical 
institutionalism regarding the agency and behaviour of different actors. In particular, I agree 
with Copestake and Williams (2012) that PEA can benefit from engagement with what they 
refer to as the “aidnography” literature17 (Mosse 2004; Mosse and Lewis 2006; Eyben 2010) 
that aims to understand the agency and actions of development workers themselves, and 
their ability to influence institutional change. I discuss in Chapter Four how my close 
relationship with WaterAid in Mali helped me to address this issue and I analyse in more 
detail the roles of the staff of WaterAid’s partners in Chapters Six and Seven.  
 
Drawing together these observations from a critical institutionalist perspective, Cleaver 
proposes “institutional bricolage” as a concept to describe the way that institutions actually 
tend to emerge as a mixture of socially embedded (based on particular social and cultural 
practices) and bureaucratic (based on more formalised ideas and structures) (Cleaver 2002, 
2012). The idea of institutional bricolage seeks to avoid the false distinction of portraying 
institutions as either clearly formal or informal, and emphasises that local participants 
themselves, as well as intervening individuals and organisations, have some ability to shape 
institutions for managing resources such as water. Cleaver (2012) identifies a series of key 
features of institutional bricolage, two of which are particularly relevant to this study. Firstly, 
bricolage involves improvising on existing practices with new ideas, and adapting 
innovations from elsewhere to fit a particular context, such as taking formal state-endorsed 
ideas of water tariffs but then changing the rules on tariffs to suit local traditions. Secondly, 
the organisational forms of institutions (such as water management committees) often exist 
for multiple purposes rather than the single-purpose institutions imagined by mainstream 
institutionalism. In Chapter Seven I discuss how these ideas apply to the case study villages 
in this research. 
 
Finally, perhaps the most important element of comparison between mainstream 
                                                 
17
 “Aidnography” refers to undertaking ethnography of aid workers. 
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institutionalism and critical institutionalism, and a strength of how Cleaver conceptualises 
institutional bricolage, lies in what outcomes they see as possible. Critical institutionalism 
emphasises the possible unequal outcomes of institutional evolution rather than assuming 
that win-win solutions can be found. As I discuss in the following sections, the other areas of 
literature that I draw upon tend to be more optimistic about the ability of local actors and 
bricolaged processes of institutional change to deliver positive outcomes for the poor. In the 
next section I discuss work which focuses on wider issues of institutions for local governance 
and the delivery of public goods.  
 
 
Local governance of public goods and practical hybridity 
 
The second area of literature that I bring to the discussion on institutional change is 
summarised in Booth (2012) and draws strongly on the Africa Power and Politics Programme 
(APPP) research project led by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).18 The key question 
of APPP was “which institutional patterns and governance arrangements seem to work 
relatively well and which work relatively badly in providing public goods, merit goods and 
other intermediate conditions for successful development?” (Booth 2012: vii). Local 
governance and the provision of public goods, including water and sanitation, were key 
research areas.  
 
I argue that this work is relevant to linking political economy analysis with better 
understandings of institutional change for a series of reasons. Firstly, the APPP work 
addresses a similar set of problems to the critical institutionalist literature described by 
Cleaver, but helps widen the debate beyond natural resource management to the delivery 
of public and merit goods and local governance at levels beyond the community. Indeed, 
Booth (2012) explicitly acknowledges strong affinities between the concept of institutional 
bricolage used by Cleaver and the idea of practical hybridity used by APPP (discussed further 
below), although Booth does not explore in detail the similarities and differences between 
the two terms.  
 
                                                 
18
 Booth’s (2012) report Development as collective action problem: Addressing the real challenges of 
African governance is the key synthesis paper which brings together the Africa Power and Politics 
Programme’s research in order to develop an overall theoretical framework. Other key literature of 
interest related to the programme includes Booth (2011a, 2011b), Kelsall (2009, 2011) and Olivier de 
Sardan (2011). 
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Secondly, this area of literature is interesting because of its links to and frustration with 
previous PEA work, and its desire to propose further practical possibilities for action by 
external organisations. Booth himself has acted as a trainer for DFID staff on conducting PEA, 
but like the PEA critics discussed in Section 3.2 expresses disappointment with progress 
made by aid agencies in actually changing their approaches: "even the best donor 
governance advisers and most reflective country activists have real trouble imagining what 
to do differently" (Booth 2012: 7).  
 
This observation leads to the third key element of interest in the APPP work: its suggestion 
that part of the problem with previous governance approaches (even those based on ideas 
of “good enough governance” and PEA rather than ‘good governance’) is an over-focus on 
principal-agent thinking. By this they mean that donor-funded efforts to improve 
governance have tended to be either ‘supply-side’ (measures intended to improve 
governments’ ability to deliver public services, such as civil service reforms) or 
‘demand-side’ (ways of empowering citizens to claim their rights, such as community 
monitoring). However, Booth argues that both approaches are based on the principal-agent 
problem of one set of actors getting another to perform better, whereas the delivery of 
many forms of public goods actually involves more challenging collective action problems.19 
 
The APPP’s objective then became the search for theory beyond simply the idea that 
context matters, as “a meeting point between researchers’ recognition of complexity and 
practitioners’ hunger for guidance” (Booth 2012: 71). They call the concept developed 
“practical hybridity”, arguing that this is what is required for successful delivery of some 
public goods. Practical hybridity involves two elements. Firstly, the institutions that emerge 
address collective action problems in the particular context, rather than being 
externally-proposed solutions transferred from elsewhere. This is the basic argument of 
‘best fit’ rather than ‘best practice’ already common in most of the PEA literature. Secondly, 
such institutions will draw on “local cultural repertoires” (Booth 2012: 88), because this is 
less costly in terms of social disruption then creating new institutions from scratch. This 
argument is similar (but elaborated in less depth) to Cleaver (2012: 48) observing how 
institutions that socially fit “minimise cognitive energy” or (in economics terms) minimise 
                                                 
19
 Booth (2012: 11) defines collective action problems as existing “where a group or category of 
actors fail to cooperate to achieve an objective they agree on because the first-movers would incur 
costs or risks and they have no assurance that the other beneficiaries will compensate them, rather 
than ‘free riding’. The problem is more likely to arise when the group in question is large and the 
potential benefits are widely shared (‘non-excludable’).” 
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transaction costs.  
 
A further strength that the idea of practical hybridity shares with institutional bricolage is 
the focus on the actual outcomes that result in terms of access to public services (or natural 
resources). Booth (2012: 81) argues that practical hybridity refers to the formation of 
institutions that are not "merely palliative adaptations to the inadequacy of state provision." 
This is a crucial distinction that I explore further in Chapters Six and Seven in relation to the 
potential and limits of community financing of rural water services. The Mali case study 
suggests that the optimism regarding the benefits of practical hybridity evident in the APPP 
work may not apply in other contexts where the capacity of local actors is limited by the 
resources available.  
 
However, a weakness of the concept of practical hybridity is that the APPP literature 
provides less detailed theorisation around issues of agency and the role of particular 
individuals than the critical institutionalist approach and Cleaver’s idea of institutional 
bricolage, or the work of Andrews (2013) on institutional entrepreneurs discussed below. 
This is why I bring into the discussion the literature on the roles of development workers 
themselves (referred to as “aidnography” by Copestake and Williams 2012). 
 
Finally, despite its policy- and practice-oriented motivations, the APPP work is pessimistic 
about the role of external organisations in promoting practical hybridity, principally for the 
same reasons as those that I discussed under the criticisms of PEA which focus on donor 
constraints. Booth has “serious doubts about whether official development agencies will 
ever achieve the quality of understanding and the management flexibility” required, since 
“even if it were possible to reduce the perverse effects of aid pressure, there would remain 
a set of issues to do with the accountability requirements which are intrinsic to aid as a 
transfer funded by Northern taxpayers” (Booth 2012: 95-96).   
 
 
77 
Public sector reform, bricolage and muddling through 
 
The third area of literature on institutional change that I draw on focuses on 
externally-influenced public sector institutional reform, mostly at a macro level, such as 
reforms to public financial management systems. The key arguments are set out in Andrews 
(2013) and Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock (2012).20 Their key argument is that the 
response to many intended public sector reforms in low-income countries, especially those 
reforms driven by external aid agencies, is that “governments and organisations pretend to 
reform by changing what policies or organisations look like rather than what they actually 
do” (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2012: i). The authors call this phenomenon “reforms 
as signals” (Andrews 2013): governments prioritise form over function in order to satisfy 
donors and maintain aid flows. As I discuss in Chapter Five, this is particularly relevant to the 
discussion of donor influence on national policymaking in Mali.  
 
Instead, these authors argue that some form of “purposive muddling through” is required, 
suggesting that “incremental reforms focused on addressing problems frequently result in 
hybrid combinations of elements that work together to get the job done” (Andrews, 
Pritchett and Woolcock 2012: 14). They then propose a structured approach which external 
organisations can adopt in order to promote these processes, which they call 
Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation, or PDIA (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2012). This 
involves supporting an environment for decision-making which encourages local 
experimentation and the engagement of wide sets of actors so that proposed reforms are 
feasible and implementable.  
 
I argue that this literature is of particular interest in linking political economy analysis, 
mainstream institutionalism and critical institutionalism because of the way it takes ideas 
from new institutional economics as its starting point but then, like Cleaver and the critical 
institutionalist school of thought, uses concepts from other areas of social science such as 
bricolage. As I already discussed in relation to the definition of institutions, Andrews (2013) 
is also sensitive to the role of norms and beliefs in influencing agents, in addition to formal 
rules. Like Booth (2012), Andrews is critical of international agencies such as the World Bank 
for acknowledging that institutional forms cannot simply be transferred across countries, 
                                                 
20
 These most recent publications also draw on previous work by the authors and other collaborators, 
principally Adler, Sage and Woolcock (2009); Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews (2012); Pritchett and 
Woolcock (2004); and Woolcock, Szreter and Rao (2011).  
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yet commonly failing to move beyond this in practice. 
 
Examination of this literature is also useful to show how ideas which are similar to those of 
Cleaver and the critical institutionalist school can be applied to national-level institutional 
changes. Like Cleaver, Andrews (2013) uses the idea of “bricolage” to refer to the process of 
recombining existing practices with new ideas to result in institutional change, and pays 
close attention to the role of different agents in these processes. This body of work also 
demonstrates a useful focus on the agency of development workers themselves, which 
provides an opportunity to link it with the “aidnography” literature that I introduced above. 
Andrews (2013) refers to “institutional entrepreneurs”, those agents who break with 
existing institutional arrangements and create alternative rules and practices. I bring these 
discussions together in relation to the role of the staff of WaterAid’s partners in Chapters Six 
and Seven.  
 
However, there are also some differences between this area of work and critical 
institutionalism. As emphasised by the second area of criticism of PEA approaches and by 
critical institutionalism, it is important to consider conflict as a possible part of the processes 
and results of institutional change. The consideration of conflict represents both a strength 
and weakness in the work of Andrews and his collaborators. Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) 
remind us that institutions often emerge precisely for the reason of resolving social conflicts, 
but that during this process the memory of the original conflict is frequently lost or 
obscured, leaving behind only a “creation myth”. They use this observation as a further 
argument against attempts to transplant institutions from one context to another without 
understanding the underlying issues at stake.  
 
Adler et al. (2009) even more directly address issues of power and conflict in their 
examination of institutional change. They are perhaps over-optimistic regarding the ability 
of externally-supported change to help ‘manage’ conflict, hoping that “interim institutions” 
can emerge as mechanisms to address conflict during longer-term processes of institutional 
change. However, there is also a sense of realism in this work in the way that Adler et al. 
(2009) respond to an argument similar to the third area of criticism of PEA that I identified in 
Section 3.2. As they put the question: "are arguments for incrementalism and hybrid forms 
of engagement between formal and informal systems a conservative (‘neoliberal’) strategy 
of institutional reform?" (Adler et al. 2009: 26). They argue that while some would prefer 
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more radical action, it is more realistic for external interveners to look to support gradual 
change based on adapting existing institutions towards possible win-win situations. I 
sympathise with this point of view and agree that it provides a useful way for considering 
the approaches of organisations such as WaterAid to institutional change. However, as 
Cleaver reminds us, it is also important to understand where outcomes are unequal and 
power relations mean that the poor are unlikely to be ‘winners’.  
 
 
Summary of analysing institutional change 
 
In Table 3.2 I summarise the three sets of literature discussed in the previous sections in 
terms of the key concepts used, their guidance for policy and practice, and their strengths 
and weaknesses.  
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82 
Examining the strengths and weaknesses of these areas of literature provides a reminder of 
three key issues. The first is to ensure that concepts such as bricolage and hybridity are 
analytically useful in understanding how and why institutional arrangements for public 
services have emerged in particular forms, and to avoid their use as terms which become 
too generalised.21 Secondly, we must pay close attention to the outcomes of institutional 
arrangements (as Cleaver emphasises), distinguishing between what Booth (2012: 81) refers 
to as “merely palliative” responses to a lack of state-delivered public services and 
“constructive” hybrid alternatives (Meagher 2012: 1074).  
 
I address these first two issues by providing in Figure 3.1 a simplified representation of how 
the different areas of literature on the formation of institutions relate to each other, and 
how the concepts they refer to typically lead to differences of ‘form’ (in terms of how 
institutional arrangements are mixed between the formal/bureaucratic and 
informal/socially embedded) and ‘function’ (in terms of access to public services for the 
poor). The diagram demonstrates the key difference between “practical hybridity” as 
described by Booth (2012) and “institutional bricolage” as set out by Cleaver (2012) in terms 
of the typical outcomes emerging from each process.  
 
                                                 
21
 Goodfellow (2013) makes this point in relation to recent literature on conflict, governance and the 
analysis of institutions for security and public authority, which uses the terms ‘hybrid’ and ‘hybridity’ 
extensively but sometimes vaguely. 
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Thirdly, the literature highlights the distinction between analysing how institutional change 
at different levels actually happens (for example, through processes of bricolage) and 
assessing whether the approaches of WaterAid and other actors actively support bricolage 
and ‘best fit’ or attempt to promote more rigid ideas of ‘best practice’. It is important to 
note that actors such as WaterAid may publicly claim to promote ‘good governance’ and 
‘best practice’ while being more sensitive to ideas of ‘best fit’ in their actual activities. The 
literature on the agency of development workers themselves is helpful in understanding 
these possible differences (Mosse 2004; Mosse and Lewis 2006; Eyben 2010). In the next 
and final section of this chapter I summarise the overall conceptual questions that emerge 
from these issues, how they fit into the wider political economy framework and how they 
relate to the structure of the analysis in the remainder of thesis. 
 
 
3.4. Conclusions and structure of the analysis 
 
In this chapter I have shown a way of combining different areas of literature to create an 
extended political economy analysis framework which provides a systematic approach to 
the analysis of institutional change related to the financing of rural water services. This 
approach demonstrates how a political economy analysis framework can draw on further 
theoretical concepts relevant to the particular problem, as suggested by Harris (2013).  
 
The framework also highlights the overall conceptual questions that arise from this 
discussion. These questions overlap the different elements of a political economy analysis 
approach (structural factors, institutions and agents) and the different geographical scales 
of interest in Mali (national, municipal and community). In Figure 3.2 I show how these key 
conceptual questions relate to the analytical framework and the different scales. The text 
boxes represent schematically the overlap of each question with the different PEA elements 
and scales.22 I also use the framework to provide a structure for the key analysis part of this 
thesis, Chapters Five, Six and Seven. This is represented in Figure 3.3, which shows how the 
issues that were found to be important during the research are addressed at each different 
geographic level: the national sector context, the decentralised local government level, and 
community and household levels.  
                                                 
22
 Note that as I have discussed in relation to the definitions of institutions and agents, institutions 
can take the form of organisations, but organisations are also actors, as are individuals within those 
organisations - these overlaps are represented on the left of the diagram. 
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As Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 both show, there is considerable overlap between the municipal 
and community levels and Chapters Six and Seven concerning the forms of support to 
community management and the role of WaterAid’s partners in influencing local financing 
arrangements. I also place greater or lesser emphasis on each element of the extended PEA 
framework depending on its importance in analysing the key question of the chapter. For 
example, in Chapter Five, I stress the importance of understanding the key structural issues 
of the historical evolution of the sector and the influence of donors on national policies. In 
Chapters Six and Seven, there is greater emphasis on the discussion of institutions and the 
role of WaterAid and its partners in institutional change. Chapter Seven’s focus on the 
community level also requires a strong appreciation of the agency of representatives of 
WaterAid’s partners, and of water users themselves, as well as the structural factors of 
household finances and access to alternative water sources.  
 
Before proceeding with the analysis, in the next chapter I set out the research methodology. 
In particular, I explain how I addressed the challenge of making the research relevant to 
academia, policy and practice and how close engagement with the staff of WaterAid and its 
partners helped me understand their agency and influence.  
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Chapter Four - Research methodology and partnership with WaterAid 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I describe how the methodology used for the research and the collaborative 
partnership with WaterAid developed. The research was funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council as a Collaborative Award in Science and Engineering23 (CASE) studentship, 
with Royal Holloway as the host institution and WaterAid as the non-academic partner. This 
partnership provided an opportunity for engaging closely, through elements of action 
research, with actors directly involved in trying to develop sustainable approaches to rural 
water supply, following Carter’s (2013) argument for researchers to focus on how to 
improve WASH services. However, this commitment to action required balancing with the 
academic requirements of the research, and was further affected by the coup d’état in Mali 
in March 2012. 
 
I therefore describe the evolution of the research process as a whole, from the beginning of 
the fieldwork period in 2010 to the subsequent analysis and follow-up in 2012, discussing 
the three key influences on how the process unfolded. The first influence was how the 
emphasis of the research topic evolved over time as my own understanding of the problems 
developed. Although the key research themes and questions remained the same as I set out 
in Chapter One, the focus shifted in the early periods of the fieldwork between the 
sustainability and financing of community water points, and the use of household wells 
through the promotion of self-supply approaches. I discuss these changes in Section 4.2, and 
summarise the methods used.  
 
The emphasis changed again in the later part of the fieldwork as I worked more closely with 
WaterAid and its partners. The evolving partnership with WaterAid highlights the second 
major influence on the process: how I addressed the need for the research to respond to 
the three potentially competing demands of “generating knowledge, informing policy or 
guiding practice” (Cleaver and Franks 2008: 165). Given the importance of finding a balance 
between these three elements, I dedicate Section 4.3 to discussing this part of the process.  
 
I also discuss the implications for the research of the coup d’état and subsequent 
                                                 
23
 Despite the name, CASE studentships are for research in the social sciences. 
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deteriorating political and humanitarian situation from March 2012 onwards. The crisis in 
Mali had the direct impact of preventing the final planned fieldwork visits and the indirect - 
and understandable - effect of shifting the focus of WaterAid, its partners and the sector in 
general towards more immediate humanitarian concerns rather than long-term discussions 
of sustainability. I finish this chapter with an ‘honesty box’ for the limitations and trade-offs 
involved in the methodology and research process, and an assessment of how these issues 
affect the research results. 
 
 
4.2. Research timetable, methods and case study selection 
 
Overview of timetable 
 
In this section I describe the key research timetable and activities. I summarise the 
17-month period I spent in Mali to undertake language learning and fieldwork (August 2010 
to December 2011), including the different forms of involvement with WaterAid and its 
partners. I explain how the focus of the village-level research activities shifted between 
financing for the recurrent costs of community water points and the promotion of 
self-supply approaches. I go into more depth about the methods used and the relationship 
with WaterAid in subsequent sections. 
 
The first period of fieldwork, from August 2010 to January 2011, had two key aims: following 
up research I had undertaken for my Masters dissertation in 2009 and doing the preparatory 
work for the main PhD fieldwork. This follow-up to the Masters included visits to the same 
areas where I did research in 2009 to check on progress and update reports based on this 
work (to support WaterAid’s policy work, as I discuss in Section 4.3). The preparatory work 
for the PhD included language learning, piloting possible new research methods and tools, 
and discussing the selection of case study areas with WaterAid and its partners. This initial 
period was also an opportunity to build up relationships, develop further ideas with 
WaterAid staff and learn more about the organisation’s general approach by participating in 
relevant workshops and events (a full list of which is included in Appendix 1).  
 
A key question at this stage of the fieldwork was the extent to which the research focused 
on alternative service delivery models to the approach of community-based management of 
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water points which were originally installed by an external organisation. As I explained in 
Chapter Two, self-supply (initiatives undertaken by individuals, households or communities 
to improve their own water provision) is one such possibility in Mali. During my initial 
interviews with staff of WaterAid’s partners, they suggested that collective fundraising for 
the recurrent costs of community water points was so challenging that I should also strongly 
consider initiatives to promote alternatives. Therefore from February to April 2011 the 
fieldwork focused on two self-supply pilot projects, one by WaterAid’s partners and one 
which was a collaboration between UNICEF and the health services, that had tried to 
encourage households to make improvements to their own hand-dug wells to provide 
greater protection from contamination. However, as I discuss in Chapter Seven, the scope 
and results of these pilot projects were limited to small geographic areas. Therefore during 
the same period I also started research on collective fundraising for community-managed 
water supplies, and once I had completed fieldwork in the self-supply project areas, the 
research focus shifted further towards community-based systems. 
 
This shift, from May 2011, was helped by the opportunity to link the research more closely 
to WaterAid’s own initiatives using its new Sustainability Framework (WaterAid 2011b). I 
explain my involvement in this process in more detail in Section 4.3.24 In brief, it meant that 
from May to August 2011 I helped support the start of WaterAid’s discussions about how to 
use the Sustainability Framework to analyse its own work, while also continuing my own 
research on community fundraising and finishing some remaining parts of the fieldwork on 
self-supply projects. From September to December 2011, I was then more closely involved 
in supporting fieldwork by WaterAid’s partners at local government and community levels 
on sustainability and financing. During the same period I completed my own research in 
different villages and participated in a number of key WaterAid events related to different 
aspects of WASH financing. All four key stages of fieldwork that I describe above are 
summarised in Table 4.1. In the next section I set out in more detail the key methods used 
for each part of the research. 
 
                                                 
24
 I also include in Appendix 3 a copy of a short paper written for WaterAid summarising the process 
of using the Sustainability Framework in Mali (Jones 2012).  
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Table 4.1. Summary of research activities in different periods during fieldwork 
 
Period Key activities Additional activities 
August 
2010 - 
January 
2011 
• Language learning. 
• Following up Masters fieldwork 
with additional visits and 
developing subsequent briefing 
notes, a conference paper and 
a journal article. 
• Piloting new elements of the 
methodology. 
• Discussing case study village 
selection with WaterAid and its 
partners.  
• Taking part in WaterAid’s 
evaluations of CLTS pilot projects. 
• Upgrading from MPhil to PhD. 
• Attending and presenting at the 
IRC Symposium in the Netherlands 
on Costs, finances and 
accountability for sustainable 
WASH services. 
 
February - 
April 2011 
• Fieldwork on self-supply pilot 
projects and community 
fundraising. 
• Participating in key WaterAid 
events: the WaterAid West Africa 
LMDGI conference in Burkina Faso, 
a CLTS review workshop, and the 
Annual Review with partners. 
May - 
August 
2011 
• Continuing fieldwork on 
community fundraising and 
finishing fieldwork on 
self-supply. 
• Participating in the WaterAid West 
Africa sustainability workshop in 
Liberia and starting discussions 
about the Sustainability 
Framework in Mali. 
September - 
December 
2011 
• Supporting WaterAid’s 
fieldwork on financing and 
sustainability. 
• Fieldwork on municipal 
financing.  
• Finalising fieldwork on 
community fundraising.  
 
• Participating in key WaterAid 
events related to financing issues: 
workshops on sanitation 
marketing, ‘marketing’ sector 
development plans, and the Forum 
of Mayors. 
• Attending and presenting a paper 
with one of WaterAid’s partners at 
the Rural Water Supply Network 
Forum in Uganda. 
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Methods and development of research tools 
 
In Table 4.2 I give an overview of the research methods used in relation to the key empirical 
questions. For ease of reference, I present the methods in the order in which the evidence is 
used in the analytical chapters of this thesis (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) and categorise 
the methods according to the questions they contributed most towards, noting in brackets 
where methods also contributed to a second key question. I also include the key dates for 
each activity to help place these within the chronological timetable described above. I 
include a full list of research activities in Appendix 1 and copies of research tools in 
Appendix 2.  
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Table 4.2. Summary of key methods and scope within different research areas 
 
Research questions Methods and scope Used in Key dates 
• What are the influences at 
national level on rural 
water sector policy and 
practice concerning 
service delivery 
approaches and 
cost-sharing 
arrangements? 
• What is WaterAid’s role in 
influencing the national 
sector? 
• 17 semi-structured interviews 
with WaterAid partners and 
other key informants in the 
water sector. 
• Participation and observation 
in nine WaterAid events and 
workshops. 
• Support to organising a further 
three workshops as part of 
WaterAid’s research using the 
Sustainability Framework. 
Chapter 
Five 
Sept 2010 
- Dec 2011 
& Nov 
2012 
(remotely) 
• What are the 
contributions of different 
actors to recurrent costs 
at local levels?  
• How and why have these 
cost-sharing arrangements 
emerged? 
• What models of service 
delivery and direct 
support are used? 
• What is the influence of 
WaterAid and its partners 
on institutional change at 
municipal levels? 
• 14 semi-structured interviews 
with WaterAid staff, partners, 
local government officials and 
area mechanics across five 
municipalities (a total of 22 
interviewees, since some were 
joint interviews).  
• Quantitative expenditure data 
was collected from the key 
informants in four of the 
municipalities. 
Chapter 
Six 
Jul - Nov 
2011 
• What is the functionality 
of water points associated 
with these cost-sharing 
arrangements? 
• Survey by WaterAid’s partners 
and local consultants of all 
1342 water points in the 15 
rural municipalities where 
WaterAid works (I supported 
the development of the survey 
tool and performed the data 
analysis myself). 
Chapter 
Six 
Nov 2011 
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Research questions Methods and scope Used in Key dates 
• What are the community 
contributions to recurrent 
costs and how do 
communities raise this 
money?  
• How and why have these 
arrangements emerged? 
 
 
 
• (Key informant interviews and 
budget analysis in four 
municipalities and the water 
point survey in 15 
municipalities as described 
above.) 
• 15 key informant interviews 
and six focus groups and 
participatory exercises across 
two communities. 
• Eight focus group discussions 
(by WaterAid’s partners) across 
eight communities considered 
examples of successful 
fundraising, and eight 
follow-up group interviews 
with water management 
committees and women’s 
groups in four of these 
communities (by me).  
Chapter 
Seven 
Mar - May 
2011 & 
Aug - Nov 
2011 
• How does household 
expenditure on water 
services compare to 
expenditure on other 
services and assets? 
• What are the limits to 
what users are able and 
willing to pay? 
 
• Four focus groups and 
participatory exercises across 
two communities. 
• Structured interviews and 
accompanying quantitative 
financial questionnaire in 11 
households across two 
communities. Two interviews 
were conducted with each 
male household head, one 
interview with each female. 
• 375 rapid household surveys 
(by WaterAid’s partners) across 
16 communities in four 
municipalities. 
Chapter 
Seven 
March - 
Nov 2011 
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Research questions Methods and scope Used in Key dates 
• What water sources do 
people actually use? Are 
these improved or 
unimproved points? 
• (375 rapid household surveys 
as described above.)  
• Focus group discussions (by 
WaterAid’s partners) in 16 
communities in four 
municipalities. 
Chapter 
Seven 
Sept - Oct 
2011 
• What alternative service 
delivery models to 
community management 
have been promoted and 
what are the results? 
• 12 semi-structured interviews 
with key informants at national 
and regional levels on 
approaches to the promotion 
of self-supply. 
• 25 semi-structured interviews 
with implementers and users in 
three municipalities (UNICEF 
pilot project) and two villages 
(for WaterAid project) where 
self-supply pilot projects were 
undertaken. 
Chapter 
Seven 
Jan - Mar 
2011 & 
June 2011 
 
 
As explained, one of the aims of the first period of fieldwork was the piloting and testing of 
tools. This was done for the participatory methods, focus group discussions and household 
surveys undertaken at community level. The tools were piloted in two communities where I 
had undertaken research for my Masters dissertation in 2009, because my translator and I 
were already known in those communities and our ‘gatekeepers’ (representatives of the 
water management committee in each village) were happy for us to spend more time there 
for the purposes of testing different methods. Data from these communities was only used 
for piloting and does not form part of the main research. Although during the research 
undertaken with WaterAid’s partners all tools were developed as collaboratively as possible, 
one of the weaknesses in this part of the research was the lack of time to pilot these tools in 
the field. I discuss this relation to the limitations and trade-offs of the research methodology 
in Section 4.5. 
 
For the semi-structured key informant interviews at national and municipal levels, broad 
interview outlines were developed to ensure key themes were covered. However these 
96 
were intentionally left open-ended to allow conversations to be as natural as possible and 
were adapted as the research progressed (Flick 2006). Analysis of the qualitative data was 
undertaken through manual coding and summarising of key findings from different 
discussions and interviews. I considered using qualitative analysis software to assist the 
coding and analysis process. However, based on my experience using qualitative analysis 
software in my Masters dissertation (for a set of over fifty semi-structured interviews on 
one key theme) I decided that the smaller number of interviews on each different question 
in this research did not justify the time investment required to set up computer-assisted 
analysis.  
 
Overall, testing the tools and analysis proved particularly important in relation to two of the 
methods used. At the start of the research, I wanted to test potential ways of assessing the 
relative poverty or wealth of different households and communities (if needed, by 
aggregating household data). Although I never planned to undertake inferential quantitative 
analysis using wealth indicators, I hoped that this data would still be useful for the purposes 
of sampling households with different wealth characteristics, understanding local 
perceptions of wealth and poverty, and enabling comparisons between the study area and 
other parts of Mali. I had some previous experience of the challenges of using participatory 
wealth ranking methods (Cleaver and Toner 2005, 2006; Hargreaves et al. 2007). During my 
previous fieldwork in Mali I attended a meeting of members of different water management 
committees, at which an outreach worker from the local NGO tried to facilitate a poverty 
ranking exercise. However, this proved almost impossible: most participants said that 
everyone in the area was poor, with no distinction between different possible levels of 
poverty (Jones 2009). Similar difficulties of attempting to conduct participatory poverty 
ranking in Mali were observed by Khan (2011).  
 
However, piloting different methods during this fieldwork showed that two useful and 
complementary approaches might be possible. The first was developing rapid household 
surveys which included the ten simple indicators used by the Progress out of Poverty Index 
or “poverty scorecard” for Mali (Schreiner 2008, 2010) and additional questions about water 
and sanitation access. The ten indicators assess the likelihood that a particular household 
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falls within the different poverty definitions that are used in Mali.25 In this research the 
poverty scorecard was intended to be used for two purposes. Firstly, it was used for 
identifying and sampling a mix of relatively poor and relatively wealthy households in the 
two villages where detailed interviews on household finances were conducted (equivalent 
to the use of the scorecard for targeting). Secondly, it had been planned to provide an 
estimate of the overall poverty rates in the case study villages, in order to compare these to 
national and regional figures. However, it was not possible to use the scorecard for this 
second purpose because of the poor quality of available secondary data in Mali. National 
estimates of poverty rates are based either on data from the 2001 Mali Poverty Evaluation 
Survey (EMEP) or more recent smaller and more specific surveys. However, the definitions 
used and rates estimated are inconsistent, so it was not possible to undertake a useful 
comparison.   
 
The second approach developed during piloting was closer to the idea of a participatory 
wealth ranking exercise and was designed to provide insights into the views of research 
participants on wealth and poverty in addition to the indicators based on national statistics. 
I developed exercises which involved participants categorising those household goods and 
assets that were considered essential (such as food and some farm equipment) and those 
considered desirable (such as a bicycle or a radio). The desirable goods were ranked in order 
of typical preference, and the essential assets were further divided into those which all 
households in the village possessed, and those which not all households possessed. In this 
way three broad categories of wealth or poverty were developed: the poorest households, 
which did not have all the essentials; households in the middle which had the assets 
considered essential but few of the desirable assets; and richer households that possessed 
many of the desirable assets. As I discuss in Chapter Seven, this exercise was helpful in 
gaining some understanding of typical household expenditure priorities.  
 
 
                                                 
25
 The scorecard is based on data from the 2001 Mali Poverty Evaluation Survey (EMEP) and extracts 
the indicators which correlate strongly with income poverty and are relatively easy to assess (e.g. 
number of children under 12 years old, occupation of adult members, construction material of house 
and ownership of assets such as a radio). Use of the tool by other organisations in Mali has shown 
that it provides very similar estimates for the percentages of households that are poor to those 
produced by much more detailed and resource-intensive surveys (BARA and IPA 2010). The tool is 
primarily designed to allow organisations who serve large numbers of poor people (such as 
microfinance organisations) to monitor the poverty rates of groups of their clients over time and to 
target services to particular groups if desired. 
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Case study selection and sampling 
 
In this section I explain how the key case study municipalities and villages were chosen for 
this research, as well as the households surveyed and key informants interviewed.  
 
Key informants at national level 
 
A combination of purposive sampling (seeking representatives of different actors in the 
water sector such as local NGOs, international NGOs, civil society coalitions, government 
and donors) and snowball sampling was used to find key informants. As I explain in Section 
4.4, fewer interviews were carried out at national level than originally intended because of 
the cancellation of the planned fieldwork in Mali in 2012 due to the coup d’état. 
 
Municipalities for analysis of cost-sharing arrangements and service delivery 
 
The municipalities selected for detailed studies of cost-sharing arrangements, service 
delivery approaches and direct support were chosen because each represented one or both 
of two particular characteristics. Firstly, three of the municipalities are the first three 
examples of WaterAid’s direct partnership approach to working with local government, as 
introduced in Chapter One. Adopted in 2008, this is the model of capacity support to local 
government and direct support to community management which WaterAid intends to 
expand to its other areas of intervention and promotes to other actors in the sector. In the 
two other rural municipalities chosen, WaterAid works with local NGOs and municipalities 
through a ‘tripartite’ arrangement, where funding goes to the local NGO rather than directly 
to the municipality. Secondly, four of the municipalities are examples of areas where the 
fundraising process that WaterAid refers to as ‘marketing’ Sector Development Plans has 
been used to seek further municipal funding, discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
These municipalities were also selected because they have relatively high levels of coverage 
compared to the Mali rural average, so they may have been at the stage where more 
attention might turn to sustainability as well as the issue of expanding coverage to new 
users. The municipalities are also in areas of Mali where it is common for people to have 
access to shallow hand-dug wells as alternative (unimproved) sources of water, which can 
reduce demand for water from improved sources and therefore create further challenges to 
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sustaining safe drinking water services. Table 4.3 below summarises the municipalities and 
their relevant characteristics. I was not able to undertake interviews with staff in 
Dandougou Fakala because security reasons meant I could not travel there personally. In the 
municipality of Yelekebougou, local government staff were unable to produce the relevant 
costs data in time. Therefore qualitative data from interviews in this municipality is used in 
relation to the process of fundraising through ‘marketing’ Sector Development Plans, but 
not quantitative data on cost-sharing (analysed in Chapter Six). 
 
Table 4.3. Case study municipalities for detailed analysis of recurrent costs  
 
 Municipality’s 
partnership 
arrangement 
with WaterAid 
Municipality 
received support 
to ‘marketing’ its 
Sector 
Development 
Plan 
Quantitative 
data used for 
detailed 
recurrent costs 
analysis 
Qualitative data 
used from 
interviews with 
municipality 
staff 
Dandougou 
Fakala 
Direct 
partnership 
No Yes No – not able to 
travel to region 
because of 
security 
restrictions 
Dialakoroba ‘Tripartite’ 
arrangement 
through partner 
NGO 
Yes Yes Yes 
Kolokani Direct 
partnership 
Yes Yes Yes 
Tioribougou Direct 
partnership 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yelekebougou ‘Tripartite’ 
arrangement 
through partner 
NGO 
Yes No – staff were 
unable to 
produce the 
information 
Yes 
 
 
In each municipality, I interviewed as many as possible of the key informants concerned 
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with financing arrangements for the recurrent costs of rural water services. This included 
the staff of the water and sanitation Technical Unit (or WaterAid’s local partner NGO which 
performed the equivalent role in two municipalities); elected officials (usually the mayor 
and the deputy mayor with designated responsibility for water and sanitation); civil servants 
(responsible for the administration of municipal expenditure); and handpump mechanics.  
 
Communities and households for analysis of collective fundraising, household finances and 
water point usage 
 
Two villages in the municipality of Dialakoroba (Bogola and Kola) were initially selected for 
examining collective fundraising and household-level financial issues because WaterAid’s 
partner NGO suggested that these communities were relatively dynamic in terms of 
collective action and could therefore represent useful case studies of village fundraising. 
Owing to this perceived dynamism, these communities had also previously been selected for 
the piloting of self-supply promotion (through demonstrations of improved traditional wells) 
and Community-Led Total Sanitation (a similar idea to self-supply for sanitation). Therefore 
the two communities could also be used as case studies of the self-supply approach as 
implemented by WaterAid’s partners, and the insights I gained into community fundraising 
in these villages helped feed into the development of the research in eight further villages. I 
discuss both these below.  
 
As set out in Table 4.2, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and participatory 
exercises on topics such as financing water supply and household expenditure were 
undertaken in these two villages (a full list is included in Appendix 1). Selection of key 
informants was by snowball sampling, starting with members of the water management 
committees. Key representatives from the water management committees also acted as 
‘gatekeepers’ to help arrange the other research activities in the villages. With their 
assistance, all of the group exercises were arranged to ensure as far as possible that there 
was a mix of male and female participants (unless it was a specific discussion about 
women’s associations, for example), from different parts of the village (to avoid members of 
one particular extended family dominating the exercise), and of different ages.  
 
Six households in each of the two communities were also chosen for detailed structured 
interviews and a financial questionnaire. A rapid survey of all households in the two villages 
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was undertaken beforehand using the poverty scorecard. This allowed the three households 
at either end of the poverty ranking to be selected, ensuring that a range of levels of wealth 
were included. The survey could not be completed with one household due to the absence 
of key household members on repeat visits, so 11 households remained in the sample 
across the two villages. As explained when discussing the results from these exercises and 
interviews in Bogola and Kola in Chapter Seven, these methods were not designed to be 
statistically significant but were intended to generate qualitative data on how people 
managed money and examples of typical expenses. 
 
The eight further communities where focus groups and interviews with water management 
committees and women’s groups were undertaken were selected by WaterAid’s partners as 
case studies that they thought represented examples of successful community fundraising 
for the costs of water services. Two villages were selected in each of the key municipalities 
discussed above. The data collected by WaterAid’s partner in the municipality of 
Yelekebougou was insufficiently detailed, so data is used from eight communities across 
four municipalities rather than ten communities across all five municipalities. I discuss 
further the challenge of developing in-depth qualitative research with WaterAid’s partners, 
given the limited time they had available to dedicate to this work, in Section 4.5.  
 
WaterAid’s partners also selected two communities in each municipality which they 
considered particularly problematic in terms of encouraging community fundraising. Data 
from these communities is not used in relation to financing issues (because there was little 
evidence of collective fundraising in these villages), but is used from the focus group 
discussions and rapid household surveys on water point usage. The selection of these 
communities aimed to ensure that evidence on the usage of improved and unimproved 
water sources was drawn from villages which are more likely to represent the range of 
levels of success of managing community water supplies across a wider area.  
 
Municipalities and communities for self-supply approaches 
 
The selection of case study locations for examining two approaches to the promotion of 
self-supply (by UNICEF and WaterAid) was based on suggestions by key informants involved 
in the two pilot projects. The areas were recommended as good examples of the potential 
for such approaches where the implementers were thought to be committed and the target 
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populations receptive. For the UNICEF project, the location chosen for case study research 
was the health district of Dioila, where three municipalities piloted self-supply (Banco, 
Massigui, Ngolobougou), because the health services at district and municipality levels in 
Dioila were considered proactive and a good example by a previous study soon after the 
initial piloting (Sutton 2009b; 2010). For analysing WaterAid’s approach, the villages of 
Bogola and Kola in the municipality of Dialakoroba were selected, as explained above, 
because these villages were considered dynamic and had been chosen for piloting the 
promotion of self-supply. The interviewees in Dioila (key representatives of health services 
and other key informants such as masons trained during the project in each of the three 
municipalities) were chosen through snowball sampling. Key informant interviews and focus 
groups were also held in the two villages in the municipality of Dialakoroba in relation to the 
WaterAid work. 
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4.3. Research for knowledge, policy and practice 
 
Here I discuss in more detail the process of balancing the aims of “generating knowledge, 
informing policy or guiding practice” (Cleaver and Franks 2008: 165) throughout the 
partnership with WaterAid.26 I focus in particular on how my relationship with WaterAid 
changed with the introduction of the organisation’s new Sustainability Framework 
(WaterAid 2011b) and relate this to both my own previous background as a practitioner and 
the academic literature on researchers engaging with development workers.  
 
Planning research to meet three demands 
 
The three categories of research for knowledge, policy and practice are proposed by Cleaver 
and Franks (2008) based on their own experiences in the water sector. They aim to help 
explore the possible tensions within the range of academic activities which are termed 
‘research’, and to suggest how these might differ in terms of scope, focus, timescale, type of 
data and presentation of results, and audience. Although acknowledging that the 
boundaries between research for knowledge, research for policy, and research for practice 
can sometimes be unclear, I still think it is useful to consider which parts of a doctoral 
research project might respond to each objective. Therefore by adapting the work of 
Cleaver and Franks, I set out these different demands in the context of my research in terms 
of scope, focus, and the type of data and results, as shown in Table 4.4. 
 
                                                 
26
 A version of this section appears as a chapter (Jones 2013b, forthcoming) in an edited book 
addressing the ethical challenges that research students typically face when conducting fieldwork in 
developing countries. The book emerged from discussions at workshops and conference sessions in 
2010 that I was involved in organising in my role as a postgraduate representative of the Developing 
Areas Research Group of the Royal Geographic Society – Institute of British Geographers. I am 
grateful to Jenny Lunn, the book’s editor, for comments on a previous draft.  
104 
Table 4.4. Research for knowledge, policy and practice (adapted from Cleaver and Franks 
2008: 165) 
 
Research 
for: 
Knowledge Policy Practice  
Definition of scope: 
Cleaver & 
Franks: 
By researchers 
   
By policy makers  By users  
In this 
research: 
Broadly defined by the 
supervisory team, and 
later refined by me as 
the researcher. 
By me, WaterAid’s policy and advocacy team 
(trying to influence policy makers) and 
programmes team (trying to improve 
interventions). 
Focus:  
Cleaver & 
Franks: 
Improved understanding 
of the world around us  
Evidence of outcomes  Guidance for 
interventions  
In this 
research: 
Improved understanding 
of how and why the 
costs of water provision 
are shared between 
different actors. 
Evidence of the costs 
(inputs) and 
effectiveness (outputs) 
of WaterAid’s approach 
to working with local 
governments. 
Guidance to improve 
the effectiveness of 
the work of WaterAid’s 
partners with 
communities and local 
governments. 
Type of data and presentation of results: 
Cleaver & 
Franks:  
Intensive or extensive 
empirical research with 
findings generalised to 
theoretical propositions 
and to raising further 
questions. Uncertainty 
accommodated. 
Generalised, focus on 
'success stories', 'best 
practices' with lessons 
for 'scaling up' and 
'scaling out'. Certainty of 
linkages (inputs and 
outputs) required.  
Specific and localised, 
often presented as 
tools or checklists. 
In this 
research: 
Extensive qualitative and 
quantitative research, 
relating the findings to 
academic theory on the 
delivery of public 
services, institutional 
change and the role of 
NGOs. 
Lessons which could 
promote the adoption of 
WaterAid’s approach 
(‘scaling up’) by other 
actors. Some demand 
for ‘success stories’ of 
‘best practice’ for 
WaterAid’s partners.  
Tools for monitoring 
the costs of water 
provision and analysing 
users’ willingness and 
ability to pay which 
could be used by 
WaterAid’s partners.  
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Before beginning my fieldwork, I had recognised the need to consider how my research 
could respond to these three areas, but had agreed with WaterAid that the forms of the 
contributions to policy and practice could be discussed and clarified as the fieldwork 
progressed. In fact, I had already undertaken fieldwork on a related topic with WaterAid for 
my Masters dissertation, and I was able to use time at the start of the doctoral research 
fieldwork to finalise two case study reports based on this previous research. This acted as a 
way of presenting some research for policy purposes, as additional evidence for staff of 
WaterAid in the UK (as part of moves in the organisation overall to focus more on the 
sustainability of its interventions) and Mali (to help demonstrate the work of WaterAid’s 
Regional Learning Centre in promoting research and learning for decentralised water and 
sanitation services in West Africa). This work also helped me demonstrate to WaterAid staff 
in Mali my commitment to the policy relevance of the ongoing doctoral research. These 
reports served as examples of the types of outputs that could be produced, even if I later 
felt that the collaborative process itself was as important as the tangible ‘products’ that 
emerged. 
 
The start of the actual fieldwork in Mali was then perhaps a fairly typical experience of a 
geography student doing doctoral research in the Global South. As I explained in Section 4.1, 
I engaged my own translator and travelled with him to different villages where I began 
qualitative research on how payments for access to drinking water were organised in 
different communities. This was a little removed from the day-to-day practical activities and 
immediate policy requirements of WaterAid and its partners as at this stage I was looking 
for examples of what might be thought of as ‘interesting practice’ at community levels 
rather than ‘best practices’ to be replicated.  
 
During this stage of the fieldwork, I tried to follow the advice of Mercer (2006) on working 
with NGOs by attempting to establish and maintain an independent identity for myself so 
that I was not seen by research participants (water users and other stakeholders such as 
local government staff) as a representative of WaterAid or its partners. I had a related 
concern of avoiding raising the expectations of research participants that direct action might 
be taken as a result of the research outcomes. On reflection, these two challenges were 
difficult to address; despite trying to explain my position as a researcher, I think there were 
some research participants (especially community members, as opposed to local 
government staff) who did not make the distinction between this role and that of others 
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who actually work for WaterAid.  
 
This is perhaps unsurprising when even community members who were very active in their 
village water committees were at times unsure about which of the different NGO 
representatives who came to their village worked for which organisation, on occasion 
confusing staff from another organisation with those who worked for WaterAid’s partners. 
Therefore it is possible that some research participants might have thought I was acting on 
behalf of WaterAid or had more influence then I did, and therefore said what they thought I 
wanted to hear. However, I tried to minimise this influence by probing and checking within 
interviews and focus groups, and further triangulation of sources of data where possible. 
For example, when investigating how different villages undertake collective fundraising, I 
drew on focus groups undertaken by WaterAid’s partners as well as follow-up group 
interviews with water committees and women’s groups that I conducted myself.  
 
 
Supporting research for policy and practice 
 
Having spent the early period attempting to establish my position as an independent 
researcher, my relationship with WaterAid changed just over halfway through the fieldwork. 
As part of broader moves in WaterAid internationally to address the challenge of the 
sustainability of water and sanitation interventions, WaterAid organised a regional 
workshop in Liberia for representatives of its different country programmes in West Africa 
to discuss the implementation of its new Sustainability Framework (WaterAid 2011b) in 
relation to rural water services. I was invited to attend since my research was addressing a 
key aspect of sustainability. Because of this, I became - as one of the organisers put it - a “de 
facto member of the WaterAid Mali team” for the discussions about how to use the 
framework to address the challenge of sustainability in Mali. The results of the workshop 
included each country programme drafting an action plan for the research required to guide 
WaterAid’s practice and inform national policy regarding sustainability in their country of 
work. 
 
In hindsight, I realise that I had been practising what Eyben (2010) calls “planned 
opportunism”; I had known that there was a growing movement within WaterAid 
internationally to more explicitly address the problem of sustainability in the sector, and the 
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launch of the Sustainability Framework in the West Africa region was a moment when I saw 
that my support could potentially contribute to some of these changes in the context of 
WaterAid’s work in Mali. Owing to my presence at the workshop, the relevance and 
flexibility of my ongoing fieldwork, and the temporarily reduced capacity of WaterAid’s 
programmes and policy teams in Mali at the time27 (due to changes in staffing structure 
including secondments and ongoing recruitment), I became the joint lead for the proposed 
research on sustainability in Mali. My role was therefore somewhere between technical 
consultant and research manager. At the same time, I was still hoping from my perspective 
as a doctoral student that this research could contribute data which I would use for the 
academic knowledge required by my thesis as well. 
 
Although I thought that this role could help fulfil part of how I saw my commitment to 
WaterAid, I was wary at the time that there were potential challenges involved as well. I 
certainly wanted to avoid influencing the research direction too much so that it became a 
vehicle for gathering additional data which would serve only my academic work and not the 
requirements of WaterAid. Related to this concern was the possibility that my involvement 
would reduce ownership of the process by WaterAid and its partners so that any potential 
changes to policy or practice suggested by the research would be less likely to be adopted. A 
final possibility was that the research went too far in the other direction to become a 
practice-oriented project with insufficient methodological rigour to be used as part of my 
doctorate. Bell and Read (1998) specifically caution against falling into this trap as part of 
their advice to students working on collaborative projects. 
  
I tried to mitigate these risks by working with WaterAid staff to develop an iterative process 
for the research on sustainability, where the exact themes, questions and approaches were 
developed through a series of workshops with representatives of WaterAid’s partner 
organisations. The fieldwork was carried out between the workshops by WaterAid’s 
partners using tools that I had drafted but which had been discussed and validated in the 
workshops. I also took the lead on the initial data analysis, but these results were discussed 
together as much as possible so that the partners could draw out the implications for their 
own activities. I conducted short follow-up visits to some areas where the teams had 
identified potentially interesting findings in order to do further qualitative research which 
                                                 
27
 As Carr writes in his contribution to Simon et al. (2011), “in understaffed agencies, as most are, it is 
startling the number of events and outcomes that are influenced by the simple issue of who has time 
to look over the documents or attend the meeting in question” (Simon et al. 2011: 2797). 
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could contribute to my thesis. In this way the research that was done primarily for policy 
and practice could be extended into research for academic knowledge as well.  
 
Although at some points during the research activities I felt over-involved in the details of 
the process (rather than simply being an adviser on research methods), I agree with Edward 
Carr (writing in Simon et al. 2011) that there are wider benefits to academic development 
geographers (and others doing research on international development) of working in a 
development organisation. Carr argues that:  
 
… without an understanding of mundane bureaucratic moments such as budgeting, 
contracting, and monitoring and evaluation it is simply impossible to understand why 
agencies do what they do, or reliably to identify points of intervention that might 
change practice in the world. (Carr, in Simon et al. 2011: 2797) 
 
In my case, the benefits came from working closely enough with WaterAid’s partners to 
understand how the possible practical lessons for WaterAid emerging from the research 
might be enabled or constrained by the organisation’s existing annual cycle of planning, 
budgeting, monitoring and reporting. For example, the partners agreed as part of the 
actions resulting from the analysis to develop approaches for more closely monitoring the 
functionality of all the water points in their areas of intervention. However, the figures they 
had to report to WaterAid were the numbers of new water points constructed (or old water 
points fully rehabilitated) in the relevant reporting period. Therefore given limited time and 
resources there was less incentive for them to undertake the more detailed monitoring of 
functionality. This reporting process started to change across all WaterAid’s country 
programmes in 2012, to include consideration of the actual operation of water points up to 
10 years after their installation, which will address this issue.  
 
From the partners’ perspective, they saw two ways in which contributions from an academic 
perspective could benefit their own work. The first of these was in relating their practice to 
wider academic and sector debates, through raising questions and suggesting ideas. The 
second was in the support to developing data collection and analysis tools. Both of these 
possibilities had been identified as potential benefits at the start of the collaboration, but 
thinking more in terms of the outputs or products (such as policy reports and tools) rather 
than the actual process involved. On reflection, I argue that the process was just as 
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important as a means for everyone involved to learn from each other in ways that might 
provoke further critical reflection about these ideas in future work. 
 
 
Acknowledging personal and professional motivations 
 
As well as the benefits that I have argued for so far, I also have to acknowledge that my 
willingness to work with WaterAid in this more direct research management role was 
related to my own background as more of a practitioner than researcher. Before starting my 
postgraduate studies, I had been working as a water and sanitation engineer in the 
implementation of infrastructure projects for an NGO in Kyrgyzstan, and had previously 
managed a small NGO in the UK. I enjoyed the hands-on management aspects of these roles, 
and was eager to take the opportunity to include more of this type of role within the PhD 
when the chance arose, for both my own personal satisfaction and professional 
development.  
 
However, I was also conscious of the need to remain reflective in this “development 
manager” part of my overall role. As Abbott et al. (2007) and Wilson (2006) argue, 
development practitioners should be aware of the criticism of them as ‘technocrats’ 
legitimising a particular form of Western development (see Kothari (2005) for an example of 
this critique), and should seek ways of promoting learning together with those they are 
hoping to benefit. This was what I tried to support in the research process with WaterAid 
and those working for its partner organisations (although our focus was on learning within 
this group of NGO and local government staff, with less involvement of the actual water 
users themselves).  
 
The period immediately after returning from fieldwork in early 2012 was important to me 
for further reflection and additional feedback on how I had tried to balance these issues. I 
gave a presentation at WaterAid’s London office on how my academic fieldwork and the 
other research activities had developed in Mali, which allowed me to discuss these issues of 
balancing objectives and ownership with others who were experienced in research with 
both academia and NGOs. Following this, I was also invited to present at a larger learning 
event for organisations working in the rural water sector, which fed in to a wider debate 
about how different groups (academics, practitioners and donors) can contribute to learning 
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in the sector. Both these occasions were useful opportunities to reflect on my engagement 
with WaterAid during fieldwork, and highlighted the importance of discussing these sorts of 
issues with others. 
 
Later in 2012 and in early 2013, when my continued engagement with WaterAid in Mali on 
the issues of sustainability and financing was limited (as I explain when I discuss the 
implications of the coup d’état in Section 4.4), I still tried to support WaterAid in other ways. 
In the second half of 2012, six other WaterAid country programmes undertook research on 
the financial sustainability of WASH services. I was able to help this process by providing an 
example of how the WASHCost life-cycle costs approach had been adapted into the context 
of one WaterAid country programme’s work, advising on proposed research methodologies 
and plans, reviewing draft reports and supporting the facilitation of the final workshop. This 
benefited both WaterAid and me: the other country programmes were able to draw on my 
experiences in Mali, and I learnt more about similar methods and issues in other contexts.  
 
Figure 4.1. With members of the WaterAid team at my leaving presentation  
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4.4. Implications of the military coup 
 
After leaving Mali in December 2011 after the main period of fieldwork, I planned to return 
in May and June 2012 for follow-up work. This would allow me a few months at the start of 
2012 to undertake further analysis of the data gathered (beyond the initial steps taken while 
still in Mali), including on the key themes which also formed part of WaterAid’s research 
using its Sustainability Framework. I hoped to return to Mali to discuss the results with 
WaterAid and its partners, and to undertake further research in the sector to understand 
the views of other organisations on the issue of sharing recurrent costs. Although I had 
carried out some interviews with other sector actors while in Mali in 2012, I had decided 
that it would be most productive if I did most interviews at a point where I had some results 
to share with them, rather than being solely extractive. This seemed particularly relevant for 
a potentially sensitive issue such as costs and financing; if I was asking for details of other 
organisations’ budgets and approaches, it seemed appropriate if WaterAid and I could share 
our own findings to demonstrate our willingness to help open up this debate in the sector. 
In principle, this would also be a suitable time for me to offer some brief follow-up support 
to WaterAid’s partners if they were beginning to implement new approaches to monitoring 
costs from the start of their new financial year in April 2012. 
 
However, in March 2012 Mali suffered a coup d’état, leading to a political and humanitarian 
crisis as different parts of the army and political class struggled for power in Bamako, while a 
combination of rebel groups seized major towns and took control of the northern half of the 
country. Official warnings from Western embassies, including the UK, USA and France, 
advised their citizens to leave and most expatriates evacuated. Understandably, priorities 
for the water sector shifted towards immediate humanitarian action for displaced 
populations, rather than questions of longer-term sustainability. Most donors halted their 
aid to the sector: the national water directorate lost 90% of its funding (WaterAid 2012). 
Based on UK government advice (concerning the uncertain security situation) and 
discussions with WaterAid (about the appropriate time to continue research activities given 
the changed context), I postponed the planned visit, agreeing to wait until later in 2012 to 
see if the situation stabilised. 
 
In the meantime, I drafted short papers on the results of the costs analysis at local 
government levels (presented here in Chapter Six) for discussion and validation remotely 
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with WaterAid staff, even if the situation was not conducive to using these for wider 
dissemination and debate in the sector. This work was also shared as an example for the 
other WaterAid country programmes that were beginning research on the costs and 
sustainability of WASH services. Back in Mali, the two key members of WaterAid staff who 
had been leading the work on the Sustainability Framework, including my WaterAid 
supervisor, left the team to take up posts in other organisations. This posed an additional 
challenge to the organisation’s progress in using the Sustainability Framework, and to the 
depth of my ongoing engagement with WaterAid in Mali.  
 
By September 2012, Mali’s political situation was still uncertain and it looked unlikely that I 
would be able to gain permission from the university to return given that the official advice 
from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office was not to travel to the country. However, 
as an alternative measure I had developed with WaterAid a list of other contacts in the 
sector who might be willing to take part in phone interviews. I was able to do this with key 
representatives in other organisations who I had met already at events or meetings while I 
was in Mali in 2011, who remembered me and were happy to help the research. However it 
proved much harder to establish and engage with new contacts remotely, so the resulting 
data from these interviews was less extensive and in-depth than I had hoped for if I had 
been able to conduct them in person. Therefore the analysis of the national context and 
sector policy presented in Chapter Five relies more heavily on secondary data. In early 2013, 
as the French military intervention to combat the rebel advance further south began, I 
agreed with WaterAid and the university that a return to Mali within the scope of the PhD 
would no longer be possible and I should concentrate on finishing the thesis with the data I 
did have, even if this was less than I had originally planned.  
 
 
4.5. 'Honesty box': limitations and trade-offs 
 
This section represents the ‘honesty box’ for the methodology: a place to record the ‘warts’ 
in the data and the things that did not quite go as hoped or planned during fieldwork 
(Hamilton and Kessler 2004; Pisani 2009). What is important, however, is to honestly assess 
the effect of such challenges on the results obtained, and to suggest lessons which might 
help future researchers. I have already discussed the effect of the coup d’état. In this section 
I describe two further challenges, discuss the trade-offs involved in attempting to overcome 
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them, and identify the limitations which remained. The first key challenge was in 
undertaking research involving two different languages, French and Bambara. The second 
concerns working with assistants to undertake qualitative research. 
 
 
Languages: French and Bambara 
 
The original proposal for this PhD studentship stated that candidates required at least 
intermediate-level French skills (the official language in Mali) and should be willing to 
develop some skills in Bambara (the country’s main indigenous language). In reality, even 
organising the basic logistics of my fieldwork would have been extremely difficult without a 
high level of French. I also appreciated early on that learning some Bambara was likely to be 
important for day-to-day relations with colleagues and research participants. Therefore in 
this section I describe my efforts to improve my abilities in the two languages to the 
appropriate levels and discuss the trade-offs involved in decisions about how and when to 
learn the languages. I was in the extremely fortunate position of having the option to extend 
my PhD length and funding to spend time dedicated to language study, thanks to my 
Economic and Social Research Council studentship. The potential benefits to my research, 
personal life and professional development were clear, so I requested and received an 
extension of seven months, allowing language training of three months in French and four 
months in Bambara.28 I undertook the language training just before and during the period of 
PhD fieldwork, between July 2010 and December 2011.  
 
Although I never became completely fluent in French, I was able to work confidently with 
WaterAid, conduct all interviews,29 and write research tools and reports in French.30 I did 
encounter some challenges in asking or writing precise questions on topics that were 
                                                 
28
 These periods corresponded to the ESRC guidelines (ESRC 2011) which allocate different lengths of 
extension depending on the difficulty of the relevant language. All European languages qualify for 
three months’ study. Bambara is tonal and is therefore classed as a language which “presents intrinsic 
difficulties for speakers of English” (ESRC 2011: 53). However the guidelines also consider the 
availability of learning resources for each language. Study materials do exist for Bambara (developed 
for Peace Corps volunteers in Mali) so it does not qualify for the maximum six months possible for 
this category. Instead I requested and was awarded four months. 
29
 The only exceptions were two key informant interviews with expatriate technical advisors in donor 
organisations which were held in English. 
30
 However, I would describe my oral French as near-fluent: while in Mali I passed Level C1 of the 
DALF exam (Advanced Diploma in the French Language) organised by the French Ministry of 
Education, certifying a level of fluency sufficient to undertake a Masters-level course in a French 
university. After some persuasion from friends, I also took part in an improv theatre group in French. 
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already somewhat ambiguous amongst participants, for example in relation to the 
definitions of different types of maintenance of water points (discussed in detail in Chapter 
Seven). This challenge of being precise in French slowed research progress slightly because 
of the additional time needed for discussion, clarification and validation of key terms and 
results. For example, when WaterAid’s partners completed an initial survey I developed on 
local cost-sharing, it was clear that different respondents had interpreted certain terms in 
different ways, even though I had checked the French terms in advance with WaterAid staff. 
Therefore we spent time on more detailed discussions and clarification in subsequent 
workshops.  
 
For Bambara, I combined a homestay, private tuition, self-study and immersion in addition 
to my fieldwork. My homestay was for one month in Bamako before beginning fieldwork. 
Throughout the remainder of the fieldwork period I took private lessons and dedicated time 
during field visits to further learning and practice with research participants and others, 
which took up the additional three months allowed. In hindsight, it might have been helpful 
to organise an additional immersive homestay outside Bamako for a few weeks at the start 
of the fieldwork. This would have enabled me to solely focus on learning Bambara, whereas 
in Bamako I was also trying to attend WaterAid events and begin planning fieldwork 
activities. This illustrates the trade-off I had to address between dedicating time to language 
learning and spending time to better understand WaterAid’s activities and to develop 
relationships with staff and partners. As previously discussed, I think this time building 
relationships was hugely beneficial in terms of how the research partnership with WaterAid 
developed, but it slowed my attempts to make progress in Bambara.  
 
Despite these limitations, I did develop sufficient Bambara skills to understand responses to 
simple survey questions. As expected, however, I still required a translator (between 
Bambara and French) for more detailed interviews. My knowledge of Bambara was also 
useful in checking that my translator had covered all elements of a participant’s response, 
especially in group interviews and focus groups. Perhaps more importantly, my Bambara 
was very helpful for chatting informally with participants outside formal interviews, 
particularly regarding Mali’s system of kinship joking (exchanging jokes with others 
according to the relation between your family names). I was given the Malian name “Chaka 
Diallo” by WaterAid colleagues, on the basis that it was the closest-sounding to my English 
name. The Diallos are traditionally herders in Mali, so jokes regarding my name tended to 
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revolve around “my cows” (that all Diallos would have). I became very used to responding to 
the teasing exclamation “Ah, Diallo! Where are your cows?” with a joking reply such as “My 
cows are in England, they wouldn’t go in the aeroplane!” This demonstrated to research 
participants - and others I met in daily life - my willingness to learn about and engage with 
their culture, at least to the limited extent which I could. WaterAid staff and partners also 
appreciated my attempts, and I was often introduced to visitors to the office with “… and he 
speaks Bambara too!” 
 
 
Working with assistants for qualitative research 
 
Even given my progress in French and Bambara, I found attempting to undertake in-depth 
qualitative research through the medium of two different languages very challenging. This 
issue relates to my own ability as a qualitative researcher and my use of research assistants. 
I had an extremely good working relationship and personal friendship with my main 
research assistant (whose other strengths included his calm in the face of logistical 
challenges, such as those posed by the rainy season shown in Figure 4.2). However, he was 
not trained as a social scientist or in qualitative research methods, and at one point during 
the fieldwork I considered the possibility of engaging a wider team, ideally of Malian 
students or researchers with more experience in field research such as conducting 
interviews and facilitating focus group discussions. I felt that this would help the depth and 
quality of the community-level research, especially on topics such as village fundraising.  
 
However I eventually decided against this approach for two reasons. Firstly, feedback from 
my academic supervisors was that such people were hard to find and additional formal 
training was not a guarantee of ability. Secondly, as the research progressed and I worked 
more closely with WaterAid and its partners, I agreed in discussions with my WaterAid Mali 
supervisor that it was preferable that the field agents of the partners undertook these roles 
where possible, for the dual reason that they would have important insights to contribute 
and would be more invested in the results. However, since they were already busy with 
their usual activities, it was hard for them to dedicate time for the preparatory workshops 
where we discussed the research methods and approaches, or to allow time for testing the 
tools in the field. It was also difficult for us all to reach the same levels of understanding of 
concepts such as the life-cycle costs approach in the time available.  
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The result was that some of the initial community-level data from research activities 
undertaken by WaterAid’s partners was less detailed than originally planned. This was part 
of the reason why I undertook follow-up visits to some areas where possible, as explained in 
Section 4.3. This process of follow-up helped validate and deepen the qualitative data 
obtained, but demonstrates the challenges in achieving breadth, depth and relevance in 
qualitative research. In hindsight, I think I could have discussed with WaterAid and its 
partners how the research activities could be split between their own staff and additional 
teams engaged specifically for that purpose who had more time available for training, 
piloting and the fieldwork itself. Seeking a compromise of this form would be my 
recommendation to other researchers facing similar challenges. 
 
Figure 4.2. The challenges of travel in the wet season 
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4.6. Conclusions 
 
I draw out key lessons from this chapter reflecting on the research methodology and 
partnership with WaterAid which are important both for this research project and others. 
Firstly, my experience shows that collaborative studentships such as this can be an effective 
way for doctoral researchers to help bridge the demands of research for knowledge, policy 
and practice. However, meeting these three objectives may require closer engagement with 
the partner organisation than simply adopting the basic “characteristics of a good 
employee” (such as meeting deadlines and respecting the partner organisation’s interests) 
proposed in guidelines for students undertaking collaborative research projects (Bell and 
Read 1998: 27). I argue that it was important for me to go further than this and at times act 
more like an actual employee of WaterAid - albeit temporarily - for the benefit of both 
parties.  
 
This conclusion is linked to my view that thinking about process is as important as the 
eventual products of collaborative doctoral research, especially for the parts of the research 
seeking to improve practice. This observation was reflected in my own learning about the 
approaches and internal workings of WaterAid and its partners, which was crucial in 
understanding their decision-making processes and feeds into the analysis presented in 
Chapters Six and Seven concerning how WaterAid’s partners work with local governments 
and communities. I also hope that the experience for WaterAid’s partners of developing a 
collaborative investigation with a research student was a process which could help inform 
analysis that they undertake in their future work. 
 
However, I also acknowledge key limitations in the research process. Two of these were 
related to my own abilities: my command of the two languages used for the research and 
my ability to undertake qualitative research with assistants. A third factor, outside my 
control, was the military coup in Mali in 2012. I have explained that I made deliberate 
trade-offs regarding the first two issues. I prioritised building up relationships and working 
closely with the staff of WaterAid and its partners in undertaking the field research, in 
preference to spending additional time dedicated to learning Bambara, and working more 
with other researchers trained in qualitative methods. Therefore the limitations concerning 
the depth of some of the research at community and household levels are countered by 
advantages in how I was able to engage closely with WaterAid’s partners in their work 
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across community and municipal levels, discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.  
 
Finally, although the coup d’état meant that I was not able to complete all the research I 
had planned with other actors in the wider water sector, I am still able to draw on some 
primary research, as well as secondary evidence, concerning key national-level factors 
affecting the sustainability and financing of rural water services. I turn to this issue next, in 
Chapter Five, before focusing the analysis on the work of WaterAid and its partners at 
municipal and community levels in Chapters Six and Seven. In Chapter Eight I then draw the 
different strands of analysis together in relation to the research themes, and propose 
directions for future work that could build on this research. 
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Chapter Five - National context and the enabling environment in Mali 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I use the extended political economy approach developed in Chapter Three 
to guide an analysis of key issues at a national level that affect the sustainability and 
financing of services in the Mali rural water sector.31 To do this involves firstly looking 
beyond the water sector in order to understand these issues within broader structural 
factors: Mali’s historical context, especially in regard to aid dependency and the influence of 
international donors on policymaking; ongoing processes of decentralisation; and the state 
of civil society. Given these structural factors, the analytical framework then poses the 
question of to what extent policies and frameworks for rural water services delivery and 
financing represent “reforms as signals” (Andrews 2013), where reforms are 
externally-driven and adopted on paper, but lack the intended functionality in practice. Is 
there evidence of processes of “bricolage” (Cleaver 2012; Andrews 2013) in sector reform at 
national levels towards arrangements which are more likely to deliver sustainable services? 
This also involves examining “policy space” (Hickey 2009b) and “room for manoeuvre” 
(Grindle 2007) in what reforms are actually up for discussion, and the ability and approaches 
of different actors to influence these, especially WaterAid and its civil society partners. 
 
As explained in the last chapter, the coup d’état in Mali reduced the amount of research 
possible at national levels from what was originally planned. Therefore this chapter draws 
on secondary data in addition to the primary research carried out. I use predominantly 
secondary data in the first part of the chapter to explain the context of government-donor 
relations and decentralisation in Mali, and their overall relevance to the water sector. As the 
analysis focuses in more detail on the water sector itself later in the chapter, I continue to 
use secondary data but also draw on observations from attendance at meetings and 
workshops in the sector, and interviews with representatives of different organisations 
working on rural water supply. 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Parts of this chapter, especially Section 5.3, draw on a forthcoming peer-reviewed journal article 
(Jones 2013d, forthcoming [accepted pending revisions]). I thank three anonymous reviewers for 
their comments.  
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5.2. Historical context: donors, decentralisation and civil society 
 
In this section I focus on key structural and contextual issues at the national level in Mali 
which influence the ability of the rural water sector to develop sustainable financing 
mechanisms. Firstly, I discuss Mali’s dependence on aid and the historically important role 
of international donors in influencing national policymaking. Secondly, I explain the history 
and national-level drivers behind the country’s decentralisation reforms since the early 
1990s. Thirdly, I assess the state of civil society, especially in relation to the ability of civil 
society organisations to influence policymaking and act as a ‘watchdog’ on government. 
 
 
Aid dependency and the influence of donors 
 
Since the early 2000s, aid received by Mali has consistently represented 10-15% of GNI 
(OECD-DAC 2012; van de Walle 2012) and up to 50% of the government budget, passing 
US$1 billion for the first time in 2007 and remaining about US$ 900 million per year since 
2008. From 2006-2009, average annual aid represented US$ 75 per Malian (van de Walle 
2012). Interviews undertaken with both donor and government representatives by van de 
Walle (2012) in 2011 suggested a common belief in Mali having received a ‘democracy 
dividend’ in terms of increased aid in the early 1990s after democratisation. However van de 
Walle argues that this view is not supported by the available figures, which show aid varying 
between about US$ 400 and US$ 600 million per year during the 1990s, until a sharp 
increase after 2000 which was likely driven more by international trends than particular 
government-donor relations in Mali.  
 
A series of analysts argue that this aid dependency has resulted in policymaking processes 
dominated by donors, with little national ownership of plans for development and poverty 
reduction (Dante et al. 2003; Magassa and Meyer 2008; Bergamaschi 2009; van de Walle 
2012). For example, before the elaboration of Mali’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) in 2002, the country already had a poverty reduction plan in the form of the Stratégie 
Nationale de Lutte contre la Pauvreté (SNLP), which had itself been created with the support 
of the UNDP. However, the World Bank and the IMF argued that this plan was insufficient as 
the core basis for the PRSP because of weaknesses in its macro-level analysis and overall 
coherence (Dante et al. 2003; Bergamaschi 2008). Although a compromise was eventually 
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reached between the government and the international institutions, allowing the SNLP to be 
one of the main sources used to develop the PRSP, this example demonstrates the 
difficulties faced when national planning capacities are weak in comparison to what is 
needed to satisfy donor demands - or when donors overlook this issue. Van de Walle (2012) 
notes that donor reports do often moderate their criticisms with comments that national 
capacities for policymaking and public administration are improving, but that this is not 
cause for optimism because similar observations have been made in reports going as far 
back as the 1960s. This suggests that Mali is a case - in the words of Andrews (2013) - where 
history repeats itself through a series of attempted reforms where donors blame contextual 
factors (such as lack of capacity) which they overlooked. Failing to properly consider the 
context for possible reforms is one element of what Andrews calls “reforms as signals”. 
 
Some observers extend the argument of compliance by suggesting that government 
agreement with most donor demands, especially under Amadou Toumani Touré (President 
from 2002 until the coup d’état in 2012) has been due to a deliberate strategy for ensuring 
the continuation of aid flows rather than solely a lack of administrative capacity 
(Bergamaschi 2008; Magassa and Meyer 2008; Whitehouse 2012). From this perspective, 
national leaders want “assistance, not ownership” (interviewee cited in Bergamaschi 2008: 6) 
because ownership implies responsibility and accountability. Magassa and Meyer (2008: 16) 
call this the “theatre” of presidential discourse; President Touré gave “performances” for 
both donors and the population in order to increase aid flows and his personal popularity. 
Whitehouse (2012) describes the ability of Touré and the political class to maintain a 
superficial appearance of progress in order to keep aid flows going. Therefore rather than 
demonstrating a lack of government leadership, this approach in fact serves a political 
function.  
 
The second PRSP, adopted in December 2006, is given as an example of how President 
Touré’s government tried to satisfy donors while pleasing the electorate. The elaboration of 
the second PRSP was undertaken in 2006, before the review and evaluation of the first PRSP 
was complete, and soon before the presidential elections of 2007. Magassa and Meyer 
(2008) argue that this meant the second PRSP was poorly sequenced both technically and 
politically; Bergamaschi (2008) suggests this was because it suited both the President and 
the donors to avoid a gap between the two PRSPs just before the elections. Furthermore, 
President Touré then created and promoted his own development plan for the 2007 
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election campaign, the Programme pour le Développement Economique et Social 2007-2012 
(PDES).  
 
In effect, this plan competed with the more donor-driven PRSP, suggesting that the 
government was using the PRSP to ensure aid flows while simultaneously developing its 
own national programme which would be more appealing to the electorate (Bergamaschi 
2008; Magassa and Meyer 2008). After Touré’s election victory, the government tried to 
reassure donors that the PDES was still compatible with the PRSP and simply represented 
the need of African leaders to have a more nationally-owned programme than the PRSP for 
electoral purposes (Bergamaschi 2008). Van de Walle (2012) suggests that the process of 
designing the third PRSP, scheduled to be released before the planned elections in spring 
2012 (which were subsequently cancelled following the coup d’état), was proceeding along 
similar lines: strong donor involvement with a small group of public officials, but little wider 
political and public interest.  
 
This process seems to be an example of the emphasis on PRSPs as a condition for donor 
funding leading to “reforms as signals” (Andrews 2013). Andrews quotes Schick (1998: 128) 
in saying that in developing countries it is typical that "the government has two budgets: the 
public one that is presented to the parliament and the real one that determines which bills 
are paid and how much is actually spent." The process also reflects the way that “reforms as 
signals” result when there is reliance on narrow sets of high-level agents to implement 
over-specified reforms, rather than engagement with the wide set of actors which would 
actually be needed to implement institutional change in practice. Harvey (2008) argues that 
the way water policy is treated in Mali’s PRSP is one example of this over-specification, 
where the insistence on community management constrains local experimentation. These 
observations raise the question of what actually occurs behind the visible reforms and if 
there is any evidence of local experimentation under the surface. I argue that a key issue for 
understanding this possibility is decentralisation, which I turn to in the next section.  
 
 
Decentralisation reforms 
 
A key policy that observers suggest has been nationally-led rather than donor-driven is the 
process of decentralisation reforms since the 1990s (Ouedraogo 2003; Baudais and Chauzal 
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2006; Bergamaschi 2008). Decentralisation has even been described as Mali’s “best 
example” of a public policy that was government-owned but donor-assisted (Magassa and 
Meyer 2008: 16). Decentralisation began after pro-democracy movements in 1991 
culminated in the overthrow of Moussa Traoré’s military government by a coup. The 
transitional government led by Amadou Toumani Touré (who later became the second 
President after democratisation, in 2002) prepared for democratic elections and made initial 
plans for the role of decentralisation in Mali’s new democracy (Rawson 2000). The National 
Conference of 1991 argued that forms of decentralisation under the previous regime were 
only a form of neo-colonial administration, and that the intervention of central government 
in rural areas was reinforcing the power of the central state (ibid).  
 
The process of decentralisation resulted in the creation of 703 communes (municipalities) in 
Mali, the lowest level of constitutional government (Doumbia 2009), each composed of 
villages or small urban neighbourhoods. Municipalities are led by democratically elected 
councils, who elect a mayor from among the councillors. Above the communes, there are 49 
cercles and 8 régions, each headed by members elected from the councils in the level of 
government below (Le Bay and Loquai 2008). I set out the responsibilities of different levels 
in relation to water services delivery in Section 5.3.  
 
Three key motivations for the newly-elected government of Alpha Oumar Konaré in 1992 to 
pursue decentralisation are identified in the literature. Firstly, to respond to the demands of 
the National Conference of 1991 that decentralisation was a necessary part of 
democratisation, fitting both traditional ideas of bringing power back to the people and 
more modern arguments for the economic and social benefits of local governance (Rawson 
2000; Pringle 2006). The issue was not new in Mali: forms of decentralisation had been 
promoted in both the First Republic (with ideas of state-led ‘rural socialism’ under Modibo 
Keita) and the Second Republic (the creation of official village associations under the 
military regime of Moussa Traoré) (Bingen 2000; Rawson 2000; Pringle 2006). However 
these had ultimately failed to serve the interests of either the governments of the time or 
the citizens, leading to a genuine desire amongst the population for democratic 
decentralisation by the 1990s (Seely 2001; Ouedraogo 2003; Pringle 2006).  
 
Secondly, the need for the central government to maintain its own political power and 
legitimacy was an important driver for decentralisation (Seely 2001; Smith 2001; Ouedraogo 
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2003). A related third reason was that decentralisation was also used as one way of 
responding to the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali in the 1990s. However observers differ 
as to whether this approach of co-opting the Tuareg threat by extending autonomy to their 
region was one of the primary reasons for decentralisation (Seely 2001; OECD-DAC 2012) or 
a secondary benefit from a longer historical process of shifts towards democracy, as 
suggested above (Pringle 2006). 
 
These reasons suggest an extension to Andrews’ idea of governments undertaking “reforms 
as signals” to satisfy external donors. In the case of decentralisation, it appears that the 
‘signalling’ by central government was at least as much towards the population as to donors. 
Yet the result is apparently similar: a process which privileges form over function, where 
municipalities exist but have little capacity to fulfil their roles, similar to Craig and Porter’s 
(2006) idea of “quasi-territorialisation” introduced in Chapter Two. For example, one of the 
key challenges identified for decentralisation in Mali is the slow transfer of financial and 
technical resources from central to local government (Djiré 2004; DANIDA 2006; Le Bay and 
Loquai 2008; Doumbia 2009), highlighting the lack of financial authority that restricts 
decentralised governments (Johnson 2001; Smoke 2003; Conyers 2007). As Coulibaly et al. 
(2010) note, in addition to the political class there is also little incentive for civil servants 
within the state administration to devolve further powers and resources to local 
governments because this would reduce their own authority. I discuss in greater depth the 
limited funds available to municipalities and the possibilities for seeking further financing in 
Chapter Six, in direct reference to the rural water sector.   
 
 
The state of civil society 
 
In this section I argue that the somewhat positive assessments of Mali’s “quite vibrant” civil 
society (van de Walle 2012: 11) must be tempered by observations that much of civil society 
has been co-opted into the ruling class and is therefore weak in its ability to act as a 
‘watchdog’ holding government to account (Roy 2005; Sears 2007; Magassa and Meyer 
2008). This demonstrates the challenge of international donors assuming an ‘associational’ 
view of civil society, as described in Chapter Two, which relies on a separation of state and 
civil society and the ability of civil society organisations (including NGOs) to help represent 
public opinion in policymaking processes. Therefore I also consider the other roles that civil 
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society can play, the different types of civil society organisation that exist, and draw out 
issues relevant to a more detailed discussion of civil society and the water sector later in the 
chapter when I consider the role of WaterAid. 
 
I first consider the four key roles of civil society in Mali identified by Togola and Gerber 
(2007), who base their observations predominantly on the ‘associational’ school of thought 
on civil society (Hyden 1997; Mohan 2002) introduced in Chapter Two. Firstly, civil society 
organisations can act as advocates for their constituencies, such as trade unions, student 
groups and women’s associations, and making associated contributions to policy debates. 
Secondly, civil society organisations commonly play a significant role in delivering services, 
such as community-based organisations supported by NGOs (Magassa and Meyer 2008). (I 
consider community-based water management committees in-depth in Chapter Seven, and 
focus in this section on the role of civil society at national levels.) Thirdly, civil society can act 
as a government partner in development planning (predominantly in promoting 
decentralisation). Finally, civil society has a role as a ‘watchdog’ over government, from 
national to local levels.  
 
These categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, health centre committees may 
have a role in both service delivery (such as helping to manage rural clinics) and advocacy 
(on behalf of patients, towards other local actors such as the municipal council). NGOs are 
considered here as one element of civil society, along with many other actors 
(“community-based organisations, traditional leaders, unions, business associations, 
religious organisations, independent media, student groups, cooperatives”) within the 
‘associational’ school of thought (Togola and Gerber 2007: 1). As I discussed in Chapter Two, 
it is important to distinguish between the roles of formal NGOs and more informal social 
movements or community-based organisations, so I examine this issue in more detail in 
relation to the water sector and the work of WaterAid in Section 5.4.  
 
Roy (2005) argues that international donors see civil society’s ‘watchdog’ role as its most 
important, in order to help combat clientelism, in line with the ‘associational’ school of 
thought on civil society (Hyden 1997; Mohan 2002). Yet most of the civil society 
organisations that were key in calling for democracy in the early 1990s then became political 
parties and were co-opted into the ruling class (Magassa and Meyer 2008; Roy 2005), 
highlighting the problem with assuming that a civil society distinctly separate from the state 
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could emerge. Analysts suggest that this challenge worsened under the regime of President 
Amadou Toumani Touré since 2002 (Sears 2007; Magassa and Meyer 2008; van de Walle 
2012; Whitehouse 2012), as the ‘rule by consensus’ approach reduced opposition to the 
government. The “entire political class was in government” (van de Walle 2012: 11), and 
civil society was unable to provide an alternative due to a combination of co-optation and 
suffering the same urban elite bias as the political class. This reinforces the argument made 
relating to sub-Saharan Africa in general by authors such as Chabal and Daloz (1999) and 
regarding Mali in particular by Roy (2005) and Sears (2007) that it is not possible to 
conceptualise civil society as independent from the state. 
 
Even observers such as Togola and Gerber (2007) agree that civil society is weakest in its 
‘watchdog’ role of holding government accountable, although they do not extend the 
discussion to consider if this is due in part to the inherent blurring between state and civil 
society in Mali. They argue instead that civil society organisations acting as advocates for 
particular interest groups represent the strongest form of civil society in Mali. The definition 
of interest groups used by Togola and Gerber includes both those groups with primarily 
economic interests (such as producer groups and trade unions) and those considered part of 
broader associational life (such as women’s associations or religious organisations), 
following the distinction made by Hyden (1997).  
 
However, other observers argue that the proliferation of civil society groups in Mali - a 
“spectacular eruption” according to Magassa and Meyer (2008: 11) - has not made a 
significant contribution to policymaking. For example, although there was wide participation 
of civil society in the consultation processes for the second PRSP, this contributed to the 
development of a long ‘shopping list’ of desired policies with little coherence or 
prioritisation (Bergamaschi 2008), and a low chance of being implemented because of the 
lack of connection between the planning process and subsequent budgeting (Magassa and 
Meyer 2008). Furthermore, much of what is labelled Malian civil society is actually 
dependent on international NGOs and their donors. At a basic level, these are likely to suffer 
some bias due to their usually urban elite staff and possible donor influence (Roy 2005; van 
de Walle 2012). Stronger criticisms are of deeper co-optation of such organisations into the 
corrupt ruling class, as already suggested (Sears 2007).  
 
Weak opposition to the political class has led to weak political participation by the majority 
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of the population (Roy 2005; Magassa and Meyer 2008); electoral turnout in the decade 
leading up to the coup in 2012 was the lowest in West Africa (Whitehouse 2012). Van de 
Walle (2012) suggests that international donors should bear some responsibility for focusing 
aid on direct budget support to the executive branch of government, without sufficiently 
considering the lack of a functioning opposition as a form of horizontal accountability, nor 
the limited ability of civil society to articulate the views of ordinary citizens instead of just 
urban elites. However, Whitehouse (2012: para. 17) returns to the question of the 
pervasiveness of clientelism: “[Malians] condemn their classe politique [political class], but 
by explaining away corruption as a matter of individual greed, they obscure the social and 
structural factors that allow their leaders to abuse their authority and circumvent the law.” 
This is what Magassa and Meyer (2008) call the paradox of Mali’s citizens: permitting 
government by consensus and corruption, yet abstaining at the ballot box.  
 
In Section 5.4, I return to these debates when I consider the role of civil society 
organisations and NGOs in the water sector, and their potential for influencing policy 
debates towards more sustainable financing mechanisms for rural water services.  
 
 
5.3. The national water sector 
 
The evolution of the sector 
 
In this section I examine more closely the history of the rural water sector itself, linking this 
to the structural context of government-donor relations and decentralisation reforms 
described so far in this chapter. I suggest that there are four key periods of interest in 
understanding the historical evolution and current state of the drinking water sector 
(including rural water supply) in Mali since initial moves towards decentralisation in the 
1990s. The first of these was from the first democratic presidential elections in 1992 to the 
first local government elections in 1999. This was a key period in preparing the legal 
framework for decentralisation and identifying the relevant administrative areas which 
would later be passed responsibility for water supply within their boundaries (Lemelle 2008). 
(At the time of these first elections in 1999, the only powers transferred to local 
governments were those of general administration, such as registering births, marriages and 
deaths, rather than responsibility for any more extensive public services.) The national 
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water directorate (DNH) was also created in 1999. 
 
The following phase of development, from about 2000 to 2004, was the period when the 
first key policies and laws bringing together decentralisation and water were introduced, 
through the adoption of the first National Drinking Water Strategy and the Water Code (law 
02-006). This law defined the operational framework for drinking water supply and the 
accompanying financing policy. In rural areas, this gave local governments ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring drinking water services but required them to delegate actual 
day-to-day operation to private operators or users’ associations. (The French term for this 
form of local government role is “maître d’ouvrage”). Likewise, municipalities became 
responsible for oversight and monitoring of the operators, although this could also be 
delegated to another private body (Diarra et al. 2004). A further decree was passed in 2002 
to officially hand over these powers and responsibilities for drinking water (as well as health 
and education) to local governments. 
 
The Water Code recognised the continued role of the state (through the national water 
directorate and its deconcentrated regional offices) in helping municipalities fulfil their own 
roles, and in providing some support to the management of rural water supplies. However, 
the details of this support were not specified. In regard to the responsibility for financing 
water services, the law specified that there should be full recovery of operating costs and 
partial recovery of investment costs from users in rural areas (République du Mali 2002). 
(The more detailed cost-sharing policies based on this law are elaborated in the 2007 
National Drinking Water Strategy [DNH 2007]).  
 
From 2004 to 2012, the focus for the water sector was then on trying to put these policies 
into practice, in particular through strengthening local governments and the water sector as 
a whole through gradual moves towards a sectoral approach of coordination between 
international donors (who provide about 80% of sector financing), the national water 
directorate and its regional bodies, and the newly decentralised levels of government. The 
2004 National Plan for Access to Drinking Water (PNAEP) was adopted to identify the 
investment required to increase access to water from an overall national coverage level of 
62% in 2004 to 82% in 2015, and in the same year a system of roundtable meetings of 
donors began in order to accompany this investment plan and improve coordination 
(AMCOW 2010). Yet despite this recognition of the need for increased financing, one of the 
129 
elements of water policy emphasised in Mali’s 2nd generation PRSP, for 2007-2011, is to 
“reduce the burden of the water sector on public finance through sharing of expenses 
between government authorities, local authorities and users” (République du Mali 2006: 
54). 
 
Further moves towards a more coordinated approach were made in 2006 and 2007 through 
the creation of the Sectoral Programme for Water and Sanitation (PROSEA), a revision of the 
National Drinking Water Strategy (DNH 2007) to take into account the Water Code and 
decentralisation (World Bank 2008), and the first Joint Sector Review with the state and 
donors. PROSEA is an attempt - at least in theory - to link planning and budgeting at all 
levels into a national financing plan in the form of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(DNH 2008b), even if the full implementation of the desired Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) 
and direct budget support to the sector had not been achieved by 2011 (AMCOW 2010). 
PROSEA has also been criticised for insufficient connections to the local development plans 
elaborated by municipalities (CAEPHA 2009; DANIDA 2010). I discuss the difficulties in 
developing and using such plans in Chapter Six, which reflect the challenges of “reforms as 
signals” described by Andrews (2013) and colleagues. 
 
The challenge to overall sector coordination is illustrated by the fact that in recent years 
levels of disbursement by the water directorate have been only about 60-70% of allocated 
budgets because of a lack of alignment between national and donor requirements for 
budget procedures (World Bank 2008; WaterAid Mali 2009). A programme of joint 
Danish-Swedish support planned for 2011-2014 was due to be the first funding fully in line 
with PROSEA and the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and was intended both to 
support the water directorate in preparing for future direct budget support and to act as an 
example to other donors of how to support a sectoral approach.  
 
Unfortunately, the coup d’état and subsequent political crisis in Mali in 2012 stalled this 
progress. Priorities for the water sector changed towards humanitarian relief for those 
displaced by rebel conflict in the North, and supporting urban water services in Bamako 
which came under increased pressure due to the arrival in the capital of internally displaced 
people fleeing the fighting (WaterAid Mali 2012). At the same time, many donors pulled out 
their long-term aid to the water sector and the national water directorate saw its budget 
drop by 90% (ibid). The key means of coordination became the humanitarian water, 
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sanitation and hygiene cluster, set up in July 2012 but underfunded even for the immediate 
emergency response (OCHA 2012). The process for developing the PRSP for 2012-2017 
halted, and therefore so did the advocacy by civil society organisations for increasing the 
consideration of water, sanitation and hygiene in this version of the PRSP (interview 28 Nov 
2012). By early 2013, sector actors were unsure when funding from the major bilateral and 
multilateral donors might restart, since this could be conditional on the transitional 
government holding elections and handing over power to a newly-appointed democratic 
government (interview 3 Dec 2012). At the time of writing in early 2013, observers were 
sceptical on whether the national elections proposed for July 2013 could be held 
successfully (International Crisis Group 2013).  
 
 
Key institutions and actors 
 
In this section I set out the key institutional arrangements and actors for the rural water 
supply sector in Mali that have emerged from the historical processes presented in the 
previous section. I firstly describe the official institutions and roles as defined under 
decentralisation legislation and national policy (principally based on the Water Code and the 
National Drinking Water Strategy). However, as I discussed in Chapter Three, I also analyse 
the actual institutional arrangements that exist since these may have formed through 
improvisation, adaptation and processes of bricolage where agents ‘make do’ and ‘muddle 
through’ (Cleaver 2012; Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2012). Therefore I highlight key 
areas where policy is less tightly defined, leading to differing interpretations in practice. 
These differences between official national policy and actual practice are discussed in 
greater detail though the local-level processes analysed in Chapters Six and Seven.  
 
The institutional framework in Mali broadly matches the three levels of a service delivery 
approach for rural water identified by Lockwood and Smits (2011): decentralised local 
governments act as the service authority but cannot legally manage the day-to-day running 
of water services. Instead, they should delegate operational management to voluntary 
water management committees or water users’ associations (or, more rarely, for-profit 
private operators) to act as service providers. National level policy is set by the national 
water directorate (DNH), part of the ministry for water and the environment. There are also 
regional offices of the water directorate, and some sub-regional offices at district level 
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(known as cercles in Mali). 
 
Table 5.1 shows the administrative levels of decentralisation in Mali and their associated 
responsibilities according to the legal framework and national drinking water policy. I also 
add the official financing roles of different actors, classifying their responsibilities according 
to the national frameworks and the international definitions for the different components of 
life-cycle costs of water and sanitation services (Fonseca et al. 2011). 
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Table 5.1. Administrative levels, actors, functions and financing roles for rural water supply 
 
Levels Actors and functions 
for rural water 
supply according to 
legal framework and 
national policy  
(DNH 2007) 
Financing roles for rural 
water supply according 
to legal framework and 
national policy 
(adapted from DNH 
2007, based on 
definitions from Fonseca 
et al. 2011) 
Summary of financing 
roles in practice 
 
 
National National Water 
Directorate (DNH): 
Policy, setting norms 
and standards, 
macro-level 
investment planning, 
national 
infrastructure 
inventory, technical 
advice to lower 
levels. 
• Capital expenditure. 
• Capital maintenance 
expenditure after 20 
years of an 
infrastructure’s life. 
• Indirect support 
costs. 
• Cost of capital 
(interest). 
In recent years 
(2004-2010), DNH has 
financed an average of 
1100 water points per 
year, 29% of which are 
rehabilitations (i.e. capital 
maintenance 
expenditure), but data is 
not available on whether 
these were all older than 
20 years (DNH 2012b).  
Regional  
(8 régions) 
Regional Water and 
Energy Directorates 
(DRHE): 
Regional-level 
planning, monitoring 
and technical advice 
to lower levels.  
• Indirect support 
costs, possibly some 
direct support. 
Regional offices have very 
little capacity to provide 
support to lower levels: 
64% of regional staff 
positions were unfilled in 
2008 (World Bank 2008) 
and more recent figures 
show only 170 staff 
outside the capital 
(Koestler and Toubkiss 
2010). 
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Levels Actors and functions 
for rural water 
supply according to 
legal framework and 
national policy  
(DNH 2007) 
Financing roles for rural 
water supply according 
to legal framework and 
national policy 
(adapted from DNH 
2007, based on 
definitions from Fonseca 
et al. 2011) 
Summary of financing 
roles in practice 
 
 
District  
(49 cercles)  
Sub-Regional Water 
and Energy Services 
(SSRHEE): 
District-level 
planning, monitoring 
and technical advice 
to lower levels. 
• Indirect support 
costs, possibly some 
direct support. 
In reality, SSRHEE exist in 
very few districts of Mali 
because of lack of funds 
(World Bank 2008; USAID 
2010). 
Municipality  
(703 
communes) 
Communes:  
Local planning, 
coordination, 
contracting of 
infrastructure 
development, 
ongoing technical 
assistance to 
communities, 
monitoring.   
• Up to 3% 
contribution to 
capital expenditure. 
• Direct support costs. 
Municipalities have 
extremely limited access 
to investment funds or 
financing for support 
costs - discussed in-depth 
in Chapter Six. 
 
Community 
/ users 
Water management 
committees or 
users’ associations: 
Day-to-day 
management, tariff 
collection. 
Note: The service 
provider can also be 
a private for-profit 
operator.  
• Up to 2% 
contribution to 
capital expenditure. 
• Capital maintenance 
expenditure for 20 
years of an 
infrastructure’s life. 
• Operating and minor 
maintenance. 
• Some direct support 
costs. 
Some users and 
communities raise 
sufficient funds for 
operating and minor 
maintenance costs, but 
rarely capital 
maintenance - discussed 
in-depth in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
Note: “Water management committee” is generally used in the Mali context to refer to the 
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group of users who manage one water point or multiple water points in one village. “Water 
users’ association” usually refers to associations which group together committees from 
multiple villages. I use the terms in this way, although they are sometimes used 
interchangeably by others.  
 
The institutional framework demonstrates the recognition in policy that water management 
committees and water users’ associations are not capable of acting as service providers and 
ensuring the continued functioning of rural water supplies without additional support. 
However, by examining the intended roles and responsibilities of different actors within the 
institutional framework, it is clear that the exact elements of support to service providers 
and which actors are responsible for these are not precisely defined. While reviews of the 
sector by donors such as the World Bank have argued that the community-based 
management model should be “reconsidered” (World Bank 2008: 40), and post-construction 
support improved, they do not detail how this might be done in practice. This raises the 
question of how external actors such as NGOs can help local actors clarify these roles and 
support them in fulfilling their responsibilities, which I address in Chapter Six.  
 
The lack of clarity over how exactly municipalities and other actors should support 
community management bodies and other service providers is reflected in ambiguity 
concerning the responsibility for financing the recurrent costs of rural water services. 
Official government policy specifies that users should pay for maintenance, management, 
replacing parts less than 20 years old, technical and financial monitoring, and any relevant 
taxes (DNH 2007). As summarised in Table 5.1, these correspond to the recurrent cost 
categories of operating and minor maintenance expenditure, capital maintenance 
expenditure, and some direct support costs, according to the definitions of the WASHCost 
project (Fonseca et al. 2011). 
 
However, despite this policy that users are responsible for all costs for up to 20 years, 
national strategy also states that the government and the municipalities should make some 
provisions for supporting “partial renewal of some facilities with less than 20 years of life" 
(DNH 2007: 44). Therefore national policy is still ambiguous about when exactly 
municipalities or central government can or should contribute for the costs of renewal or 
replacement (elements of capital maintenance expenditure). In the face of this ambiguity, 
actors have adapted in their local contexts as suggested by the idea of “bricolage” (Cleaver 
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2012), as I discuss in-depth in Chapters Six and Seven.  
 
Although I have discussed here those levels of government with direct responsibility for 
ensuring drinking water supply, it should be noted that some other parts of government 
also play a role, even if indirect. For example, while the health sector does not have 
responsibility for water supply, it does undertake some related activities under its mission of 
reducing the burden of ill-health caused by water-related illnesses such as diarrhoea. This 
difference in mandates between the two departments of ensuring access to improved 
sources of drinking water versus reducing illness (interviews with staff in the national 
directorates of health and water 5 and 13 Jan 2011) leads to differing views on the 
possibility of alternative service delivery models, such as household self-supply, which I 
discuss in Chapter Seven. For the national water directorate, only water points improved to 
national standards, which are usually community-based rather than household-owned, 
count towards national figures for drinking water coverage. However, for the health 
department, if a family uses its own unimproved well and can be encouraged to improve 
this to provide some level of protection from contamination (even if not to national 
standards), this can improve the quality of water consumed and may give some health 
benefits. Since this helps towards the health sector’s mission, the department has been 
more involved in the promotion of self-supply than the water directorate. I analyse the issue 
of self-supply using case studies in Chapter Seven.  
 
 
Policy space 
 
In this section I consider the “policy space” that exists in Mali’s rural sector as a result of the 
combination of historical context, institutions and actors discussed so far in this chapter. I 
use the term “policy space” as part of the extended political economy framework to express 
two related ideas. The first refers to the spaces, such as sector reviews and working groups, 
where policy is discussed and potentially changed (Hickey 2009b). Cornwall (2002, 2004) 
argues for a focus on whether such spaces are ‘open’ or ‘closed’ to the poor (or those who 
advocate on their behalf), and whether the people are formally ‘invited’ to these spaces, or 
have more proactively ‘claimed’ the spaces for themselves. Cornwall suggests that open, 
‘claimed’ spaces are more likely to facilitate pro-poor policy decisions. However, even the 
decision-making in ‘closed’ spaces is still a ‘visible’ form of power, following the forms 
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proposed by Gaventa (2006). Therefore I consider a second aspect of “policy space” which is 
closer to the idea of “room for manoeuvre” (Grindle 2007) in terms of what policies and 
reforms are actually up for discussion in these spaces. Analysing this ability to set the 
agenda represents a way of considering forms of “hidden power” (Webster and 
Engberg-Pedersen 2002; Gaventa 2006).  
 
As I explained in Chapter One, Mali appears similar to the group of countries identified by 
Lockwood and Smits (2011) where coverage is between 50% and 70% and expanding, but 
with a high risk of ‘slippage’. This results in an unavoidable tension between investing in 
infrastructure to increase coverage and focusing attention on issues of sustainability. I 
acknowledge this tension and its possible influence on causing the sector in Mali to 
prioritise debates around expanding rather than maintaining coverage; one interviewee 
even suggested to me that “no-one [at national levels] wants to talk about sustainability” 
(interview with donor representative 14 Feb 2011). This is why, as explained in Chapter Four, 
the research undertaken at local government and community levels focuses on areas which 
already have high coverage and so may be more likely to start paying greater attention to 
issues of sustainability. However, I argue that it is also necessary to analyse to what extent 
national-level policy spaces are able to address these twin issues of expansion and 
sustainability. 
 
An analysis of the recent annual water sector reviews, where the water directorate and 
other sector actors meet to review progress and discuss common challenges, suggests that 
there is still greater attention to concerns with how to expand coverage than sustainability. 
Since the Mali water sector has not yet progressed to a full Sector-Wide Approach, these 
reviews are the key official forum for discussion between different actors and represent an 
important policy space.  
 
The key themes which recur as issues where recommendations are made during recent 
annual reviews (based on reports from 2008 and 2010) centre around improving the 
planning and implementation of investment in infrastructure in the water sector to ensure 
effective expansion of coverage, rather than thinking about sustainability. Given the low 
levels of budget disbursement already discussed, discussions are especially concerned with 
how to effectively link the budget planning of the state, the water directorate and donors. 
These issues are considered as part of the ‘roadmap’ in progressing towards the 
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implementation of the PROSEA sectoral programme. Recent related achievements cited in 
the reports of the annual reviews include the completion of a study on the investment costs 
of different types of water infrastructure in different contexts (according to e.g. technology, 
region, groundwater depth), which has been used to inform the Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework for 2011-2013 (DNH 2010). The update of the national water point database, 
which is clearly important for sustainability and understanding the levels of functionality of 
water points, is actually emphasised as a tool for investment planning (DNH 2010). The 
reviews do also mention key issues related to maintaining services such as improvements in 
the allocations of funds for the running costs of the regional offices of the water directorate 
(DNH 2008a), although there have then been problems in getting the funds disbursed (DNH 
2010).  
 
However, despite the priority issues evident in the annual reviews, sustainability is still a 
concern for the sector and it appears that policy spaces can exist at least for broad debates 
on this theme. Even since the coup, which might have been thought to reduce the policy 
space for talking about long-term issues in the water sector, there have been national-level 
discussions about sustainability. For example, a workshop involving the national water 
directorate and NGOs including WaterAid was held in November 2012 for “reflections on 
the sustainability of public water services” (DNH 2012c: 1). The recommendations from 
these debates included undertaking an assessment of the state of decentralisation reforms 
concerning the water sector (including both decentralisation of local government 
administration and deconcentration of state technical services for water) and a review of 
the actual practices concerning infrastructure maintenance. Therefore there is a clear 
recognition in the sector that the issues of sustainability and support to community 
management must be addressed, even with the additional challenges raised given the 
uncertain political environment. 
 
Although these reflections are positive signs for policy space to talk about sustainability, it is 
unclear exactly which issues concerning sustainability will be up for debate. For example, I 
have highlighted already the ambiguities in national policy concerning the recurrent costs of 
water services (discussed in greater detail in terms of their relevance at local levels in 
Chapters Six and Seven). However, despite the apparent need for further discussion about 
the details of these recurrent costs and who should pay them, the key message promoted 
by the national water directorate is still simply that the state is primarily responsible for 
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investment and the users for subsequent costs of operation.  
 
For example, in a presentation by a representative of the national water directorate at the 
National Water Forum in January 2012 (an event designed to precede the 2012 World 
Water Forum) on ‘Financing water for all’ it was stated that “the financing of drinking water 
supply is characterised by the dominant role of the state for investment and the users for 
responsibility for running costs”32 (DNH 2012b: slide 3). This message was repeated in the 
November 2012 sustainability workshop discussed above, where the discussions about 
financing still focused on mobilising funds for new investments (from taxes and transfers), 
assuming that operation could be covered by tariffs (DNH 2012a). Therefore, although it 
seems that national policy spaces may be open to discussing the evolving roles of 
municipalities and decentralised sections of the water directorate in supporting sustainable 
services, it may be more difficult to discuss how the costs of these activities and of 
long-term maintenance of physical infrastructure might be shared between different actors.  
 
 
5.4. The role of WaterAid: advocating for local governments as service authorities 
 
As explained in Chapter One, WaterAid has worked in Mali since 1999, but its focus on 
decentralisation and local governance of water and sanitation (including the approach of 
direct budget support to some municipalities) combined with advocacy work at national 
level emerged as elements of its second official country strategy from 2006 to 2011. In this 
section I discuss WaterAid’s key approaches since 2008, especially as they relate to 
national-level engagement, before analysing the work of WaterAid and its partners at local 
government and community levels in greater detail in Chapters Six and Seven.  
 
I argue that the rationale behind WaterAid’s key approach in Mali is the idea of linking 
service provision to advocacy, at least in terms of “advocacy on behalf of the poor” (as 
defined by Banks and Hulme 2012). WaterAid’s Sustainability Framework (2011) explains 
that the organisation globally undertakes service provision only on a “relatively limited 
scale” (WaterAid 2011b: 31), with two key reasons for being involved in service provision 
work. The first is credibility: the argument runs that WaterAid requires direct engagement in 
the practicalities of service provision in order to participate credibly in wider discussions 
                                                 
32
 Translated from French by the author. 
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about water and sanitation policy. The second argument is for the demonstration effect: the 
innovations that WaterAid develops through its role in service provision can act as an 
example to other service providers who have the ability to implement such approaches at 
scale (WaterAid 2011b).  
 
As explained in Chapter One, WaterAid introduced the Sustainability Framework to its staff 
and partner organisations in West Africa, including Mali, in mid-2011, as a means of 
supporting their thinking in relation to improving their own service delivery activities and 
advocating more widely for an increased focus on issues of sustainability. The framework 
was adapted into a tool which could be used to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the 
work of WaterAid’s partners at municipal levels against the different elements of the 
framework. WaterAid originally intended to undertake sector-level policy analysis and 
subsequent engagement with national-level actors on policy issues affecting sustainability in 
2011, in line with the argument in the framework that WaterAid should engage with others 
to debate the “merits and scalability” of the organisation’s own approaches (WaterAid 
2011b: 31). Unfortunately, the time required to collect evidence from WaterAid’s own work 
and staff turnover issues in the policy and advocacy team delayed this engagement. The 
analysis undertaken during 2011 therefore focused on municipal and community levels, 
which I examine in Chapters Six and Seven, drawing on both the research carried out 
directly with WaterAid and its partners, and the other fieldwork detailed in Chapter Four.  
 
However, despite the challenges in developing specific policy and advocacy work related to 
sustainability, WaterAid’s general approach still rests on the idea of linking service provision 
and advocacy, through its promotion of municipal Technical Units within local governments 
as a model for other actors to follow. This approach of linking innovative service provision to 
subsequent advocacy is called “advocacy by stealth” by Banks and Hulme (2012: 10, drawing 
on Batley 2011) - the idea that by working in partnership with government, NGOs can 
demonstrate approaches for better service provision. Indeed, Batley suggests that in these 
cases the distinction between service provision and advocacy is unhelpful because the two 
elements - in principle, at least - are integrated in the strategies of NGOs such as WaterAid, 
as demonstrated by the explanation in WaterAid’s Sustainability Framework. As discussed in 
Chapter Two in relation to the framework for analysing NGO approaches developed by 
Banks and Hulme (2012), we can also consider if there are differences between “advocacy 
on behalf of the poor” and other activities which are better able to help the poor be 
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advocates for themselves. However, given the general limitations of civil society at national 
levels in Mali, explained in Section 5.2, I argue that it is unrealistic to expect WaterAid and 
its partners to go much beyond advocacy on behalf of the poor in the national sector 
context. Instead, I argue that we should focus on assessing whether “advocacy by stealth”, 
which is still a way of trying to influence institutional change, leads to arrangements which 
benefit the poor. 
 
WaterAid engages in a variety of such advocacy activities at national level, either directly 
organised by WaterAid itself or through supporting other initiatives and networks. 
WaterAid’s own advocacy includes, for example, holding a Forum of Mayors to help local 
governments lobby central government for the transfer of more funding to local levels, and 
using its Regional Learning Centre to support learning and capacity-building in the sector 
around approaches for decentralised service provision. The networks and coalitions that 
WaterAid supports include networks of journalists and of parliamentarians for water and 
sanitation, and two national civil society coalitions, CAEPHA33 and CN-CIEPA.34 CAEPHA and 
CN-CIEPA are both coalitions part-funded by WaterAid through the Governance and 
Transparency Fund from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). The 
two coalitions work closely together, although CAEPHA has a greater focus at local 
government levels (for example, in promoting public hearing days to bring citizens and 
elected councils together) and CN-CIEPA more at national levels (interviews with CAEPHA 
and CN-CIEPA staff 28 Nov and 3 Dec 2012). Both have also tried to use examples of civil 
society involvement in service provision activities (for example, local NGOs promoting 
hygiene behaviour change programmes) as a way of advocating for greater civil society 
representation in national policy such as the development and implementation of PROSEA, 
the sectoral plan introduced in Section 5.3 (CAEPHA 2009; CN-CIEPA 2010).  
 
This approach represents an example of civil society groups trying to link their different 
roles of service delivery and advocacy, as suggested by Togola and Gerber (2007), within the 
‘associational’ view of civil society and its potential influence on policymaking. The two 
coalitions claimed some success in obtaining a place for civil society representation on the 
PROSEA steering committee, although the steering committee subsequently failed to 
become operational, as explained in Section 5.3 (AMCOW 2010; FAN and WaterAid 2011). 
This further demonstrates some of the limits to civil society action. CAEPHA and CN-CIEPA 
                                                 
33
 The Coalition for Access to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. 
34
 The National Coalition for the International Campaign for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. 
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are also both networks of existing NGOs and coalitions, reliant on donor funding and its 
associated possible influence (Roy 2005; van de Walle 2012). As explained above, the Banks 
and Hulme (2012) idea of NGOs promoting direct ways for the poor to advocate directly for 
themselves seems unrealistic in the national water sector given the context of civil society in 
Mali; CAEPHA and CN-CIEPA’s work on empowerment remains at local government levels. 
The way these organisations address issues of sustainability is also through work on citizen 
empowerment at local levels, hoping that initiatives such as municipal public hearing days 
will continue to be held after the support from WaterAid’s civil society partners and will lead 
to more accountable and responsive local governments (interview with CN-CIEPA staff 3 Dec 
2012).  
 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have used the extended political economy analysis framework to analyse 
key national-level issues affecting the sustainability and financing of rural water services, 
from the structural factors of aid dependency, partial decentralisation reforms and the 
weakness of civil society, to the key institutions and sector actors. In addressing the 
conceptual question of whether national policy reforms in the rural water sector are actually 
“reforms as signals” (Andrews 2013), I have shown the core differences between the 
institutional framework in policy and in practice. Although the official institutional 
framework in Mali broadly matches the three levels of a service delivery approach for rural 
water outlined by Lockwood and Smits (2011), there is a lack of clarity over the 
responsibilities of different actors and a lack of capacity to fulfil their roles, especially 
concerning ongoing support to community management.  
 
Although it is not possible to say to what extent donors have influenced specific elements of 
policy relevant to the water sector (such as the legal framework set out in the Water Code 
and the subsequent national strategies based on this), I have shown how Mali’s dependency 
on aid and the motivations of the political class to maintain aid flows have given 
international donors a strong influence over national policymaking in general. Therefore it is 
plausible that similar processes have occurred regarding policies and frameworks for the 
water sector. The outcome appears similar to what Harvey (2008) calls a strategy of passing 
the buck between national government and donors. Community management and the 
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recovery of operating costs from users have been adopted as national policies without 
sufficient consideration of the limits to these approaches and how support could be 
provided from higher administrative levels.  
 
This chapter has also assessed the “policy space” that exists in Mali’s rural water sector for 
discussing issues of financing and sustainability and addressing the concerns highlighted. It 
appears that there is some space in national debates for reflection on the roles of different 
actors and the success (or otherwise) of decentralisation processes so far. However, 
financing debates are more focused on how to mobilise new funding (whether by the 
central government or municipalities) than on discussing the roles of different actors in 
contributing to the recurrent costs of water services. This observation has implications for 
the approach of WaterAid and its partners, which I have explained is based on “advocacy by 
stealth” (Banks and Hulme 2012), seeking to demonstrate to other actors the potential of 
WaterAid’s own model for enabling municipalities to fulfil their role in expanding coverage 
and supporting ongoing services. This requires an understanding of both how WaterAid’s 
model works in practice, and the potential for using the results to contribute to national 
debates with the objective of similar approaches being taken up by government and other 
donors. 
 
Therefore my next step, in Chapter Six, is to undertake more in-depth analysis of the roles of 
different actors at municipal government level and how the costs of rural water services are 
shared between them. Given the observation, in line with Andrews’ argument of “reforms 
as signals”, that a lack of capacity and coherence hinders the implementation of national 
policies, it is necessary to analyse in detail how organisations such as WaterAid and its 
partners respond to these challenges at local levels. In particular, this allows us to assess the 
conceptual question of whether processes at these levels represent unrealistic attempts to 
implement ‘best practice’ principles which conform to national policy, or examples of 
“practical hybridity” and “institutional bricolage” where actors try to adapt as best they can 
to their context. In turn, this helps us understand the potential and limits of local actors to 
develop effective systems of community management and local government support for 
rural water services. 
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Chapter Six - The role of local governments in financing rural water services 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I analyse the role of decentralised local governments in contributing to the 
financing of rural water services and providing support to community management of water 
supplies, drawing on case study data from five municipalities where WaterAid works (as 
explained in Chapter Four, costs data was available in four of the municipalities, but one 
additional municipality is considered using qualitative data on how municipalities seek 
financing).35 As discussed in Chapter Four, these municipalities were selected for research 
chiefly because they have existing high coverage rates in terms of basic access to water 
services, so represent useful areas in which to consider issues of sustainability and how to 
avoid ‘slippage’ of coverage rates falling back (Reddy et al. 2010). Three of the municipalities 
were also the first three local government areas where WaterAid had begun the approach 
of direct budget support and helping set up local WASH Technical Units. I explain this 
approach in more detail below when I describe the activities of WaterAid in trying to 
support local governments to fulfil their official roles, in terms of both expanding coverage 
and ensuring that services continue to function. I then examine each of these two key roles 
in turn. I describe the options available to municipalities according to national policy for 
seeking funding and implementing new infrastructure, and assess WaterAid’s approach to 
helping local governments obtain this financing.  
 
I then turn to the role of municipalities in providing support to community management, 
comparing the approach promoted by WaterAid to other options suggested in national 
policy. I analyse the recurrent costs of these different models of direct support, as well as 
the other recurrent costs of water services incurred at local levels i.e. operating and minor 
maintenance expenditure and capital maintenance expenditure. This analysis responds to 
the first key theme of the research, concerning how costs are shared between different 
actors. In the subsequent section of this chapter, I compare the findings on the approaches 
to sharing recurrent costs with the associated functionality rates of water points in the 
different case study municipalities. This enables me to identify the implications for the 
research themes of approaches to service delivery (especially concerning the role of local 
                                                 
35
 This chapter draws on two articles which are forthcoming in peer-reviewed journals (Jones 2013c, 
forthcoming [accepted, in press]; Jones 2013d, forthcoming [accepted pending revisions]). I am 
grateful to the anonymous reviewers of these articles for their comments.  
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governments as service authorities) and how NGOs can promote sustainable financing 
approaches.  
 
Throughout the chapter, I analyse the findings in relation to the analytical framework 
presented in Chapter Three, especially concerning the processes of institutional change 
observed at municipal level and the role WaterAid and its partners play. Using the 
framework, I argue that the municipal level of local governance is where the three bodies of 
literature on institutional change that I draw on overlap, each placing a slightly different 
emphasis on what to look for when understanding the governance of public services and 
natural resources.  To recap, the work of Andrews et al. and Booth emphasises the need to 
examine what national policy reforms actually look like at the local government level, 
especially whether institutional reforms prioritise form over function (”reforms as signals”) 
and if the local effect is policy incoherence. Booth suggests looking for positive locally-driven 
reforms, if these can be distinguished from merely palliative attempts to make up for a lack 
of state-assured public services.  
 
The critical institutionalist literature and Cleaver’s argument is more cautious: it emphasises 
the limits to locally-driven action within wider structural constraints, highlights the 
possibility of unequal outcomes, and the importance of understanding the overlap between 
institutions at municipal level with those at community level. As I concluded in Chapter 
Three, I also distinguish between observations of how institutional change actually happens 
(through processes of bricolage) and whether the approaches of external actors such as 
WaterAid acknowledge and promote bricolage or more rigid ideas of ‘best practice’. In this 
chapter, this question requires assessing whether national policy and WaterAid’s approach 
sufficiently consider a critical institutionalist perspective or if they are too reliant on an 
unrealistic mainstream institutionalist viewpoint. 
 
 
WaterAid's approach 
 
Before presenting the evidence and analysis, in this section I summarise WaterAid’s 
approach in Mali at local government levels, rather than their overall national-level work 
described in Chapter Five. WaterAid’s work in Mali sits mainly within the organisation’s 
wider programmatic approach in West Africa, the Local Millennium Development Goal 
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Initiative (LMDGI). The LMDGI approach was developed to encourage and support 
decentralised local governments in taking responsibility for meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals for water and sanitation, by planning and seeking financing for local 
equivalents of the MDG targets in their areas. WaterAid’s support was designed to improve 
the capacity of local governments to plan, finance and implement the required interventions, 
and to improve the ability of citizens to participate in these processes (WaterAid 2008). 
 
In Mali, WaterAid’s current key approaches and areas of work developed along with the 
LMDGI concept as part of its second official country strategy from 2006 to 2011 (WaterAid 
Mali 2010). WaterAid now works in a total of 15 rural municipalities, in partnership with 
local NGOs and the municipal governments themselves. In line with the LMDGI aims and 
national policy in Mali, there is a strong focus on supporting municipalities in planning, 
securing financing and organising the implementation of new infrastructure development. 
However, WaterAid also emphasises the role of municipalities in providing ongoing 
post-construction support to community management, such as monitoring, technical 
support and conflict resolution (WaterAid Mali and GERAD 2008). 
 
As I briefly explained in Chapter One (see Figure 1.1), since 2008 WaterAid has begun 
introducing a system of direct budget support to its partner municipalities to create a WASH 
Technical Unit within each of these local governments. The WASH Technical Unit is now the 
model proposed by WaterAid as a way of allowing local governments to act as service 
authorities and ensure direct support to communities. The Technical Units are each made 
up of one to two members of paid staff (usually a WASH coordinator and a field agent), who 
are employed as civil servants of the municipality and report to the elected mayor. However, 
their salaries and the overheads (such as office equipment and transport costs) of the 
Technical Unit are financed by WaterAid through a system of direct budget support to the 
municipality.  
 
The staff of the Technical Unit work for the municipality in the planning and implementation 
of new infrastructure, and provide ongoing post-construction support to community 
management. Before the introduction of the budget support approach, this work on 
implementation and direct support to community management bodies was undertaken by 
members of staff of local NGO partners of WaterAid in each municipality. This previous 
approach is still used in most of the rural municipalities where WaterAid intervenes, 
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because the arrangement of direct local government partnership and budget support has 
been introduced so far on a gradual rolling basis. 
 
 
6.2. Municipalities' role in expanding coverage 
 
Financing capital investment: national policy and reliance on aid 
 
In this section I discuss the different ways in which municipalities in Mali can and do access 
financing for capital investment in rural water services. Although my focus is on recurrent 
costs and sustainability, as already explained, I consider capital investment here because it is 
supposed to be a key part of the municipalities’ overall role of “maîtres d’ouvrage”: under 
decentralisation reforms, municipalities in Mali have increasing responsibility for local 
development planning, including water and sanitation. For drinking water, this includes 
organising the construction of infrastructure, arranging for operators to take charge of 
infrastructure (whether private enterprises or community-based management structures), 
and ensuring the control and monitoring of these approved infrastructure management 
bodies (Diarra et al. 2004). Or, as Coulibaly et al. (2010: 23) put it, “in practice, 
decentralisation [in the sectors of water, health and education] means mainly that new 
capital expenditure responsibilities have been offloaded to local governments." 
Understanding the processes of financing capital investment also helps examine the 
relationships between the municipalities, other levels of government and NGOs, and 
permits us to start analysing the reality of the institutional arrangements in place. For 
example, this highlights the tensions between targeting funds to help promote equity 
amongst different municipalities, and imposing conditionalities on financing which generate 
competition between municipalities, an issue which I explore further in relation to the role 
of WaterAid in the next section.  
 
I first examine the processes for financing capital investment in water infrastructure, for 
which there are four key potential sources available to municipalities. The first two of these 
are generally ‘on-budget’ and therefore the municipality can plan for these on an annual 
basis: local taxes from the population of the municipality (principally the regional and local 
development tax) and intergovernmental transfers from central government (Diarra et al. 
2004; Coulibaly et al. 2010). The other possible sources for investment are usually 
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‘off-budget’: sectoral funds from the national water directorate (via its deconcentrated 
regional offices) and projects funded by NGOs or other donors. Municipalities usually have 
less decision-making authority over these ‘off-budget’ funds, although as I discuss further 
below, WaterAid is trying to encourage the inclusion of these funding streams within 
municipalities’ budgets to aid their planning and autonomy.  
 
Although legally there are a variety of sources of local taxation available to municipalities,36 
in practice for the majority of rural municipalities (which cannot collect significant taxes 
from the other possible sources such as markets and land sales) the most relevant tax is the 
regional and local development tax (taxe de développement régionale et locale, TRDL). The 
TRDL is levied on each person of working age in a municipality, at an annual rate of about 
US$ 4 per person (Coulibaly et al. 2010), 75% of which is retained by the municipality, and 
25% allocated to the cercle and region above. Even though estimates suggest that average 
recovery rates of the TRDL have risen from about 50% in the mid-2000s (Diarra et al. 2004) 
to about 90% by 2010 (Coulibaly et al. 2010), the amounts concerned are still so low that 
the revenue can generally only be used for supporting the overheads of a municipality’s 
administration rather than any investment in public services.  
 
Therefore municipalities must look to central government for capital investment financing. 
The key intergovernmental transfer mechanism for investments by local governments is 
ANICT (the National Agency for Local Government Investment), a system which disburses 
money to local governments from a central fund for public services such as health, 
education and water; other public works, such as council offices; and infrastructure 
designed to promote economic development, such as livestock markets (Diarra et al. 2004). 
ANICT is dependent on funds from international donors (acting as a form of pooled fund) 
and so has been criticised for challenges of year-to-year predictability (Mehta and Mehta 
2008), different reporting requirements to the rest of the national finance system 
(OECD-DAC 2012), and long-term sustainability (Lemelle 2008; Jaglin et al. 2011). Despite 
these problems, with a total annual budget of up to US$ 40m by 2010, ANICT remains by far 
the most important form of intergovernmental transfers, representing about 2.3% of the 
total government budget (Coulibaly et al. 2010). The sizes of the allocations from ANICT to 
different municipalities are determined according to four weighted criteria: population of 
                                                 
36
 These include, amongst others: vehicle taxes; taxes on bars, nightclubs and restaurants; taxes on 
public advertising; mining taxes; taxes on waste collection, and tax on livestock. It is unsurprising that 
most of these options do not apply in any significant way to poor rural areas. 
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the municipality, rate of recovery of local taxes (the TRDL), distance from the capital city, 
and poverty rate (Le Bay and Loquai 2008). However, WaterAid has criticised the ANICT 
criteria for putting greater weight on population and tax recovery than on poverty levels, 
which can put poorer municipalities - with a lower ability to organise effective tax collection 
- at a disadvantage in the allocations despite their potentially greater need (WaterAid 2008). 
  
As part of the conditions for applying to ANICT, municipalities have been required to 
elaborate local development plans, known as PDSECs (Social, Economic and Cultural 
Development Plans), in which they set out the public investment needs in the area. In 
theory, these plans were supposed to be developed through a participatory process which 
involved the local population in setting priorities for investment. However, Coulibaly and 
Hilhorst (2004) argue that most municipalities have relied extensively on NGOs and private 
consultancy firms to help them develop these plans, and focused more on meeting the 
technical demands of the documentation required by ANICT than creating ways for local 
people to have input into the process. Even where intentions were good, there was a lack of 
tools and experience to enable a participatory process (Bangaly 2002).  
 
This process represents an example of “reforms as signals” (Andrews 2013): the 
phenomenon where there is pressure on a developing country’s public administration 
(typically from external donors) to adopt particular forms of administration, usually copied 
from Western public administration (or an idealised version of this), with much less focus on 
the actual function and outputs that result. As Andrews et al. argue, the actual people 
whose role it is to promote change - in this case, local councillors, civil servants and citizens 
themselves - tend to be left out of the conversation about what changes are desired. In the 
next section I discuss to what extent WaterAid’s approach to working with local 
governments has been able to overcome this challenge or not, partly by analysing whether 
their understandings of institutional change draw more on mainstream institutionalism or 
critical institutionalism.  
 
From 2001-2003, municipalities were also required to contribute 20% of the costs of all 
projects funded through ANICT. However, this contribution was too much for some 
municipalities to pay (Coulibaly and Hilhorst 2004) and there were reports that in many 
cases private contractors paid this share on behalf of the municipality as a bribe in order to 
be awarded future contracts (Hetland 2007). From 2004, the contribution required was 
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reduced and is now set according to the type of project. The required contribution from the 
municipality is 3% of the cost for water projects (Lemelle 2008; WaterAid 2008). For health 
and education projects, no contribution from the municipality is now required at all (Jaglin 
et al. 2011).  
 
In terms of investment in water provision, 486 water projects were funded through ANICT 
between 2002 and 2006 (Lemelle 2008), most of which were basic water points such as 
boreholes equipped with handpumps, or “modern wells” (Jaglin et al. 2011). To put this in 
perspective, there are nearly 700 rural municipalities in Mali, so at least one third of 
municipalities did not access any funds for water projects from ANICT during this period. 
One problem identified is the common requirement to group water infrastructure 
investments into projects of a certain size (a minimum number of new water points) in 
order to achieve the necessary economies of scale, which can be difficult on a 
per-municipality basis (DANIDA 2010; DNH 2012a).  
 
Although the criteria for receiving funds from ANICT are intended to support equity across 
municipalities and regions by adjusting allocations according to the circumstances of 
different areas (Lemelle 2008), the conditionality aspects of the mechanism create an 
element of competition between municipalities. As Le Bay and Loquai (2008: 151) put it: 
“the tolerance threshold for defects in local government performance seems to be 
declining.” They argue that increasing selectivity on access to financial aid should benefit 
municipalities because it enables them to become more responsible for their own 
performance.  
 
Faggianelli et al. (2009) extend this argument more specifically into the water sector by 
suggesting that an additional condition on receiving funds from ANICT could be the payment 
by the municipality concerned of the required fees to the privately-operated technical 
support service (STEFI) for small piped water systems which exists in certain regions and is 
described in more detail later in this chapter. The rationale is that the central government 
should avoid financing new infrastructure in areas where the municipality does not appear 
committed to supporting the maintenance of existing infrastructure. Water for People and 
IRC (2012) make a similar argument based on experiences in other countries, suggesting 
that external actors in the water sector should prioritise their support to a few districts in 
order to develop models for how to reach and sustain full coverage which can inspire other 
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districts. WaterAid’s own discussions amongst different country programme teams in West 
Africa as the organisation introduced its Sustainability Framework expressed similar ideas.  
 
These examples of elements of competition between municipalities demonstrate the 
possible tensions between equity and sustainability; if it is thought that only areas with 
sufficiently strong leadership can achieve sustainability, there is the risk that areas with 
weaker leadership could fall behind. Jaglin et al. (2011) argue that some areas of Mali have 
already received funds from ANICT in excess of their own development needs at the 
expense of other regions, even though the approach was supposed to promote equity. This 
has been exacerbated, according to Jaglin et al. (2011: 132), by the tendency of NGOs and 
donors “to mark out ‘their’ territory” of work. 
  
There is a possible parallel between this element of competition and some of the debates in 
geography about local government entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989; Rogerson and 
Rogerson 2010), where local governments compete to make their area attractive to private 
investment. There are some clear differences between the Mali case and most of the 
examples discussed in the local government entrepreneurialism literature: the Mali 
examples are rural rather than urban; they are predominantly trying to attract donor and 
central government grant funding rather than private investment (although Harvey and 
Rogerson and Rogerson do note that taking advantage of redistribution from central 
government, especially for infrastructure investment, is one strategy that entrepreneurial 
local governments can adopt); and the focus is on funding basic services. However, there is a 
possible similarity between this case and the arguments in the literature, concerning the 
danger that the competitive process becomes a zero-sum game. This results in a situation 
where neither central government nor donors expand the amount of resources they give, 
but some local governments are prioritised - possibly unfairly - over others. I discuss this 
further in the next section in relation to WaterAid’s approach. 
 
Despite the intention of decentralisation to give more authority to municipalities over rural 
water services and investment planning as discussed above, ‘off-budget’ funds (that flow 
through the national and regional water directorates or NGOs and donors) continue to be 
more significant, and are likely to remain so (DANIDA 2010). As Coulibaly et al. (2010: 29) 
pessimistically observe: “There are not currently any significant prospects for modification 
of Mali‘s intergovernmental fiscal system, with respect either to decentralisation of tax 
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authority or the automatic assignment of certain revenue transfers to the sub-national 
governments.” In line with the national drinking water strategy, municipalities are supposed 
to liaise with the regional water offices to develop priority lists for investment based on the 
needs identified in the PDSEC. The regional water offices can then approve the 
municipality’s project plans and in theory the municipality can proceed in its role of 
organising contracts and setting up operators for the water infrastructure. However, since 
the approval of such investment relies on the necessary funding being identified and 
available, the municipalities and regional water bodies are still heavily dependent on the 
plans of external donors, which tend to be for large programmes covering a particular 
region at once.  
 
Having presented the ways in which municipalities can obtain capital investment financing 
for rural water services, I turn in the next section to the role of WaterAid and consider the 
organisation’s approach in light of the challenges presented. I argue that WaterAid’s idea of 
promoting models for how local government can ensure the implementation and 
sustainability of water services should be assessed against both whether the model works 
where it has been used so far, and if it can realistically be scaled up elsewhere too, without 
promoting inequalities between municipalities. This involves considering to what extent 
WaterAid’s work falls into the possible trap of promoting “reforms as signals” or not, and 
whether the implicit understandings of institutional change evident in the work of WaterAid 
and its partners are based more on mainstream institutionalism or critical institutionalism.  
 
 
The role of WaterAid in helping local governments seek further financing 
 
In the previous section I examined how municipalities can seek funding for capital 
investment for rural water services, highlighting a series of key issues. The ability of 
municipalities to generate local taxes barely covers the basic administration costs of local 
government. This leaves little money for investing in public services (or for running them, 
which I address further in the next section). Therefore municipalities have to look elsewhere 
for investment financing: intergovernmental transfers from central government, funds 
which come through regional offices of the water ministry or aid from donors. However, the 
actual processes involved in accessing these funds display elements of “reforms as signals” 
(Andrews 2013), meaning that emphasis is placed on the form of the institutional change 
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rather than its usefulness, and competition, which is seen as a good thing by many but leads 
to the danger of promoting zero-sum games between different municipalities. Therefore in 
this section I explore in more detail how WaterAid tries to help municipalities raise money, 
in order to assess whether this approach helps get past the problems identified, or suffers 
from similar challenges. 
 
Given the importance of international donors in financing the water sector, these have been 
the key target when WaterAid has tried to support municipalities in finding additional 
investment funds. WaterAid calls this fundraising process ‘marketing’37 by the municipalities. 
In each of the municipalities where it works, WaterAid has helped the municipality (through 
engaging an external consultancy firm) to develop local Sector Development Plans (Plan 
Sectoriel de Développement, PSD) for water and sanitation, in a similar way to the process of 
elaborating general local development plans (PDSECs) that I discussed above. The Sector 
Development Plans for water and sanitation are intended to include a much more detailed 
analysis of the water and sanitation needs of each village in the municipality which can 
provide a more rigorous basis for the priorities to be included in the municipality’s PDSEC.  
 
The development of the Sector Development Plans for water and sanitation in WaterAid’s 
municipalities of intervention took place in 2007 and 2008, with each plan setting out the 
needs for water and sanitation infrastructure implementation until 2015. The rationale for 
this timeframe was that it was a way of translating the Millennium Development Goals for 
water and sanitation - to reduce by half the proportion of people without access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation by 2015 - into local targets and plans. Given the limited funds 
available to the municipalities from intergovernmental transfers discussed above, WaterAid 
decided to support the municipalities in fundraising from other sources. Therefore in 2008 
WaterAid began delivering training for municipalities on how to ‘market’ their Sector 
Development Plans i.e. approaching potential donors to fund elements of the plans and 
then managing the subsequent projects and donor relationships. In addition to the 
fundraising objective of ‘marketing’, the process was intended to improve the coordination 
of NGO and donor activities with the priorities of the municipality as set out in the Sector 
Development Plan, and to help develop the capacity of the municipality to manage the 
planning, implementation and monitoring of infrastructure projects.  
 
                                                 
37
 I use inverted commas as a reminder that I am referring to a specific use of the term ‘marketing’ 
rather than its more general meaning. 
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Four rural municipalities were chosen in the first group of municipalities to receive training 
(Dialakoroba, Kolokani, Tioribougou and Yelekebougou). These municipalities were selected 
for a combination of reasons: their proximity to Bamako, the capital city (and therefore ease 
of organising both training sessions and potential events or meetings with donors based in 
the capital); their longer history of working with WaterAid than some other areas where the 
organisation works; and their perceived potential capacity (in terms of ability and 
commitment of relevant officials and staff) to undertake the ‘marketing’ activities proposed.  
 
Where possible, the participants in the training were the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor with 
responsibility for water and sanitation (both elected representatives of the municipality who 
sit on the municipal council), the general secretary of the municipality (a civil servant), the 
coordinator of the municipality’s water and sanitation Technical Unit or a representative of 
the local NGO partner of WaterAid working in the municipality (depending on the form of 
partnership approach used by WaterAid in that municipality), and a representative of the 
water users’ association of the municipality. In addition, local financing studies were carried 
out in two of the municipalities (Kolokani and Yelekebougou) to provide further evidence to 
potential funders of the municipalities’ needs.  
 
The inclusion of the water users’ association in the process was intended to help 
demonstrate to donors the systems in place for managing the operation and maintenance of 
the infrastructure after construction, since as explained under decentralisation law the 
municipality should not directly undertake these activities itself but should instead delegate 
day-to-day running of the systems to a private operator or a voluntary body. As discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Seven, the most common forms of management are 
community-based water management committees or other more informal groups of users 
at village level. These community-level groups should in theory form part of a larger 
municipality-wide water users’ association to help provide mutual support between 
community committees and provide a mechanism for the representation of water users in 
municipality-level discussions. However, as my previous research described in Jones (2011a) 
explains, these voluntary associations are sometimes inactive, so it is unclear whether 
involving their supposed representatives in the ‘marketing’ process would actually help 
secure donor funding or not. 
 
In 2009, the next round of local elections was held in Mali and many of the elected 
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representatives who had previously been in positions such as the Mayor or the Deputy 
Mayor with responsibility for water and sanitation lost these roles, although in some cases 
they retained their seats as ordinary councillors but without additional Mayoral 
responsibilities. Therefore in 2011 WaterAid organised a further training programme for 
representatives of the same four municipalities (and one additional nearby municipality, 
Tienfala, where WaterAid had started working since 2008), to act either as a refresher 
training or as the first training opportunity depending on the participant. In the remainder 
of this section I present analysis based on documentation from WaterAid, interviews with 
partners and local government representatives from four municipalities involved in the 
‘marketing’ process, and observation of the workshop on ‘marketing’ held for WaterAid’s 
partners in 2011.  
 
The feedback from interviewees was that WaterAid’s support to the municipalities in terms 
of developing the Sector Development Plans and promoting the idea of NGOs working more 
closely with the municipalities may be having some beneficial effect in terms of coordination. 
Representatives in two of the municipalities (Kolokani and Tioribougou) gave the example of 
another international NGO working on water and sanitation which had previously developed 
relationships with particular selected villages in the municipalities, but without consulting 
representatives of the municipality or considering the municipality-wide priorities described 
in the Sector Development Plans. The interviewees explained that this NGO had now begun 
to start consulting with representatives of the municipalities concerned, and had 
provisionally indicated that in future it would work in line with the priorities expressed in 
the Sector Development Plans that WaterAid helped the municipalities to develop 
(interviews with municipal councillors and civil servants 4 Nov and 23 Nov 2011).  
 
However, many challenges to coordination remained. One example of note was a local NGO 
with which WaterAid has a partnership in municipalities in northern areas of Mali (outside 
the scope of this research). This NGO also works in one of WaterAid’s partner municipalities 
in this study, Kolokani, but does not itself partner with WaterAid in this area. Instead it 
receives funding for its activities from another larger NGO. Despite the smaller NGO’s 
knowledge of the use of Sector Development Plans thanks to its work with WaterAid 
elsewhere, in Kolokani it did not liaise with the municipal council or follow the Sector 
Development Plan, because its funder NGO had alternative procedures in place (interviews 
with municipal officials and civil servants 23 Nov 2011). In another municipality, Dialakoroba, 
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an international NGO came to work in the municipality after the key meetings when the 
Sector Development Plans were shared with actors in the area, and started using 
approaches to water and sanitation which were different to those specified in the Sector 
Development Plan (interviews with municipal councillors 21 April and 1 Oct 2011).  
 
Moreover, improving the coordination of NGOs using the Sector Development Plans does 
rely on each municipality’s representatives being familiar with and in agreement with the 
plans, which may not be the case if they had little involvement in the actual process of 
developing the documents. In the 2011 workshop on ‘marketing’ the Sector Development 
Plans, the majority of participants admitted that they were not familiar with the plans for 
their own municipalities (observation from show of hands at workshop 26 Sept 2011). There 
are two reasons for this lack of involvement. Firstly, the process in some cases was 
dominated by the consultants involved, in a similar way to the criticisms made by Bangaly 
(2002) and Coulibaly and Hilhorst (2004) of the original PDSECs. This suggests that in some 
respects WaterAid’s approach has fallen into the trap of promoting “reforms as signals” 
described by Andrews (2013): some of the people who should have had key roles in these 
changes were insufficiently involved, and priority was given to the ‘form’ of the processes 
rather than the actual ‘function’ of developing plans which were locally-owned. 
 
The second reason for some councillors’ lack of involvement in putting together the Sector 
Development Plans was more difficult to avoid; some officials had only been elected since 
the plans were first developed. One councillor, who had responsibility for water and 
sanitation in his municipality during the 2004-2009 mandate but lost this position after the 
2009 elections, stated that he “saw lots of copies of the Sector Development Plan at the 
Mayor’s office, but they were never distributed after the handover [to the new council]” 
(interview with municipal councillor 22 Nov 2011). Both officials interviewed in this 
municipality suggested that the new Mayor and Deputy Mayors may have been inclined not 
to use the Sector Development Plans “for party political reasons” (interviews with municipal 
councillors 22 Nov 2011) i.e. because possible benefits from using the plans might have 
reflected credit on the previous administration rather than the current incumbents. 
WaterAid was aware of these sets of problems and had planned to support revisions of the 
Sector Development Plans in 2012 with greater involvement of each municipality and less 
reliance on external consultants, but this was put on hold after the coup d’état in March 
2012.  
156 
 
Although the municipal representatives reported this possible benefit to improved 
coordination of drinking water development projects, almost all interviewees said that it 
was difficult to find new NGO or donor partners because of a lack of knowledge of who to 
contact and lack of funding for the necessary travel and other activities involved in the 
‘marketing’ process (interviews with municipal councillors 1 Oct, 3 Nov, 22 Nov and 23 Nov 
2011). After the 2008 round of training, WaterAid gave financial and logistical support to 
some of the municipalities to help organise roundtable events with existing and potential 
future donors in attendance, as well as representatives of the regional water directorate 
and deconcentrated regional bodies of other public services. At these meetings the 
municipality could present the Sector Development Plan and begin discussion about which 
donors might be willing to contribute to elements of the plan. However, the municipalities 
did not have funding for additional activities to follow-up on this or to seek other donors 
who were not present.  
 
These challenges demonstrate the general limitations of the idea of ‘marketing’ as a way of 
municipalities securing additional funds for rural water services, and may also have a further 
effect on equity between municipalities. Councillors in one of the municipalities that had 
been able to undertake some of the most extensive marketing activities accepted that the 
process did entail “aggressive” competition between different municipalities, especially 
geographically neighbouring ones (interview with municipal councillors 1 Oct 2011). They 
made the similar argument to Le Bay and Loquai (2008) and Faggianelli et al. (2009) that this 
competition between municipalities is a good thing and preferable to other methods of 
allocation by the central government, because competition means that municipalities who 
are able to show that they are really committed are likely to be awarded more resources. 
But this also demonstrates the weakness of the approach in promoting equity between 
municipalities, and displays a similar trend to that identified in South Africa by McDonald 
and Pape (2002) where municipalities compete against each other for resources from 
private investors and tourists and the redistributive role of the central state is minimised. In 
this case, it is also elements of the approach of INGOs such as WaterAid that encourage 
competition between municipalities for funds from the central government and donors.  
 
To illustrate this I use the example of the municipality of Dialakoroba, where WaterAid 
works through its local partner NGO AMPDR. The municipality undertook ‘marketing’ of its 
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plans to potential partners through roundtables and meetings in 2008 and received the 
further follow-up training in 2011 as described above. In the period 2008-2011, 25 new 
water points were built in the municipality, twice as many as had actually been proposed in 
the Sector Development Plan (12 water points). As a result, by 2011 there were no villages 
in the municipality considered underserved in terms of number of water points, either by 
figures used by the national water directorate (DNH 2011), or by my own calculations based 
on the water point mapping survey carried out through WaterAid in November 2011.  
 
Despite this, there were still proposals in the Sector Development Plan to implement a 
series of small piped systems in the municipality from 2012 onwards. This is understandable 
from the point of view of trying to upgrade users’ access from the existing sources of 
handpumps on boreholes and “modern wells” to a system of tapstands supplied from a 
borehole fitted with a motorised pump and a reservoir, which should in theory provide a 
service of greater reliability, accessibility (in terms of distance, because it can supply 
multiple dispersed tapstands and therefore be closer to more households) and/or quality. 
However, it seems that upgrading the drinking water supply of users in a municipality who 
already have access to improved water sources should be lower priority than ensuring 
access to improved water sources for the first time to users in other municipalities. 
 
This illustrates one of the challenges to equity in WaterAid’s approach to working with local 
governments. In seeking to show that local governments can be capable of implementing 
and managing rural drinking water services, WaterAid has so far tended to give greater 
support to municipalities which have already demonstrated a certain level of capacity. But in 
demonstrating and developing this capacity, these municipalities may also get ahead of 
other municipalities which may be in greater need of support in terms of their populations’ 
access to drinking water. In municipalities which have relatively high existing coverage, it is 
also important to start paying more attention to issues of post-construction support and 
recurrent costs. I turn to these issues in the next section.  
 
From this assessment of WaterAid’s approach to supporting municipalities in raising funds 
and planning for new investment in rural water services, I argue that the organisation’s 
strength has been in recognising and trying to address the key challenges of a lack of 
resources and coordination at municipal levels. In effect, they are trying to support 
institutional change from one “mode” of local governance (Olivier de Sardan 2011) to 
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another. The current institutional arrangements are predominantly a combination of 
“project-based” and “associational” modes (Olivier de Sardan 2011), where donors and 
NGOs represent the main sources of investment and local committees the key means of 
delivering public services, but with low levels of coordination. WaterAid’s approach is 
designed to promote a shift towards a mode of governance with stronger “municipal” and 
“associational” features, in addition to the project-based elements, meaning that local 
government is able to provide the desired coordination in investment and service delivery, 
even if its own resources remain relatively limited.  
 
However, as I have described above, parts of WaterAid’s work - such as the promotion of 
Sector Development Plans - have exhibited the challenges that Andrews (2013) refers to as 
“reforms as signals”, prioritising the appearance of institutional reforms over the actual 
results. Furthermore, WaterAid’s approach also involves promoting some elements of 
competition between different municipalities, leading to the possibility that municipalities 
with greater capacity and access to resources are able to get even further ahead of others. I 
argue that these issues demonstrate in WaterAid’s approach a tension between the ideas of 
mainstream institutionalism - for example, promoting formal processes, decision-making 
and incentives - and critical institutionalism, which is more sensitive both to the ways in 
which institutions change through gradual adaptation, and to the possibility that these 
processes increase inequality. I extend this argument in the next section when I move 
beyond the issues of capital investment and planning, and address the second key role of 
municipalities in Mali in relation to rural water services: ensuring ongoing support to 
community management bodies.  
 
 
6.3. Municipalities and support to communities 
 
In this section I examine how WaterAid works in partnership with decentralised local 
governments to develop approaches for providing support to community management of 
rural water supplies, beyond the initial phase of financing and developing new infrastructure 
that I have discussed so far in this chapter. I also analyse how the approaches promoted by 
WaterAid compare to policy and practice in the wider Mali rural water sector. Although 
WaterAid and the sector have not explicitly adopted the idea of a service delivery approach 
as described by Lockwood and Smits (2011), the model of municipal government 
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involvement that WaterAid supports is broadly equivalent to the role of service authorities 
within a service delivery approach to rural water supply. However, there are differences 
between the arrangements for direct support to community management used within 
WaterAid’s approach and the arrangements suggested by national policy, so I discuss the 
two approaches.  
 
I acknowledge, as discussed in Chapter One, that Mali is one of the countries experiencing 
“tension between pursuing increased coverage … [and] addressing sustainability in a more 
structured way” (Lockwood and Smits 2011: 148-9). However, in the four municipalities 
used as case studies for analysis of costs in this section, estimated levels of coverage were 
90% or above (according to surveys by WaterAid’s partners in November 2011) i.e. higher 
than the average for rural Mali. Therefore these municipalities could represent areas where 
attention can shift further towards addressing sustainability and issues of support to 
community management, as the imperative to increase coverage becomes relatively less 
important compared to other areas. Examples of practice from these municipalities could 
provide useful future lessons for other parts of Mali, responding to the research themes on 
the role of local governments and NGOs. As part of this debate regarding support to 
community management, I analyse how the recurrent costs of rural water services are 
shared between different actors, in policy and in practice. This evidence responds to the 
first research theme and enables me to expand the analysis further into the debates on 
institutional change. 
 
 
Support to community management: WaterAid’s approach and other models 
 
As introduced at the start of this chapter, the model of WASH Technical Units promoted by 
WaterAid is intended to help municipalities ensure ongoing support to community 
management as well as the implementation of new infrastructure. This approach is what 
Smits et al. (2011) term an internal arrangement for direct support, where the support is 
provided by agents of the local government service authority itself (even if they are funded 
by WaterAid). However, external arrangements – where the support comes from a different 
entity to the service authority – also exist in Mali. The key example to highlight is the STEFI 
(Technical and Financial Monitoring) system (Faggianelli et al. 2009; Smits et al. 2011). The 
STEFI system involves a private operator commissioned by municipalities to undertake 
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monitoring and technical advice to service providers of small piped systems. Therefore the 
STEFI system is categorised as an approach of local government subcontracting to a 
specialised support agency (Smits et al. 2011). STEFI is the main model suggested by 
national policy in Mali for providing support to community management (DNH 2007). 
 
In addition to the differences in the arrangements of the Technical Unit and STEFI 
approaches (agents within the municipal staff compared to subcontracting to a specialised 
agency), there are three other key differences which require examination. These raise 
questions about exactly what forms of support communities require and what combination 
of actors can provide and finance this support. Analysing the costs and financing of these 
support approaches also reminds us of the importance of the other recurrent costs of water 
services at local levels and how they are shared, which leads into the next section of this 
chapter.  
 
However, the first area of difference between the approaches is in the actual support 
activities undertaken themselves. Table 6.1 lists the typical activities which can be provided 
as part of direct support arrangements, based on those identified by Smits et al. (2011) and 
WaterAid’s Sustainability Framework (WaterAid 2011b). The table then compares the 
activities which form part of the work of the municipal Technical Units supported by 
WaterAid to the activities performed in the STEFI approach. The chief role of the STEFI 
system is as a monitoring service to provide information and recommendations to service 
providers and municipalities, concerning the technical functioning of water systems and the 
financial performance of the operators (Faggianelli et al. 2009). As is clear from Table 6.1, 
the mandate of STEFI is more limited than the Technical Units. The Technical Units also 
undertake the activities of monitoring, technical advice and administrative support, but in 
addition perform a number of further possible support functions too. For example, some 
provide more intensive support to community management committees over issues such as 
conflict resolution, refresher training courses, legal registration and contract administration, 
and contributions to some recurrent costs such as capital maintenance expenditures.  
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Table 6.1. Types of support to community management 
 
 WaterAid: 
Municipal WASH 
Technical Units  
National policy: 
STEFI (Technical 
and Financial 
Monitoring 
System) 
National policy: 
Regional and sub- 
regional water 
directorates, 
collaborating with 
municipalities 
Activities performed as part 
of direct support (Smits et al. 
2011; WaterAid 2011b): 
For all “modern 
water points” in 
rural areas: 
handpumps, 
“modern wells”, 
small piped systems 
For small piped 
systems only, 
hoped to extend 
to handpumps 
(Faggianelli et al. 
2009) 
For handpumps and 
“modern wells” 
until these are 
integrated into 
STEFI system 
Monitoring of water service Y Y Y 
Technical advice on 
operation and maintenance 
Y Y Y 
Administrative support e.g. 
help with tariff-setting 
Y Y Y 
Organisational support e.g. 
legal and contract advice 
Y   
Conflict resolution Y   
Support in capital 
maintenance 
Y Government 
after 20 years 
Government after 
20 years 
Training and refresher 
courses 
Y   
Provision of information e.g. 
guidelines and manuals 
Y Y Y 
Resource mobilisation e.g. 
helping communities raise 
funds for recurrent costs 
Y   
Support to supply chains Y   
Additional support to 
‘externalities’ such as 
environmental change 
Y   
Approx. cost per user per 
year (US$ 2011): 
0.5-1.4 0.34 Unknown 
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The second key difference between the WaterAid-supported approach and the STEFI system 
is in their scale and their scope in terms of the types of water supply infrastructures 
supported. The municipal Technical Units in WaterAid’s areas of intervention support the 
management of all types of “modern” water supply systems in rural areas, including 
concrete-lined wells, boreholes fitted with handpumps, and small piped systems.38 However, 
as discussed above, the approach of municipal Technical Units as a form of direct support 
has been introduced by WaterAid into only three municipalities so far. Similar forms of 
support are provided in the other 12 rural municipalities where WaterAid works, but these 
are through a local partner NGO rather than via agents of the municipality. 
 
In contrast, the STEFI approach covers a much wider geographic area but only provides 
support to small piped systems within these areas, not other types of water supply. The 
national strategy intends for the system to be extended to cover handpumps in future, but 
the mechanism for doing this has not yet been determined (DNH 2007; Faggianelli et al. 
2009). In the meantime, the equivalent functions of STEFI for handpumps and unserved 
areas are supposed to be provided by regional and sub-regional offices of the water 
directorate, in collaboration with municipalities (DNH 2007, 2012). However in practice this 
is extremely limited because of the lack of staff in sub-regional and municipal levels (World 
Bank 2008; Koestler and Toubkiss 2010), as discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
The third area of difference relates to the costs and financing of the two approaches. In the 
four municipalities supported by WaterAid for which cost data was analysed, the Technical 
Units cost from US$ 0.5 to US$ 1.4 per person per year (the process of analysing these 
expenditures and other recurrent costs is discussed in more detail in the next section). The 
costs per user are sensitive to the population of the municipality since the absolute cost of 
each Technical Unit is similar. This does highlight the potential for sharing the costs of 
support between different municipalities to benefit from economies of scale. This approach 
is called “intercommunalité” in Mali and is recognised as an option in national policy. 
WaterAid has already trialled this in the adjacent municipalities of Tioribougou and Kolokani, 
which share a coordinator for the WASH Technical Unit. In all these municipalities these 
costs are currently funded through direct budget support to the municipalities from 
WaterAid (or in one of the case study municipalities, still through a local NGO partner). In 
                                                 
38
 These are the types of water sources defined as acceptable for drinking water use in Mali, referred 
to as “modern water points” (DNH 2007). 
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contrast, the STEFI system costs US$ 0.34 per person per year, a lower figure than the 
Technical Units because of its more limited mandate and less intensive form of support. This 
cost is financed from part of the user tariff for water with further contributions from the 
municipalities and government (Smits et al. 2011). 
 
These figures illustrate the tension between what forms of support the different possible 
approaches can provide, and what can be financed from within the Mali sector itself i.e. 
from taxes and tariffs according to “the 3Ts” framework (OECD 2009), rather than ‘transfers’ 
(funding from international donors such as WaterAid). Recent international benchmarks 
proposed by the WASHCost project suggest that expenditure of US$ 1-3 per person per year 
is required for the direct support necessary for sustainable basic rural water services 
(WASHCost 2012). Therefore in the smaller municipalities where WaterAid’s approach was 
used in this study (costs up to US$ 1.4 per person per year) the expenditures for the WASH 
Technical Units are within the WASHCost benchmarks. The costs of the STEFI system are 
below the proposed WASHCost benchmarks, but, as discussed above, the STEFI approach 
has a more limited mandate than a full system of direct support which encompasses all the 
possible activities.  
 
Therefore a debate is required in Mali about what combination of direct support activities is 
really needed and how these can be financed. The proponents of the STEFI system have 
suggested that it is not a question of whether to extend the approach to all municipalities 
and other types of water points, but rather how to do so (Faggianelli et al. 2009). However, 
interviewees in the sector noted that significant practical challenges remain. For example, 
one STEFI team is suggested to cover 50 to 100 municipalities. Even if the national water 
directorate organises a tender process in order to shortlist private operators intended to 
cover certain regions, the Mayor of each municipality is still required to sign the contract for 
that municipality. Historically, some Mayors have been dissatisfied with the choice of 
operator or the actual results (interviews with water ministry and donor officials 13 Jan and 
14 Feb 2011). The information provided by STEFI is of limited use if it is not acted upon, 
either by those involved in the day-to-day management of water services, the municipality 
itself, or by higher-level sections of the water directorate. Although the assessments of the 
performance of the STEFI system so far suggest that overall it has helped improve the 
functionality of the services it covers (Faggianelli et al. 2009), as explained above this only 
applies to small piped systems, so the approach’s potential to improve the sustainability of 
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services from handpumps is difficult to assess. 
 
Similarly, since the WaterAid approach of municipal Technical Units only covers a small 
number of municipalities, it is hard to assess the impact of this more intensive and costly 
approach. As I discuss in the next section, the experiences of WaterAid’s partners so far 
suggest that the success of the Technical Unit approach to direct support may depend in 
particular on the factor of sharing the recurrent costs of operation and minor maintenance 
expenditure and capital maintenance expenditure and how this issue is addressed.  
 
These observations of WaterAid’s approach and other arrangements for providing support 
to community management can be considered in relation to the analytical framework and 
how we understand institutional change. In the first half of this chapter, when examining 
WaterAid’s work in helping local governments plan and finance new infrastructure, I argued 
that there was a tension in the organisation’s approach between the ideas of mainstream 
institutionalism and critical institutionalism. Now that I have also compared WaterAid’s 
model for municipal support to community management with other forms of 
post-construction support, it is possible to see further elements of both mainstream and 
critical institutionalist thinking.  
 
For example, I have shown that WaterAid tries to create municipal Technical Units which 
provide all the elements of support proposed by Smits et al. (2011) and WaterAid (2011b), 
at a cost roughly in line with the expenditures that international benchmarks suggest are 
required for supporting rural water services. However, this attempt to set up a new 
institutional arrangement starts from a position where almost nothing existed before, in 
terms of local government capacity for supporting water services, and requires financing 
beyond what the Mali water sector can currently provide. These observations suggest that 
WaterAid adopts an over-optimistic mainstream institutionalist approach to creating new, 
formal institutions, rather than more gradually building on what exists locally, even if this is 
limited.  
 
Yet there are still aspects of critical institutionalism within this approach: WaterAid is trying 
to support the role of municipalities as actors who can promote problem-solving within 
their local contexts (as described by Booth 2012). In contrast, although the STEFI system 
does not try to do everything at once, it is less focused on local problems: it imposes on 
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local governments a system which they do not always agree with, and which does not take 
into account all forms of rural water services (such as handpumps).  
 
 
How recurrent costs are shared 
 
In this section I extend the analysis of recurrent costs to include operating and minor 
maintenance expenditure and capital maintenance expenditure, in addition to the costs of 
direct support introduced in the previous section. As I explained in the previous chapter, 
official government policy specifies that users should pay for maintenance, management, 
replacing parts less than 20 years old, technical and financial monitoring, and any relevant 
taxes (DNH 2007), which corresponds to the recurrent cost categories of operating and 
minor maintenance expenditure, capital maintenance expenditure and some direct support 
costs (Fonseca et al. 2011). However, despite this policy that users are responsible for all 
costs for up to 20 years, national strategy also states that the government and 
municipalities themselves should make some provisions for supporting “partial renewal of 
some facilities with less than 20 years of life" (DNH 2007: 44). Therefore national policy is 
still ambiguous about when exactly the municipality or central government can or should 
contribute to the costs of renewal or replacement. This lack of clarity is also reflected in 
debates between representatives of WaterAid’s partners about how to define different 
categories of recurrent costs for rural water infrastructure, and which actors should pay 
these. I discuss this in more depth in Chapter Seven in relation to how WaterAid’s partners 
work with different communities to determine user contributions to recurrent costs.  
 
Given these ambiguities about who should pay for different elements of the recurrent costs 
of rural water services, in this section I draw on data from four municipalities where 
WaterAid works to present empirical evidence of how much is really spent on recurrent 
costs and how these costs are shared between different actors. These data are shown in 
Table 6.2. The analysis does not consider costs which occur at national levels (i.e. indirect 
support costs such as the national water directorate or WaterAid’s country office; or the 
cost of capital). Costs are presented as ranges of minimum to maximum expenditures 
observed in the four municipalities, in line with the guidelines for data presentation from 
the WASHCost project. The table also identifies the key actors contributing to each cost 
component, to show the observed mix of “the 3Ts” of financing sources used (OECD 2009), 
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as introduced in Chapter Two: ‘tariffs’ (all forms of user contributions), ‘taxes’ (expenditure 
from local and national government budgets raised from domestic taxation), and ‘transfers’ 
(funding which ultimately comes from international donors). 
 
The data are presented for the period 2008-2011 for both practical and theoretical reasons. 
Methodological guidance from the WASHCost project suggests that it is difficult to obtain 
accurate cost data going back further than three years, and that the extra effort involved in 
seeking data from longer historical period may not be justified in terms of the quality of the 
data. For research reasons, 2008 was also the most appropriate starting point for data 
analysis because this was the year in which WaterAid started a direct partnership approach 
(involving local direct budget support to the municipality) in three of the four municipalities 
(Dandougou Fakala, Kolokani and Tioribougou). In the fourth municipality, Dialakoroba, 
WaterAid still works through a ‘tripartite’ formula where it partners with a local NGO and 
the municipality. In the municipalities except Dandougou Fakala, the process of ‘marketing’ 
their Sector Development Plans to seek funding from other donors also began in 2008. 
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Table 6.2. Expenditure on recurrent costs for rural water services in four municipalities39 
 
Cost 
component  
Key elements of the cost 
component in this 
context 
Approximate 
expenditure range, 
2008-2011 (US$ 
2011 per person 
served per year) 
Key actors contributing to 
this expenditure 
Operating 
and minor 
maintenance 
expenditure  
(OpEx) - for 
handpumps 
Operating costs, 
maintenance and repairs 
which typically occur at 
least once every year at 
a cost up to US$ 100 per 
intervention. 
< 0.1 in all 
municipalities. 
Usually the users, with 
occasional contributions 
from NGOs i.e. a mix of 
tariffs with some 
transfers.  
Capital 
maintenance 
expenditure 
(CapManEx) - 
for 
handpumps 
and “modern 
wells” 
Costs which go beyond 
routine maintenance or 
small repairs, typically 
occurring less frequently 
than every year and 
costing more than US$ 
100 per intervention. 
Includes renewal, 
replacement and 
rehabilitation of 
infrastructure. 
0.1-1.6 
 
The expenditure in 
each municipality 
is dependent on 
the timing of donor 
and government 
projects to 
rehabilitate old 
infrastructure. 
 
Although users are 
supposed to pay for 
capital maintenance 
within a theoretical 20 
year lifespan of any 
infrastructure, in practice 
most interventions are by 
NGOs or central 
government, or 
sometimes municipalities 
with WaterAid’s budget 
support i.e. a mix of 
transfers and some taxes.  
Expenditure 
on direct 
support 
(ExpDS) - for 
handpumps, 
“modern 
wells” and 
small piped 
systems 
The costs of a WASH 
Technical Unit of 1-2 
staff (salaries, transport, 
office expenses) to 
support the planning, 
implementation and 
monitoring of WASH 
services, either as part of 
the municipality’s staff 
(where WaterAid gives 
direct budget support) 
or as local NGO staff. 
0.5-1.4 
 
Each Technical Unit 
has similar 
absolute costs, so 
the per capita 
costs are sensitive 
to the population 
of the municipality. 
WaterAid i.e. transfers – 
either through direct 
budget support to the 
municipality in the direct 
partnership model, or 
through a local NGO 
partner. This support is 
for sanitation and hygiene 
in addition to water. 
                                                 
39
 The details of the calculations used are given in Appendix 3. In line with the suggestion of the 
WASHCost project, recurrent costs are rounded to one decimal place, where decimals are used (Burr 
et al. 2012). 
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I discussed in the previous section the costs of direct support and how they compare to 
other approaches in Mali and international benchmarks. Here I also briefly analyse the 
findings on costs and financing of operating and minor maintenance and capital 
maintenance expenditure; these are discussed in greater depth in relation to the role of 
users themselves in Chapter Seven. The expenditures observed for all three of these 
different cost components are presented in Table 6.3 and compared to national guidelines 
and international benchmarks. 
 
Table 6.3. Comparison of expenditure to national guidelines and international benchmarks 
 
Cost ranges (US$ 2011 per person served per year) Cost component 
Expenditure in four 
municipalities in 
this study 
(2008-2011) 
National guidelines 
in Mali (DNH 2003) 
International 
benchmarks 
(WASHCost 2012) 
Operating and minor 
maintenance 
expenditure  
(OpEx) – for 
handpumps 
< 0.1 in all 
municipalities 
0.4 0.5-1 
Capital maintenance 
expenditure 
(CapManEx) - for 
handpumps and 
“modern wells” 
0.1-1.6 
 
 
0.5 
(for handpumps, 
excluding eventual 
replacement after 
20 years) 
1.5-2 
(for handpumps) 
Expenditure on direct 
support (ExpDS)  
- for handpumps, 
“modern wells” and 
small piped systems 
0.5-1.4 
(including some 
support to 
sanitation) 
 
N/A 1-3 
(for handpumps 
or piped 
schemes) 
 
 
As explained above, users are supposed to pay all the costs of operation and maintenance 
and capital maintenance for rural water services within a theoretical 20 year lifespan of any 
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infrastructure, according to national policy (DNH 2007). National guidelines (for boreholes 
fitted with handpumps) indicate that this entails users contributing about US$ 0.9 per 
person per year to cover operation and maintenance (about US$ 0.4 per person per year) 
and capital maintenance (about US$ 0.5 per person per year). After 20 years it is assumed 
that full rehabilitation of the infrastructure is required and will be paid through central 
government programmes (this element of capital maintenance is therefore not included in 
the guideline figures for user payments) (DNH 2003).  
 
The international cost benchmarks identified by the WASHCost project (also for boreholes 
fitted with handpumps) are that a basic level of service requires in the range of US$ 0.5-1 
per person per year for operation and minor maintenance and US$ 1.5-2 per person per 
year for capital maintenance expenditure. The national Mali guidelines for operation and 
maintenance and capital maintenance expenditures are lower than these international 
benchmarks, which suggests that there is already an increased risk of lower service levels 
than intended (WASHCost 2012). However, the actual expenditures by users on operation 
and maintenance and capital maintenance costs in this study are significantly less than even 
the national guidelines. Possible reasons for the low operation and maintenance 
expenditure in comparison to national guidelines are a willingness by users to use 
alternative unimproved sources, and a lack of expenditure on preventative maintenance. 
These are also factors in the low capital maintenance expenditures paid by users. I analyse 
these issues in much greater depth in Chapter Seven as part of the discussion about the role 
of users in financing water services.  
 
However, there is also a further possible factor affecting capital maintenance, which is the 
ambiguity over who should pay for capital maintenance expenditures explained above. The 
only municipality which showed capital maintenance expenditure of more than US$ 0.7 per 
person per year in this study was a municipality which had received an extensive handpump 
rehabilitation project in 2010, which was government-run and donor-funded rather than 
using funds from users. I discuss this example further in the next section in relation to the 
importance of capital maintenance expenditure for sustainability. 
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6.4. Levels of functionality in the case study municipalities 
 
The functionality survey of all water points (explained in Chapter Four) allows the 
identification of levels of coverage and functionality in the four key case study municipalities 
considered in this chapter, in order to analyse possible links between approaches to sharing 
recurrent costs and the sustainability of rural water services. (The research considers the 
actual usage of different water points by users in the case study villages used for more 
in-depth analysis in Chapter Seven.)  
 
The functionality rates in the four municipalities are shown in Table 6.4, firstly considering 
all “modern water points” according to national norms (DNH 2007), and then boreholes 
fitted with handpumps separately. 40 Before discussing functionality, it is important to note 
that although the estimated coverage is above 90% based on national norms in each 
municipality, many “modern wells” in Mali actually have no cover or have a cover which is 
often left open by the users. Therefore they do not always conform to the international 
definition of a protected dug well as an improved source used by the Joint Monitoring 
Program (JMP). The estimated coverage would fall in each municipality if the strict JMP 
definition was used, although in Kolokani, Tioribougou and Dialakoroba the estimated 
coverage would still be 80% to 90% even if all dug wells were discounted. The municipality 
of Dandougou Fakala would show the largest drop in coverage under this method, to as low 
as 50%.  
 
                                                 
40
 The percentage of the population covered was calculated on a village-by-village basis according to 
the national norms for the maximum number of people who can be served by each type of water 
point, the number of each type of water point in the village, and the village population. The 
village-level data was then aggregated to produce the table. 
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Table 6.4. Coverage and functionality of water points in four case study municipalities 
(survey data November 2011) 
 
Estimated 
coverage 
Functionality rate Municipality 
 
Population 
(approx) 
 
All “modern water 
points” according 
to national norms 
All “modern water 
points” according 
to national norms  
Boreholes fitted 
with handpumps 
only 
Dandougou 
Fakala 
10,000 99% 59% 90% 
Kolokani 39,000 95% 74% 64% 
Tioribougou 14,000 93% 81% 78% 
Dialakoroba 19,000 100% 86% 88% 
 
Note: “modern water points” refers to public tapstands in small piped systems, boreholes 
fitted with handpumps, and concrete-lined wells (based on DNH 2007). 
 
 
When examining the functionality rates for handpumps, it appears that the rates are higher 
in the municipalities of Dandougou Fakala and Dialakoroba (both about 90% functional) 
than in the other two municipalities, which are both below 80%. I argue that the approaches 
to capital maintenance in the period 2008-2011 may help explain the higher rates. In 
Dandougou Fakala, as discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, the WASH Technical Unit 
has adopted a much more structured approach to organising expenditure and the sharing of 
costs for operation and maintenance and capital maintenance between the users and the 
municipality. This approach has attempted to develop a clearer local interpretation of the 
ambiguous national policy. The Technical Unit reports that the introduction of this method 
since 2008 has gradually helped encourage users to pay their contribution to repairs and 
therefore to reduce downtime of infrastructures. However, for the moment the approach is 
still reliant on funds which are part of the direct budget support from WaterAid to the 
municipality, and it is not clear where the municipality might be able to access financing for 
these costs without the support of WaterAid.  
 
The approach of the Technical Unit in Dandougou Fakala again highlights how WaterAid and 
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its partners draw on ideas of both mainstream and critical institutionalism. The Technical 
Unit has attempted to mix some elements of the national policy with what it sees as realistic 
based on its knowledge of communities in its own municipality, an approach in line with a 
critical institutionalist view on institutional change. Yet despite this hybrid approach of 
trying to solve local problems in a way which responds to policy incoherence and builds on 
existing cultural practices, in some ways it is different to the examples of “practical 
hybridity” in the governance of public goods used by Booth (2012) and described in Chapter 
Three. Booth argues that such examples have tended to emerge independently of external 
interveners, and are not reliant on external funding. Yet the case of Dandougou Fakala is 
only possible because of the funding WaterAid provides for the staff of the Technical Unit 
itself, and as some discretionary budget for the Unit to use as part-funding for repairs to 
water infrastructure.  
 
In Dialakoroba, the high functionality rate seems to have been strongly influenced by an 
extensive government-run and donor-funded handpump rehabilitation project in the 
municipality in 2010. Over one third of the handpumps in the municipality were 
rehabilitated during this one project. Therefore the high functionality rate in Dialakoroba 
may be more due to a recent one-off series of capital maintenance expenditures rather than 
a more systematic approach. Overall, the functionality rates across the four municipalities 
suggest that the recurrent expenditures observed in the period 2008-2011 do not yet lead 
to a sustainable basic service level. 
 
 
6.5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I analysed the two key roles of local governments in Mali for rural water 
services and the associated financing challenges: expanding coverage and helping support 
community management for sustainable services. WaterAid’s work on developing the 
capacity of municipalities to raise funds themselves from other sources focuses on financing 
the costs of capital expenditure, even in municipalities where levels of coverage are already 
at or close to 100%. This raises issues of both sustainability and equity in rural water services. 
In municipalities with high coverage, sustainability becomes a problem without sufficient 
attention to capital maintenance expenditure and the costs of direct support. Supporting 
these municipalities in raising further capital investment costs also poses challenges of 
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equity between different municipalities because there are other local government areas 
which have lower coverage rates and therefore have greater need for investment in capital 
expenditure.  
 
I also presented two different approaches to providing direct support to rural water service 
providers in Mali: the model of municipal WASH Technical Units promoted by WaterAid, and 
the privately-operated STEFI system proposed in national policy. These approaches differ in 
the range of support activities they perform; their geographic scale and scope in terms of 
the type of infrastructure covered; and their costs and financing. Therefore greater 
national-level debate is required about which aspects of support to service providers are 
most important, especially to community-based management of handpumps, and what 
combination of actors can provide and finance this support.  
 
WaterAid and its partners need to pay closer attention to the costs and financing 
arrangements involved in order to more clearly examine the long-term political feasibility of 
the model of local government direct support to rural water services that they promote. The 
analysis presented here shows that the current costs of the model promoted by WaterAid 
are of a similar order of magnitude to the successful models of direct support for which 
evidence exists from other countries (Smits et al. 2011; WASHCost 2012). However, these 
costs may be too much for local governments in Mali to bear or fundraise themselves in the 
foreseeable future. Therefore WaterAid could consider further the potential for 
“intercommunalité” i.e. sharing the costs of support between different municipalities to 
benefit from economies of scale. This is recognised as an option in national policy and 
WaterAid has already trialled this in two adjacent municipalities where it works. Further 
analysis was presented of how the recurrent costs of operation and minor maintenance 
expenditure and capital maintenance expenditure are shared within WaterAid’s areas of 
work, as part of direct support to community management. It emerged that there are 
differing local interpretations of national policy regarding the definition and responsibility 
for paying capital maintenance expenditure, which I explore further in the next chapter.  
 
The observations presented in this chapter can be understood through the analytical 
framework developed for this thesis, in particular by considering the processes of 
institutional change that are illuminated by examining the role of local governments in rural 
water services. As I have argued, the municipal level is where the three areas of work on 
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institutional change used in the framework come together to help understand how the 
institutions in place for delivering public services have emerged and might be influenced. 
The evidence shows that WaterAid’s approach contains elements of both mainstream and 
critical institutionalist thinking. Firstly, the organisation promotes formal institutional 
arrangements within local government (municipal Technical Units for water and sanitation), 
with related processes such as Sector Development Plans and ‘marketing’ which 
demonstrate the challenge of “reforms as signals” (Andrews 2013), where the appearance 
of institutional reforms is greater than the actual results. However, there is some evidence 
that the Technical Units themselves do seek forms of local problem-solving which build on 
existing culture and practices. In this way they implicitly adopt a critical institutionalist view 
and actively promote “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver 2012), a process which I discuss in 
greater depth at community level in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Seven - The role of users in paying for access to rural water services 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I use empirical evidence to address the role of water users themselves, 
developing an understanding of how much rural communities contribute to the costs of 
water services and how users pay. In Chapter Six I briefly discussed the contributions of 
users to the costs of operation and minor maintenance and capital maintenance 
expenditure in four municipalities; in this chapter I analyse these payments in greater detail 
through household interviews and surveys, village-level case studies, and additional 
quantitative data from a further 11 municipalities. I examine the different mechanisms used 
for raising money to pay for water services and how these practices have emerged, 
especially collective fundraising arrangements by water management committees and other 
community groups.  
 
This evidence enables the actual payments made to be compared to the contributions and 
payment practices promoted by government and NGO policies. I analyse these differences 
in relation to the extended political economy framework and the possible ways of 
understanding institutional change. This involves using the ideas of critical institutionalism 
introduced in Chapter Three to understand community fundraising itself and how WaterAid 
and its partners interact with communities. In this way the analysis contributes lessons to 
the second and third research themes, concerning the implications for community 
management approaches, decentralised support, and the role of NGOs in promoting 
pro-poor sustainable financing. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Six, the primary focus of the research is on water services provided 
from community water points: tapstands which are part of small piped networks, boreholes 
fitted with handpumps and “modern wells”. These are the sources available in rural areas 
which are considered as acceptable for drinking and domestic water by national policy (DNH 
2007). Of these, I focus on boreholes equipped with handpumps because evidence suggests 
that it is services provided by these types of water points that experience the greatest 
challenges to long-term sustainability (DNH 2008a). However, as discussed in Chapter Two, I 
also consider projects in Mali which have sought to promote self-supply of improved 
hand-dug wells owned by households as an alternative form of access to water. By 
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examining data regarding the different types of water source used, I am also able to make 
an assessment of the levels of service received by users that are associated with the 
cost-sharing arrangements observed. 
 
 
7.2. Comparing national policy and actual practice 
 
In this section I examine how much communities contribute to the recurrent costs of rural 
water services, and how they pay. As previousIy explained, I focus on handpumps because 
of their known problems of poor sustainability (DNH 2008a). I first present the cost 
contributions proposed by national policy and NGO guidelines in Mali to show how much 
users are supposed to pay. I then use survey data from all water points (over 1300 in total) 
in the 15 rural municipalities where WaterAid works to provide further estimates of the 
actual annual expenditures made by communities on the recurrent costs of handpump 
operation, minor maintenance and capital maintenance (as a way of triangulating the 
estimates in Chapter Six, which were based on data held by key informants such as pump 
mechanics, rather than users’ own responses). As the 2008 public expenditure review of 
Mali’s rural water and sanitation sector by the World Bank states, “there are no studies 
making it possible to evaluate up to what point the beneficiaries really pay for water and up 
to what point savings are made to deal with maintenance, repairs and the renewal of 
equipment” (World Bank 2008: 31). This chapter helps to address this gap and respond to 
the first research theme of how costs are shared between different actors, focusing on users 
themselves. 
 
The evidence presented demonstrates the clear differences between user contributions in 
policy and practice. I show further disparities between policy and practice regarding the 
ways in which communities pay their contributions, for example whether they pay directly 
per container filled, via a regular tariff, or by contributing to collections after a breakdown 
has occurred. I also compare the typical approaches used for paying for water from 
handpumps to the payment modes used for public tapstands (as part of small piped systems) 
and “modern wells”. I conclude this section by showing the extent to which communities 
are able to pay for repairs to handpumps and other types of water supply associated with 
these payment amounts and mechanisms. In the subsequent parts of this chapter I go on to 
discuss how WaterAid’s partners try to bridge these differences between policy and practice, 
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and what can be learnt from communities that are identified as more successful in their 
approaches to fundraising. 
 
 
National policy 
 
As explained in Chapters Five and Six, official government policy in Mali specifies that users 
should pay for maintenance, management, replacing parts less than 20 years old, technical 
and financial monitoring, and any relevant taxes (DNH 2007). Users are also supposed to pay 
a contribution equivalent of up to 2% of the capital costs (depending on the type of 
infrastructure) at the time of construction. However this contribution is not actually used as 
part of the initial investment; instead, the money is intended to become the beginnings of 
the fund for operation and maintenance costs (DNH 2007). These costs correspond to the 
components of operating and minor maintenance expenditure and capital maintenance 
expenditure set out by Fonseca et al. (2011). 
 
More detailed guidelines also exist to help communities plan for these costs of operating, 
maintaining and rehabilitating boreholes fitted with handpumps. The table below shows the 
annualised costs estimated by the National Water Directorate (DNH 2003) and Global Water 
Initiative (GWI 2011) for the India Mk II handpump (the most common type of handpump in 
rural Mali). Costs are quoted in the FCFA figures used in each set of guidelines, followed by 
the total equivalent figures in US$ 2011 to account for inflation since the DNH guidelines 
were published.41 Both sets of guidelines intend that all these costs are paid by the users, in 
line with the national policy. 
 
                                                 
41
 Based on World Bank deflators and market exchange rates for Mali. 
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Table 7.1. Estimated annualised costs of operation and maintenance (OpEx) and capital 
maintenance (CapManEx) of India Mk II handpumps in Mali (adapted from DNH 2003 and 
GWI 2011) 
 
 Annual cost (FCFA) Annual cost (FCFA) 
 Based on DNH (2003) Based on GWI (2011) 
Manager fees (for daily management) As agreed by users 48,000 
Operational costs of management body 
(stationery, travel etc.) 
24,000 22,000 
Spare parts 15,000 42,000 
Technician fees (for maintenance visits) 20,000 10,000 
Total operation and maintenance (OpEx) 59,000 122,000 
Total capital maintenance (CapManEx) 70,000 55,000 
Total annual cost (OpEx + CapManEx) 129,000 + agreed 
manager fees 
177,000 
Equivalent figures converted to US$ 2011:   
Total operation and maintenance (OpEx) 162 241 
Total capital maintenance (CapManEx) 192 109 
Total annual cost (OpEx + CapManEx) 354 + agreed  
manager fees 
350 
Total annual cost (OpEx + CapManEx) per 
user, based on the national norm of 400 
users per handpump 
0.9 0.9 
 
Note: The figures for capital maintenance are annualised costs. Capital maintenance costs 
are typically regarded as expenditures which occur less frequently than annually, but must 
be saved for each year so that the money is available when these expenses are needed. 
 
 
Official guidance from DNH (2003: 6) states that payment for water from handpumps should 
be via a regular tariff or direct payment at the pump according to volume used. Although 
the national strategy aims to encourage payment per volume drawn (typically according to 
the size of the collection vessel), the guidance for management of handpumps 
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acknowledges that it is often impractical in rural areas because of the difficulties faced by 
users in having daily access to cash. Therefore the option of a regular tariff (typically each 
month) is also approved, as long as it has been calculated to cover all operation, 
maintenance and replacements necessary. A flat rate tariff is also supposed to have the 
advantage of encouraging users to use as much water as they need for a healthy and 
hygienic lifestyle, without being concerned about the marginal cost of the water they access 
(DNH 2003). Organising collections after a breakdown or using collective village activities 
such as a common field are not approved as methods of paying for water because they are 
considered too unreliable. 
 
 
Actual practice 
 
Water point survey data from 15 municipalities can be used to show the actual 
contributions made by user communities and how users pay. For each handpump surveyed, 
community representatives were asked to estimate the average total annual expenditure 
made by the community. (The survey team did not ask this question to users of small piped 
systems or wells, due to an omission by the consultants conducting the survey). Estimates 
were reported for only 39% of handpumps surveyed. This low response rate is likely due to a 
combination of factors: difficulties in finding someone in the community who could respond, 
a lack of record-keeping, and possibly some instances where expenditure was zero but 
classified as unreported. Results are shown in Table 7.2.  
 
Table 7.2. Reported typical annual expenditure on recurrent costs for handpumps (survey 
November 2011) 
 
Total no. of 
handpumps 
surveyed 
No. of 
handpumps 
where typical 
annual 
expenditure 
was reported 
% of 
handpumps 
where typical 
annual 
expenditure 
was reported 
Mean 
(FCFA) 
 
Median 
(FCFA) 
 
Minimum 
(FCFA) 
 
Maximum 
(FCFA) 
 
447 176 39% 47,000 36,000 2,500 260,000 
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Both the mean (47,000 FCFA, or about US$ 94) and median (36,000 FCFA, or about US$ 72) 
annual amounts paid by communities are significantly less than those considered necessary 
by the DNH or GWI guidelines presented above, representing costs per person of around 
US$ 0.2 per year. Given the large number of non-responses which likely includes some 
instances where expenditure was zero, the averages probably represent an upper bound on 
the actual annual expenditures made by communities on recurrent costs. The more detailed 
assessment undertaken in the four municipalities discussed in Chapter Six suggested that 
expenditures on operating and minor maintenance were up to US$ 0.1 per person per year 
during the period 2008-2011 (with users only contributing to capital maintenance 
expenditure on extremely rare occasions). Taking these two sets of figures together 
suggests that user contributions to recurrent costs, where contributions occur, are up to the 
range of US$ 0.1 to US$ 0.2 per person per year.42 
 
These reported annual expenditures of 36,000 FCFA to 47,000 FCFA could possibly cover the 
costs considered necessary for basic spare parts and the fees for occasional visits by a 
technician (approximately 35,000 FCFA to 52,000 FCFA according to the two sets of 
guidelines). However, these amounts would be insufficient to include general day-to-day 
management fees or the annual contribution needed for capital maintenance expenditure. 
At only 3 out of the 447 handpumps did users report paying at least the 177,000 FCFA 
(about US$ 350) annual costs suggested by GWI guidelines. I discuss in more detail in 
Section 7.4 how communities identified as more successful at fundraising by WaterAid’s 
partners actually raise this money. However, I also note that ‘success’ is understood by 
WaterAid’s partners more often to mean that communities are able to raise sufficient funds 
for operating and minor maintenance expenditure (up to about 50,000 FCFA or 
approximately US$ 100 per year) than it is to imply that communities can contribute the 
annual amounts greater than 100,000 FCFA required to cover capital maintenance 
expenditure as well. I describe these views in more detail later in this chapter, drawing on 
participatory workshops with representatives of WaterAid’s partners. 
  
Table 7.3 shows the methods used by communities to pay their contributions to the 
recurrent costs of water services. In addition to boreholes fitted with handpumps, data is 
included for “modern wells” and public tapstands which are part of small piped systems 
because these provide a useful comparison of how methods vary in part according to 
                                                 
42
 In line with WASHCost, recurrent costs are rounded to one decimal place (Burr et al. 2012) 
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different types of water point. 
  
Table 7.3. Methods of paying for water (survey data November 2011) 
 
 n Direct sale 
at water 
point 
Regular 
tariff 
Collection 
after 
breakdown 
No 
contribution 
No 
response 
Public tapstand 
from small piped 
system 
297 76% 12% 4% 5% 3% 
“Modern well” 598 1% 7% 13% 44% 36% 
Handpump on 
borehole 
447 10% 16% 49% 11% 14% 
 
 
Only for public tapstands connected to small piped systems do the majority of users pay via 
the nationally-approved methods of direct sale per volume collected or a regular tariff. For 
“modern wells”, 80% of responses were “no contribution” by the community or “no 
response”, because actual maintenance expenditure for wells is very rare. For handpumps, 
only about a quarter of responses were the nationally-approved methods: 10% via direct 
vending per volume at the water point and a further 16% paying a regular tariff. At around 
half of handpumps, payment occurs only after a breakdown when a collection is made for 
the repair costs. For the final 25% of handpumps, responses were “no contribution” by the 
community or “no response”. 
 
This examination of actual practices shows that only a tiny minority of communities raises 
the funds proposed by national policy guidance to ensure the operation, minor maintenance 
and capital maintenance of handpumps, and that the nationally-approved payment 
mechanisms are used at only 26% of handpumps. What are the associated results in terms 
of the ability of communities to ensure that any necessary repairs are funded and paid for in 
a timely manner? Table 7.4 shows the different severities of repairs that can be covered by 
user contributions at different water points.  
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Table 7.4. Levels of repairs that are covered by user contributions (survey data November 
2011) 
 
 n All repairs Only small 
repairs 
No repairs 
at all 
No 
response 
Public tapstand from 
small piped system 
297 64% 21% 5% 11% 
“Modern well” 598 1% 18% 45% 36% 
Handpump on 
borehole 
447 18% 52% 7% 23% 
 
 
Table 7.4 shows that at only 18% of handpumps surveyed do the contributions made by 
communities cover all repairs, as national policy requires them to. A further half of 
communities are able to cover small repairs.43 As a comparison, respondents at almost two 
thirds of public tapstands on small piped systems reported that user contributions covered 
all repairs. At only 5% of public tapstands did users report making no financial contributions 
and therefore not being able to pay for any repairs themselves. WaterAid’s partners suggest 
from experience that users of public tapstands in general have a higher willingness to pay 
for a combination of different reasons. Firstly, small piped networks are generally only 
installed in large villages of 2,000 people or more, where users tend to have higher incomes. 
This is a plausible argument although I do not have evidence to support it beyond the 
observations of WaterAid’s partners. Secondly, piped networks are relatively more common 
in rural areas in the north of Mali, where there are fewer hand-dug wells and therefore 
fewer alternative cheaper or more convenient sources than in the south of the country. 
Table 7.4 also shows that respondents at about 80% of “modern wells” stated that users did 
not cover any repairs, or gave no response; as explained above, this is probably because 
maintenance expenditure for wells is rare.  
 
As a further insight into user responses to breakdowns, WaterAid’s partners were asked to 
                                                 
43
 For the purposes of this survey, “small repairs” were defined according to the perception of the 
respondent. However, since this is the only category between “all repairs” and “no repairs at all”, 
“small repairs” effectively means “some repairs”. The issue of defining different types of repairs and 
the associated costs is discussed in more detail in Section 7.3 in relation to the role of WaterAid and 
its partners.  
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estimate, based on their experience, how long it took each community where they worked 
to pay the user contributions to the cost of repairs after a breakdown of a water point (this 
question was not included in the wider water point survey). As discussed above, the 
majority of communities do not cover all the costs they are supposed to according to 
national policy and guidelines. Therefore the figures in Table 7.5 refer to the time taken to 
pay a contribution which may be partial and supplemented by another actor in order to 
cover the full costs required. 
 
Table 7.5. Time taken for villages to pay their contribution to repairs after a breakdown 
(WaterAid partner estimates, July 2011) 
 
Time taken for a community to pay their contribution 
to repairs after a breakdown of a water point 
Estimated percentage 
of villages (n=203) 
Less than one week 33% 
One week to one month 33% 
More than one month 34% 
 
 
The figures in Table 7.5 are estimates, rather than being based on full survey data, but they 
provide a further angle on the problem of relying on user contributions for maintenance 
expenditure. There is no official policy in Mali on acceptable levels of downtime for water 
points, but Carter et al. (1999b) suggest a maximum of 2% of the time, equivalent to seven 
days per year. If the estimates from WaterAid’s partners are accurate, then about two thirds 
of villages in their areas of intervention would fail this benchmark. Even if the assumption in 
these estimates that most communities manage and raise funds for all the different points 
in their village together, rather than using a separate committee for each water point, is 
reasonable, it still raises the question of how downtime of a particular water point affects 
the service levels received by users. Do users travel further to another improved source? Or 
do they use an alternative unimproved source of lower water quality? I discuss these issues 
further in Section 7.6. In the next section I turn to how WaterAid and its partners address 
the other challenges raised here, concerning what contributions communities can 
realistically be expected to make and what costs should be supported by other actors. 
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7.3. The role of WaterAid and its partners 
 
In this section I examine how WaterAid and its partners respond to the differences between 
policy and practice in terms of user contributions to rural water services presented in the 
previous section. Although WaterAid and its partner NGOs and local government Technical 
Units in theory align themselves with the national policy that users are responsible for the 
recurrent costs of operating and minor maintenance expenditure and capital maintenance 
expenditure, in practice they acknowledge the evidence presented in this chapter, that the 
majority of communities are either not able or not willing to pay the necessary contributions 
required to cover all repairs to handpumps. WaterAid and its partners therefore 
acknowledge that they are trying to support a level of service which is above the effective 
demand level of the users. Surveys and discussions in workshops with representatives of 
WaterAid’s partners showed that they generally consider that repair costs in the range 
20,000 FCFA to 50,000 FCFA (about US$ 40 to US$ 100) per water point should be paid by 
users, on the understanding that such repairs are required up to once per year. This broadly 
corresponds to the evidence presented in the first part of this chapter, that in cases where 
communities do report contributing to operation and maintenance, the annual upper bound 
on these contributions is 36,000 FCFA to 47,000 FCFA (about US$ 72 to US$ 94).  
 
However, only one of WaterAid’s partners, the Technical Unit in the municipality of 
Dandougou Fakala, has defined a more specific figure for the expected level of community 
contribution and how this relates to the roles and responsibilities of other actors, an 
approach that I briefly introduced in Chapter Six. In this municipality the Technical Unit, 
which is supported by WaterAid, has agreed with communities that users should pay up to 
40,000 FCFA (about US$ 80) for each repair needed. If a repair is more expensive than this, 
then the municipality (using its budget for water and sanitation which is provided by 
WaterAid) will cover any costs above the first 40,000 FCFA. This approach differs 
fundamentally from official national policy set by the water directorate. The Technical Unit 
acknowledges that ideally such financing would be generated by each user committee and 
managed by a water users’ association which groups together the committees of multiple 
villages or the whole municipality. However, it has not been possible either to mobilise 
sufficient funds from each community, or to organise committees into a larger association, 
so the Technical Unit argues that it is the municipality’s responsibility, with WaterAid’s help, 
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to promote an alternative solution. Therefore the Technical Unit has taken the model 
contract which the national water directorate proposes is signed between municipalities 
and water management committees (DNH 2003) and adapted it to reflect these differing 
responsibilities.  
 
In a similar way to Booth’s (2012: 83) description of local problem-solving “to address the 
effects of policy incoherence” observed in the Africa Politics and Power Progamme’s 
research on local governance and the delivery of public services, the cost-sharing initiative 
developed by the Technical Unit of Dandougou Fakala does “include the posing of a problem 
to which national policies and leaders are not offering solutions.” However, the case studies 
that Booth describes “relied primarily, although … not always exclusively, on mobilising local 
resources, and they have, above all, not been driven by the availability of either government 
or donor funds” (Booth 2012: 83). In contrast, the Technical Unit’s current solution is only 
possible because of the funds made available to the municipality by WaterAid; the approach 
has helped mobilise some local resources at community levels, but only to a certain limit. 
This observation acts as a counterpoint to the optimism for local problem-solving expressed 
by Booth. 
 
WaterAid’s other partners had not developed such clear specific procedures for determining 
the contribution of users in case of breakdowns. Instead, they used more informal 
discussions on a case-by-case basis, arguing that some communities could pay up to 200,000 
FCFA in the event of major breakdowns and should therefore do so if they can afford this. 
The exact form and level of user contributions was generally left to the community to decide, 
often based on an agreement about what was reasonable for each household to contribute 
rather than what was necessarily needed. The exact split of costs was therefore also often 
community-specific, and to an extent dependent on the NGO’s own budget which was 
available at the time to allocate to repair costs.  
 
However, the other partners did generally share a similar conceptual view to the specific 
approach of Dandougou Fakala: NGOs (or local government with WaterAid’s support) rather 
than users usually need to pay for bigger repairs and major rehabilitations (capital 
maintenance). The representatives of WaterAid’s partners were eventually able to agree, 
after extensive discussion during workshops, on four different categories of repairs. The 
objective of defining such categories was to be able to develop better monitoring of which 
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actors were paying for which costs,44 even if there was not yet consensus on who actually 
should pay in each case. These definitions are set out in Table 7.6. 
 
Table 7.6. Definitions of levels of repairs and costs agreed with WaterAid’s partners 
(workshops October and November 2011) 
 
Type of repair Description Typical 
frequency 
Discussions on 
who should pay 
Corresponding 
WASHCost 
category 
Small repair Spare parts and labour 
costing < 50,000 FCFA 
(about US$ 100). 
Every 1-2 
years 
Users, although 
some WaterAid 
partners do 
contribute 
Operating and 
minor 
maintenance 
expenditure 
Major repair Spare parts and labour 
costing > 50,000 FCFA 
(about US$ 100). 
Every 2-5 
years 
Users if possible 
but more often 
WaterAid 
partners 
Capital 
maintenance 
expenditure 
Rehabilitation Complete replacement 
of the whole lifting 
mechanism and/or the 
surrounding 
superstructure e.g. 
replacing entire 
handpump or pulley 
mechanism on a well 
and/or replacing the 
surrounding concrete 
walls. 
Less 
frequent 
than every 
5 years 
Users only 
occasionally 
despite what 
official policy 
suggests 
Capital 
maintenance 
expenditure 
Major 
rehabilitation 
Complete 
rehabilitation of the 
whole works e.g. 
clearing borehole or 
excavating collapsed 
well. 
Up to 
every 20 
years 
WaterAid 
partners or 
central 
government 
Capital 
maintenance 
expenditure 
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 As I discuss in Chapter Eight, the coup and changeovers in WaterAid staff hindered the progress on 
developing this monitoring. 
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This lack of clarity over the exact division of responsibilities between users and other actors 
reflects both the ambiguity in national policy concerning capital maintenance expenditure, 
explained in Chapter Five, and the responses of WaterAid’s partners to different levels of 
willingness and ability to pay amongst different communities. I argue that the differences 
between policy and practice identified here represent an example of Mosse’s (2004: 639) 
argument that ‘good policy’ “legitimizes and mobilizes political support” while often being 
“unimplementable” in practice. As already discussed, the limitations on the amount of 
national-level qualitative research possible in this project (due to the coup and subsequent 
political crisis) prevented in-depth investigation into how national policies such as the Water 
Code and the National Drinking Water Strategy (DNH 2007) were developed. However, my 
argument developed in Chapter Five is that it is reasonable to suppose, given wider 
donor-government relations and the dependence of the water sector on foreign aid, that 
mobilising domestic and international political support and therefore financial assistance 
was a plausible reason for water legislation and policy adopting both community 
management and cost recovery to the extent that they did. 
 
However, while national cost-sharing policies may be ‘good’ in terms of gaining the 
necessary political support, the experiences and reactions of WaterAid’s partners suggest 
that these policies are “unimplementable” (Mosse 2004) in practice. Mosse argues that 
development actors faced with this challenge try “to maintain coherent representations of 
their actions as instances of authorised policy, because it is always in their interest to do so" 
(Mosse 2004: 639). Understanding why development organisations act as they do, according 
to Mosse, requires a greater consideration of the agency of the actors involved than 
approaches such as those of Ferguson (1994) permit. Doing this demands some form of 
ethnography or at least much closer engagement with development workers themselves to 
try to appreciate the challenges from their perspective (Mosse 2004; Carr 2011; Fechter 
2012), as I explained in developing the extended political economy analysis framework in 
Chapter Three. 
 
These questions also relate to the model suggested by Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 
(2012) for identifying whether a state is likely to be in a “capability trap” or not. They argue 
that one of the key elements when assessing how development workers behave is whether 
the strategies of front-line workers are aligned more to performance or self-interest. 
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Self-interest and maintaining their position involves workers’ compliance with inappropriate 
rules (or even corruption) rather than adopting more performance-oriented actions aimed 
at best serving the organisation’s ultimate clients or beneficiaries. Eyben (2010) makes a 
similar argument but points out that if development workers are restricted by inappropriate 
policies or management approaches, they may try to work around these rules for the 
benefit of those their organisation is trying to support, while reporting their actions to 
managers and ultimately donors in ways that are framed according to the original policies. 
In this way they aim to combine performance-related ways of working with the self-interest 
requirements of appearing to conform to instructions.  
 
These areas of literature on implementing “unimplementable” policies and the ethnography 
of aid workers highlight key questions. How do WaterAid’s partners balance the tension 
between performance-oriented and self-serving actions in this context, and how do they 
report or represent their actions further up the chain in order to continue to validate the 
model of community management with some external support? The evidence presented 
here suggests that WaterAid’s partners are performance-oriented in the way they try to 
work “relationally” (Eyben 2010) by building up understandings with local communities to 
help develop forms of “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver 2012) which combine some aspects 
of the challenging national policy with local interpretations in practice. I explore these ideas 
in greater depth in the next section in relation to understanding how communities really 
raise money for their contributions to water services.  
 
However, the second part of the question is to what extent WaterAid and its partners 
actually question national policy, given that they significantly adapt the policy in their own 
work. I argue that the links between community and local government levels are important 
in relation to this question. As described in Chapter Six, WaterAid’s model of Technical Units 
at local government level is based more on a mainstream institutionalist view of how 
decentralised public services can work than a critical institutionalist perspective. Yet the 
actions of WaterAid’s partners demonstrate an implicit critical institutionalist approach to 
working with communities, as I discuss in more detail in the next section. It is possible to 
argue that if WaterAid questions the community management and cost recovery model in 
national policy, it would raise awkward questions about the ability of their own Technical 
Unit approach to respond to this challenge, since this model (as discussed for the example 
of the municipality of Dandougou Fakala) relies on WaterAid funds to finance capital 
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maintenance expenditure. WaterAid and its partners do emphasise the challenges of 
sustainability and financing, for example in the country programme’s strategy (WaterAid 
Mali 2010). However, the responses they propose are based either on the ‘marketing’ 
approach to raise funds from other donors, which as discussed in Chapter Six has had 
limited success so far, or on increased ‘sensitisation’ of users to pay. In the next section I 
analyse the likely limits to ‘sensitising’ communities to pay more based on evidence from 
community fundraising and user preferences of types of water sources. 
 
 
7.4. Approaches to community fundraising 
 
In the previous section I introduced how WaterAid’s partners interpret the national policy 
on cost-sharing, and what this means for how much they think users can be expected to pay. 
In this section I examine in more detail how communities raise funds for their contributions, 
especially those communities which are apparently more successful at fundraising, and how 
WaterAid’s partners support them in this. I show that these more successful villages 
represent examples of “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver 2012) in the ways they combine 
traditional practices with more formal ideas about how water management committees 
should function. Yet even villages which are thought to be more successful rarely raise 
enough money to cover all their responsibilities under national policy. 
 
 
Case studies of more successful communities 
 
The case study villages selected were identified by WaterAid’s partners as being particularly 
successful at raising money. Analysis of the case studies sought to understand whether their 
mechanisms for raising money were more successful because they employed the 
recommended national policies (paying per container collected or paying a regular tariff) or 
whether they were successful for other reasons. This qualitative examination of different 
communities shows that villages actually use a combination of methods to raise money, 
some of which are those suggested by policy, and others which are not. The case study 
villages and their methods of fundraising are summarised in Table 7.7.  
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As explained in Chapter Three, the evidence presented in this section is drawn from two 
sources: focus group discussions conducted by staff of WaterAid’s partners in each 
community, and follow-up group interviews with water committees and women’s groups 
that I conducted myself where possible, except in the commune of Dandougou Fakala 
where my travel was restricted for security reasons. 
 
I include information in Table 7.7 on whether each village has either community or 
household hand-dug wells available because, as already discussed, the presence of 
alternative sources is thought to reduce demand and willingness to pay for water from 
improved sources such as handpumps. As set out in Chapter Four, this was why these areas 
of Mali were selected for the detailed parts of the research, because they posed significant 
challenges for sustainability on these grounds. WaterAid’s partners reiterated in the 
workshops that they considered strong need - in terms of lack of alternative water points - 
as one of the key reasons for some villages in their areas of work being more successful at 
raising money. However Table 7.7 shows that all the case study villages except Tacko do 
have at least one alternative source of drinking water instead of handpumps. This suggests 
that a strict idea of need does not explain the differences between communities, although 
as I discuss in Section 7.6, many households still do prefer the convenience of a hand-dug 
unimproved household well to an improved but more distant community water source.  
 
The partners also argued that the presence of exceptionally motivated, well-organised and 
transparent water management committees was an important factor - what some in the 
water sector have called “islands of success” (Davis and Iyer 2002). However as I discuss 
below, the level of motivation and organisation of a community group which nominally 
functions as the water management committee depends both on features of traditional 
community groups and more recent formal elements of water committees. There are also 
some villages in WaterAid’s areas of work where one individual or family who is particularly 
wealthy in comparison to other members of the community decides to take responsibility 
for the water point and its upkeep themselves, although this situation does not apply to the 
case study villages featured here. 
 
It is important to note from Table 7.7 that despite being nominated as examples of success, 
only one of the villages chosen (Yorobougou) raises sums of money per water point which 
approach the amounts of over 100,000 FCFA (about US$ 200) per year suggested as 
193 
necessary by national policy and guidelines. Two of the villages are in the commune of 
Dandougou Fakala, where WaterAid’s partner has explicitly decided that the users cannot 
be expected to contribute as much as national policy requires, as explained in the previous 
section. WaterAid’s partners who work in the other communes in question have similar 
views even if they were not made as explicit until this issue was discussed in the workshops 
organised during this research. 
 
In fact, even in Yorobougou the amount raised is not solely for maintenance of water points. 
This money forms part of the village’s general common fund from profits from the harvest 
of the collective field, so can also be used for other collective purposes: historically this has 
included contributions to additional school classrooms, building the village shop, digging 
other wells and a nearby microdam. Despite these other examples of expenditures, the 
village is able to deposit the surplus each year in a bank account in the main town of the 
commune which can be accessed when required for unexpected expenditures. This has 
enabled the community to spend up to 180,000 FCFA (about US$ 360) at any one time for 
major handpump repairs. As shown by the wider survey evidence discussed at the start of 
this chapter, this amount is much greater than most communities have been able to raise. 
 
 
Institutional bricolage 
 
I argue that the village of Yorobougou and the others listed in Table 7.7 represent more 
successful examples of fundraising for user contributions to water services than average 
because of the way “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver 2002, 2012) has occurred in these 
contexts. The concept of institutional bricolage has been proposed to describe the way that 
institutions commonly emerge as a mixture of socially embedded (based on particular social 
and cultural practices) and bureaucratic (based on more formalised ideas and structures) 
(Cleaver 2002). As discussed when setting out the analytical framework in Chapter Three, 
this idea attempts to avoid the false distinction of portraying institutions as explicitly 
'formal' or 'informal' and highlights the important roles of both local participants and 
intervening individuals and organisations in shaping arrangements for the governance of 
common property resources such as water. 
  
Cleaver (2012) identifies a series of key features of institutional bricolage. Among these key 
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elements are two in particular which I argue are relevant to understanding how 
communities pay for water in the case study villages. Firstly, Cleaver argues that institutional 
bricolage commonly involves combining existing practices with ideas adapted from other 
contexts. Some things remain as taken-for-granted and accepted practices, but these may 
be adapted under new conditions, such as traditional male-only meetings becoming open to 
women as well (an example given from Cleaver’s research). Secondly, the process of 
bricolage means that institutions are often multi-purpose and dynamic, rather than the 
single-purpose and more static institutions envisaged by mainstream institutionalism.  
 
In these case studies, some villages have adopted payment mechanisms which are similar to 
one of the official policy options of a regular tariff paid per household. However, in three of 
the case study communities (Kanekebougou, Tacko and Konio Peulh), the idea of a regular 
tariff has been borrowed or adapted from the existing practices of women’s savings groups 
rather than being used directly as policy might suggest. In these three villages, the regular 
tariff contributions are made by women either weekly or monthly, depending on the 
frequency of the parallel system used by the women’s savings groups. In these villages, the 
contribution from men is via an annual tariff (in Kanekebougou) or a through a contribution 
to collective farming work if additional money is required beyond the amount raised by 
women (in Tacko and Konio Peulh). Only in Tacko and Konio Peulh are contributions of 
women greater overall than those of men.  
 
For example, in the village of Tacko, identified by the Technical Unit of Dandougou Fakala as 
the most successful at fundraising in the municipality, the payment system agreed by the 
community was that the women would pay a monthly tariff of 50 FCFA (about US$ 0.1) on 
behalf of their household. This contribution is paid during the six months of the year when 
the women’s group is able to raise income for its members from the sale of fish. This use of 
elements of traditional practices in the community has been combined with more formal 
procedures that water management committees are supposed to adopt, promoted by the 
Technical Unit. For example, the committee formally records this income and shares the 
details of its accounts with the Technical Unit and the municipal council, so that it can 
demonstrate transparency to the users and show the council and the Technical Unit that it 
has raised its contribution when it requires additional support for capital maintenance 
expenditure (Sidibé and Jones 2011).  
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These observations also relate to Cleaver’s argument that institutional bricolage leads to 
institutions which serve multiple purposes rather than the typical single-purpose institutions 
which are often promoted by NGOs, such as water management committees. In some cases, 
the women’s groups have not just lent ideas to the payment systems adopted for water 
management, but the women’s groups themselves combine the facility for individual 
members to save and take loans with the possibility to jointly contribute to other collective 
community expenditures. For example, the women’s group in the community of 
Bamabougou had contributed money to the construction of a micro-dam for the village and 
the women’s group in Torokoroni had contributed to the cost of building a school 
classroom.  
 
These initiatives reflect the argument in work by other NGOs that support to women’s 
savings groups can also promote broader collective action (Ouattara et al. 1999; Allen and 
Panetta 2010; Edwards 2010; Mitlin et al. 2011). In a study of particularly successful savings 
groups in the Oxfam and Freedom from Hunger “Saving for Change” programme in Mali, 
other collective projects observed included liaising with NGOs for the construction of public 
facilities such as clinics or mills, setting up small businesses, and in one case investing in a 
cart and donkey for a water vending business which could bring containers of water from 
their nearest public facility in the next town (Edwards 2010). This last example represents 
another case of an initiative where it was a women’s group (rather than another body set up 
as a water committee) addressing problems of water access. The women’s groups in 
Edwards’ study identified three common positive factors which emerged from participation 
in the savings group and contributed to working together: increased group solidarity, 
greater respect for the women in their own households, and the opportunity to meet 
regularly to share ideas. However, these actions also often depended for their success on 
approval from the women’s husbands and the village chief. The projects also usually 
involved additional support from an NGO. 
 
The qualitative evidence on the communities presented in this chapter is not of sufficient 
depth to enable me to comment on the importance of issues of solidarity and respect in the 
context of women’s groups in these communities, or on the role of men in influencing the 
contributions to water services made by women.45 It is clear that the view expressed in 
                                                 
45
 I discussed the challenge of the depth of the qualitative research in Chapter Four. In relation to the 
examples of Tacko and Konio Peulh it was even more difficult because I could not visit these 
communities myself for security reasons. 
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some parts of Mali that paying for water is a male responsibility (Jones 2011a) does not 
apply everywhere. However, it is not possible to say whether the observed instances of 
women contributing to the costs of water services might represent a form of women’s 
collective empowerment, as suggested by some of the literature on women’s groups, or the 
continuation of unequal gender relations where men retain key decision-making power in 
relation to collective activity.  
 
However, the evidence does provide insight into the role of NGOs and external 
organisations such as the municipal Technical Units in the process of making links between 
women’s groups and other parts of communities involved in financing water services. The 
example of the village of Tacko is one case which shows how WaterAid’s partner accepted 
the need for numerous repeat visits and engagement with the community over a long 
period to enable continued discussion about what combination of practices might work to 
raise the money required for the community’s contribution to water services. By 
acknowledging and supporting practices of bricolage, WaterAid’s partners are implicitly 
adopting elements of a critical institutionalist approach. Instead of assuming that water 
management committees can be formed through applying consistent design principles, 
WaterAid’s partners work with the community institutions that do exist and adapt their 
practices by drawing on both tradition and more modern ideas.  
 
Having discussed paying for water in the context of collective community fundraising and 
how this is affected by wider processes of bricolage, in the next section I turn to considering 
payments for water in the context of household finances, and subsequently discuss 
alternative ideas for the delivery of water services which focus on provision by individual 
households rather than communities.  
 
 
7.5. Expenditure on water in the context of other household finances and priorities 
 
In this section, I try to understand what the community contributions presented in the 
previous section entail at the household level, in the context of other income, expenditure 
and financial decision-making i.e. broader contextual and structural issues. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, assessing users’ ability and willingness to pay for improved water services is 
fraught with difficulties. Typical benchmarks used for “affordability” are arbitrary and often 
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misleading (Reddy 1999; Calkins et al. 2002; Waughray and Mohan 2003). Stated preference 
approaches to assessing willingness to pay - whether using contingent valuation or 
participatory methods - are difficult to conduct well and often unreliable (Diamond and 
Hausman 1994; Whittington 2002; Null et al. 2012). Therefore this research did not attempt 
to evaluate exact quantitative figures for affordability or willingness to pay. Instead, I 
develop broad comparisons between contributions towards water services and household 
expenditure on sanitation, hygiene, health and education, drawing on quantitative and 
qualitative interviews undertaken during this research as well as available national datasets. 
As explained in Chapter Four, I also use data from participatory research, household 
questionnaires and national surveys to show how households prioritise expenditure on 
different goods and services. Water from improved community sources is clearly not top of 
the list, but, as previously discussed, household wells are often considered desirable. 
Therefore the subsequent part of the thesis, Section 7.6, investigates the promotion of 
improved household wells in more detail. 
 
 
Expenditure on access to water compared to sanitation, hygiene, health and education 
 
In Chapter Six I showed that user contributions to the recurrent costs of rural water services 
in the areas of this study are typically in the range US$ 0.1 to US$ 0.2 per person per year or 
even less. In this section I show that such contributions represent extremely minor expenses 
compared to most other goods and services. I first use data from participatory diagramming 
exercises on income and expenditure in two villages (Bogola and Kola, in the municipality of 
Dialakoroba) to provide an approximation of how household expenditure is split up 
between key categories of outgoings. I also draw on data concerning the same question, for 
rural areas, from the national Malian Poverty Evaluation Survey (EMEP) 46  of 2001 
(summarised in ODHD/LCPM 2006). The information from these two sources is shown in 
Table 7.8. It is clear that on average food dominates expenditure in all cases. In comparison, 
expenditure on water services was of such a low magnitude that it was not even mentioned 
by the two case study villages, and only included as a component within the ‘lodging and 
furniture’ expenditure category of the EMEP.  
 
                                                 
46
 Enquête Malienne d’Evaluation de la Pauvreté, translation by the author. 
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Table 7.8. Approximate divisions of total household expenditure into different categories 
(participatory exercises 10 and 24 Mar 2011; ODHD/LCPM 2006) 
 
 Bogola village Kola village National household 
survey: EMEP 2001 
Food 70% 50% 73% 
Health 10% 25% 2% 
Education 5% 8% 1% 
Transport  9% 5% 
Tax  8%  
Clothes 5%  5% 
Animal health 5%   
Lodging and furniture   9% 
Other 5%  5% 
 
 
As explained in Chapter Four, interviews were also undertaken in 11 households in the two 
villages of Bogola and Kola to understand expenditure on water in the context of wider 
household expenditure, and in particular in comparison to expenditure on sanitation, 
hygiene, health and education. The interviews were not designed to give statistically valid 
data but were intended to provide further qualitative insights into how people managed 
their household finances, including any differences in gender roles (one male and one 
female were interviewed in each household i.e. the household head and their spouse).  
 
Only one of the interviewees in the two villages had actually spent any money to access 
water in the previous 12 months, contributing to the repair of one of the pumps in the 
village. This observation reflects the wider trend that I have previously discussed: 
contributions to funds for maintaining handpumps are rare in most villages in WaterAid’s 
zones of interventions. Three other interviewees (two male, one female) had paid for bleach 
to treat water in their households’ wells. 
 
Regarding health-related expenditure, there appeared to be three groups amongst male 
respondents. Firstly, there were those who had not spent any cash for the health of anyone 
in their household in the previous 12 months. They explained that this was because they 
used traditional medicines based on wild plants that they had collected themselves. 
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Secondly, there was a group who spent in the order of magnitude of 10,000 FCFA (about 
US$ 20) per household during the year for infrequent purchases of medicines and/or 
consultations at the clinic. This was equivalent to US$ 1-2 per person per year. There was a 
final group of respondents who had spent in the order of 100,000 FCFA (about US$ 200) per 
household where there had been at least one serious illness among household members, 
possibly involving further travel to a larger town. This was equivalent to US$ 10-20 per 
person per year. Responses from the women interviewed only fell into the first two 
categories, perhaps because larger expenditures are more commonly the responsibility of a 
male household head.  
 
The 2006 Demographic and Health Survey of Mali (EDSM)47 also provides useful insights into 
households’ medical expenses and how they fund these (summarised in CPS/MS et al. 2007). 
Twenty per cent of the population reported being ill in the previous month, and in rural 
areas 40% of these people sought treatment from qualified medical help. This cost almost 
11,000 FCFA (about US$ 22) on average per person, and about 8,000 FCFA (about $US 16) 
per person even in the poorest quintile of the population. In rural areas, 71% of households 
paid cash for health expenses. Of those, about half (52%) were able to pay with immediately 
available cash from their current income or salary. The remaining half used other sources of 
finance, such as selling goods (22%), using savings (8%), taking an interest-free loan (8%) or 
a loan with interest (1%). The survey emphasises that 29% of households did not pay cash 
for health expenses; these households paid in-kind through giving up other household 
assets. The survey does not report the responses of those who did not pay at all for medical 
expenses, which might have enabled a comparison to the respondents in the villages of 
Bogola and Kola who used medicinal plants instead. However, both these sources of data 
show that when people do make medical expenses, even the rural poor, these outweigh 
typical expenditures on water by at least an order of magnitude. 
 
In terms of expenditure on education, male respondents in the two villages suggested 
expenses of up to 20,000 FCFA (about US$ 40) per household per year, for school fees and 
some materials such as exercise books. This was of the order of about US$ 2 per person per 
year (when considering costs per member of population, not per child actually attending 
school). Again, this is an order of magnitude greater than typical expenditures on water 
services. The female respondents did not contribute to education costs except for 
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 Enquête Démographique et de Santé du Mali, translation by the author. 
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occasional small items such as pens.  
 
It is also interesting to examine expenditures on sanitation and hygiene, which formed part 
of the household interviews (although national-level data is not available for these 
expenses). No respondent had made any cash expenditures on sanitation in the previous 12 
months (although some households had spent about US$ 12 on latrine slabs subsidised by 
WaterAid’s partner NGO in previous years). However, many households spent significant 
amounts on soap (the exceptions were those who used home-made soap), typically more 
than US$ 4 per person per year. This appears greater than the amount spent on education, 
or the amount spent on health by those households who did not suffer a particular serious 
illness during the year. Data from the WASHCost project in Ghana and Mozambique also 
suggest perhaps surprisingly high household expenditures on soap: US$ 10 per person in a 
six-month period in Ghana (WASHCost 2013) and 5% of household income in Mozambique 
(van de Reep 2010). These figures combine soap for handwashing with soap for other 
purposes such as bathing and washing clothes; it is often hard to disaggregate these 
because the physical soap used is commonly the same.  
 
In the households interviewed, women generally spent more on soap than men, probably 
because they are seen as more responsible for household hygiene and cleanliness than men. 
However, even in the villages identified in the study as more successful at raising funds for 
the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure, the actual amount raised per 
person per year is in the order of US$ 1 or less. Even where most or all of this is raised by 
men (such as in the village of Yorobougou), if women in general beyond the two case study 
villages are also primarily responsible for buying soap then women seem to contribute more 
to water, sanitation and hygiene together because of the relatively high expenditure on 
soap compared to water. This is despite the common remark in the case study villages that I 
was able to visit that water is a male responsibility. Women clearly do have a major role in 
paying for water in some villages, such as the two case study villages in the commune of 
Dandougou Fakala. However, I was not able to travel to these areas personally because of 
security reasons, so this research could not obtain sufficient qualitative data from these 
villages to really know how this decision came about in the communities. 
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Priorities for expenditure 
 
Having shown that expenditures on health and education are typically at least an order of 
magnitude greater than those on water, in this section I discuss how households prioritise 
expenditure by analysing what they report as essential and desirable, and presenting actual 
levels of ownership of different assets.  
 
As described in Chapter Four, in the two case study villages of Bogola and Kola I facilitated 
exercises which developed a broad set of wealth indicators by categorising those assets 
which were considered essential for households, and those that were desirable (in order of 
typical preference). The ‘essential’ assets were also subdivided into two categories: those 
which all households in the village possessed, and those which not all households possessed. 
This allowed three different broad levels of wealth (or poverty) to be developed: households 
which did not even have all the essentials; households which had the assets considered 
essential but not many of the ‘desirables’; and households that also had many of the 
desirable assets. In terms of categorising expenditure on assets by their importance and 
desirability, discussions led to the categories shown in Table 7.9. 
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Table 7.9. Categorisation of different household assets according to necessity and 
desirability (based on participatory exercises in two villages) 
 
 Bogola village Kola village 
Essential  
(and all 
households 
have it) 
Food 
Clothes 
Basic farm equipment (hoe) 
Basic house (mud or thatch roof) 
Traditional medicines 
Water 
Food 
Basic farm equipment (hoe) 
Basic house (mud or thatch roof) 
Traditional and modern 
medicines 
 
Essential  
(but not all 
households 
have it) 
Cow 
Plough 
Donkey with cart 
Modern medicines 
Latrine 
Cow 
Plough 
Water from pump 
 
Desirable  
(in order of 
preference, 
most 
desirable 
first) 
House with corrugated metal roof 
Access to water from pump or own 
well 
Bicycle 
Motorbike 
Solar panel 
Mobile phone 
TV or radio 
Sanplat latrine 
Oil lamp 
Watch 
House with corrugated metal roof 
Access to well with chlorine 
Donkey with cart 
Bicycle or motorbike 
Chicken or other small animals 
Mobile phone 
TV or radio 
Meat and fish 
Sanplat latrine 
 
 
 
Although a household well is high up the list of desirable items, in practice other items 
which were reported as less desirable were more commonly owned (e.g. a radio). It was 
hard to probe this further: it could be a function of their different costs (a radio is cheaper 
so bought first even if less desirable) or just because the participants knew my general 
research was on water and sanitation so were more inclined to cite this as important. The 
promotion of families making their own household well is discussed in more detail in Section 
7.6. Data from the rapid household surveys undertaken in 16 villages during this research, 
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from Mali’s Integrated Light Household Survey (ELIM)48 in 2006 (summarised in DNSI/MEIC 
et al. 2007) and from the fourth Mali Demographic and Health Survey (EDSM-IV)49 in 2006 
(summarised in CPS/MS et al. 2007) is used to show actual levels of ownership of key assets, 
summarised in Table 7.10. 
 
Table 7.10. Household ownership of key assets (household survey data November 2011; 
EDSM-IV 2006; ELIM 2006) 
 
 Percentage of 
households 
reporting ownership 
(n=375) 
Percentage of rural 
households 
reporting ownership 
(EDSM-IV 2006) 
Percentage of rural 
households 
reporting ownership 
(ELIM 2006) 
Radio 90% 68%  
Cow and plough 84% 47% (plough not 
specified) 
 
Motorbike 53% 25% 28% 
TV 25% 11% 7% 
 
 
It is clear that levels of ownership of each of the assets are higher than the latest available 
nationwide data for rural areas. However, it is not possible to say whether or not this 
suggests that ownership is actually higher in the villages in this study than the national 
average or not because the most recent national data is from 2006, and overall increases in 
ownership could be expected since then anyway. The key result from the different sets of 
data taken together is that significant numbers of rural households are able to buy assets 
that they themselves (according to the participatory exercises undertaken in this study) 
classify as desirable, while contributions spent on access to water remain much lower than 
required by national policy. In the next section I will discuss a key influence on this 
observation: the fact that many households prefer or are willing to use a convenient 
unimproved source of drinking water over paying for access to an improved source, which is 
often further from their home. I also analyse initiatives by WaterAid’s partners and others in 
Mali which have sought to address this challenge by promoting ‘self-supply’, the idea that 
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 Enquête Legere Integrée auprès des Ménages, translation by the author. 
49
 Enquête Démographique et de Santé du Mali, translation by the author. 
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households can be encouraged to invest in improving their own traditional wells. 
 
 
7.6. Self-supply as an alternative to community water supplies 
 
Rationale for promoting self-supply 
 
As I explained in Chapter Two, Maiga et al. (2006) suggest that Mali is a country with high 
potential for promoting self-supply as a means of improving access to drinking water in the 
form of improved hand-dug household wells, because large numbers of households already 
use traditional (unprotected) hand-dug wells: over 5 million people (60% of the rural 
population), using 200,000 wells. For those users who not have access to an improved 
community water source, self-supply could therefore represent an alternative service 
delivery model. For other users who may in principle have access to an improved 
community water point, but still experience problems of distance or reliability, self-supply 
might be a way of supplementing or complementing existing community supplies.  
 
In the four key municipalities in this research, almost 50% of households surveyed in 16 
villages had access to their own traditional hand-dug well, as shown in Table 7.11.  
 
Table 7.11. Percentage of households who have access to their own hand-dug well (in 16 
case study villages in the four key case study municipalities: Dialakaroba, Kolokani, 
Tioribougou, Dandougou Fakala; n=375) 
 
Type of well Percentage of households 
reporting access (n=375) 
No well 52% 
Traditional hand-dug well 39% 
Traditional hand-dug well improved with minor 
improvements e.g. some concrete head protection 
7% 
Hand-dug well improved to national norms 2% 
 
 
Some of the households who did not have their own well may also have had access via a 
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neighbour’s well. Table 7.12 shows that over half of households use unimproved sources for 
non-drinking needs. As might be expected, when drinking quality is not required, the most 
convenient available sources are used.  
 
Table 7.12. Percentage of households who report using each type of water point for washing 
or bathing (in 16 case study villages in the four key case study municipalities: Dialakaroba, 
Kolokani, Tioribougou, Dandougou Fakala; n=375) 
 
Type of water point Percentage of households reporting the use 
of each type of water point as their principal 
source for washing or bathing (n=375) 
Borehole fitted with handpump  13% 
Other “modern water points” 23% 
Unimproved sources 64% 
 
 
A study by RWSN, WaterAid and the Ministry of Health in 2005 and 2006 in the Koulikoro 
region of Mali (summarised in Maiga et al. 2006) showed that communities often prefer 
improved wells to boreholes fitted with handpumps, for their perceived lower cost, greater 
reliability and proximity to the home. The study also found that water quality in existing 
traditional wells was generally better than expected: 85% of the unprotected traditional 
wells tested had less than 10 faecal coliforms per 100ml.  
 
The findings of Maiga et al. (2006) regarding the common desirability of household wells 
were reflected by the household surveys and village focus groups undertaken as part of this 
research. Table 7.13 shows that in the 16 villages chosen as case studies in the four key 
municipalities of interest, approximately one in six households (16%-17%) choose to use an 
unimproved water point as their principal source of drinking water, even though there are 
sufficient improved water points in all these case study villages to provide access for 100% 
of all households. 
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Table 7.13. Comparison of the use of “modern” and unimproved water points as principal 
source of drinking water (by households in 16 case study villages in the four municipalities of 
key interest: Dialakaroba, Kolokani, Tioribougou, Dandougou Fakala) 
 
Percentage of households reporting the use of each type of 
water point as their principal source of drinking water 
Type of water point 
Estimates by focus group 
participants based on total 
number of households in 
villages surveyed (n=668) 
Responses reported by 
households actually 
surveyed in each village 
surveyed (n=375) 
“Modern water point” 83% 
84% 
(72% handpumps, 12% other 
“modern” points) 
Unimproved water point 17% 16% 
 
 
Of the ten villages where focus group discussions reported that some households used 
unimproved water sources for drinking, nine of these said it was because the alternative 
points were closer to the home.50 One village, Konio Marka, also said the cost of water from 
the small piped system in that village was a reason for people using alternative sources. 
 
This common preference for the convenience of a household well over the likely higher 
water quality of a handpump is also illustrated graphically in Figure 7.1, a map of the case 
study village of Bogola. Each coloured point on the map represents a household and the 
colour of the point represents the type of water source used by the household for drinking: 
 
• Blue = drilled borehole fitted with a handpump (an improved source according to 
international definitions and national norms). 
• Yellow = hand-dug well with concrete lining, metal cover and bucket to draw water (also 
considered improved, but with an increased risk of contamination if users leave the lid 
open or leave the bucket on the ground). 
• Red = traditional hand-dug well, usually with no lining or cover (an unimproved source 
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 In the other focus group where the reason was reported as ‘other’, the reason was not specified. 
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because of the high likelihood of contamination of the water). 
 
The map in Figure 7.1 shows that about a quarter of the households in the village use 
traditional wells, rather than improved sources, and that all but one of these households are 
in the western side of the community. The second map in Figure 7.2 also show the locations 
of the improved water points: the boreholes with handpumps (which would be expected to 
provide the best quality water) and one of the “modern wells” are further to the other side 
of the village. One of the “modern wells” near to the households in the west is abandoned 
because it has collapsed in on itself, but WaterAid’s local partner NGO also improved a 
traditional well used by two families (on the left of the map) to become protected with a 
cover.  
 
When all these improved water points are taken into account, all the households in this 
village are considered to have access to drinking water from an improved source, according 
to the national standards for the number of people who can be served by different types of 
water point and the distance they can be expected to travel to collect water (500m). 
However, as the data clearly shows, not all households are actually accessing the improved 
sources. Households in the village which are slightly further from the improved water points 
prefer the convenience of traditional hand-dug wells next to their house or in their 
compound. 
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Figure 7.1. Map of households in Bogola, categorised by source of drinking water used 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Map of households and sources of drinking water in Bogola 
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Data from the household surveys shows some reported use of household water treatment, 
summarised in Table 7.14 (although actual treatment is likely to be lower than reported 
rates due to social desirability bias i.e. respondents replying with what they think the 
interviewer wants to hear). This is also compared to national data for rural areas from 
EDSM-IV (CPS/MS et al. 2007). Although reported chlorination of drinking water in the home 
(21% of households) is higher than the overall use of unimproved sources for drinking 
described above (16-17%), 66 of the 79 households reporting household chlorination are 
from just two villages rather than spread throughout the case study areas. The focus groups 
in these villages suggested that there was a higher awareness of the importance of drinking 
water quality in these communities, and that many households report treating even water 
which has come from improved sources (focus groups 2 Oct and 10 Oct 2011). 
 
Table 7.14. Reported practices of treating drinking water by households (in 16 case study 
villages in the four key case study municipalities: Dialakaroba, Kolokani, Tioribougou, 
Dandougou Fakala; n=375) 
 
Reported method of treating 
drinking water 
Households in 16 case 
study villages 
EDSM-IV 2006  
(for rural areas) 
None 55% 62% 
Boil 2% 0.2% 
Filter 10% 32%: 
(29% cloth; 3% ceramic, 
sand or other) 
Chlorinate in well 5% 
Chlorinate at home 21% 
8% 
Other / not specified 7%  
 
 
To summarise, the rationale of the self-supply approach in Mali (at least as a supplement to 
community supplies, and possibly as a replacement) is that many users prefer the 
convenience of their own well close to the household, but could be encouraged to make 
simple improvements to the well such as a concrete surround and a cover. These 
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improvements would help protect the well, improve the water quality, and reduce the risk 
of poor health caused by drinking contaminated water. UNICEF and WaterAid began piloting 
self-supply in 2008. I analyse these approaches in the next section. 
 
 
Self-supply initiatives and results 
 
In this section I examine two approaches to supporting self-supply of improved traditional 
wells in Mali, by UNICEF and WaterAid.51 UNICEF’s approach involved supporting the health 
services at different levels to lead the promotion of self-supply through pilot projects in 
different regions. UNICEF partnered with the health services because, as I explained in 
Chapter Five, self-supply is not recognised as an option by the national water directorate. 
Under the national water policy, only water points which are improved to national norms 
are considered to provide access to potable water and it is assumed that household 
initiatives will rarely meet these standards. However, the national health directorate and its 
sub-national services consider self-supply a possible way of reducing health risks by 
improving existing household water sources to provide greater protection against 
contamination. WaterAid continued its existing approach of working through partners at 
municipal level but began to include some promotion of self-supply in this work.  
 
Both approaches were based on the idea of subsidising prototype improved traditional wells 
that could serve as demonstrations for other users to copy with their own funds. However, 
the two approaches differed in the choice of local organisation to promote the initiatives, 
the levels of subsidy offered, the typical extent of improvements to wells, and whether 
promotion was targeted at private wells for families or communal wells for multiple 
households. Therefore in this section I analyse case studies of the two approaches and 
assess their success in promoting take-up of self-supply by other users. Table 7.15 
summarises the two key approaches. Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show pictures of typical wells 
upgraded in the UNICEF and WaterAid projects respectively.  
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 This section draws on a paper presented at the Rural Water Supply Network conference in Kampala, 
Uganda, in December 2011 (Jones 2011b). I am grateful for comments from an anonymous reviewer. 
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Table 7.15. Summary of two approaches for promoting self-supply 
 
Donor UNICEF WaterAid 
Local partners 
and locations 
of piloting 
The Ministry of Health and 
regional health services in three 
regions (Koulikoro, Segou, 
Sikasso). Within these, six district 
health services were chosen, 
working with ASACOs (health 
centre management committees) 
in selected municipalities. 
Local NGOs in the municipalities of 
Kolokani, Bla and Dialakoroba, 
working with selected villages within 
each municipality. 
Level of 
promotion 
Municipalities or area covered by 
an ASACO. 
Villages.  
Summary of 
piloting 
approach 
UNICEF provided funding to 
regional health services, which in 
turn funded district health 
services to organise training for 
masons and to buy cement for the 
health committees. The health 
committees organised interested 
families or communities in their 
area to collect cement, obtain 
other materials needed (sand, 
gravel, lid) and pay for the 
masons’ work. However there was 
little promotion of the idea 
beyond the villages where the 
health committees or masons 
were based. 
WaterAid’s partners included 
improved traditional wells in their 
programmes of infrastructure 
installations. Wells were chosen on 
the basis of previous reliability of the 
water supply. If wells previously 
belonged to a family, they became 
intended for community access after 
improvement. While this approach 
emerged partly from WaterAid’s 
research on household self-supply, it 
became seen by WaterAid’s partners 
more as a means of implementing 
relatively cheap community water 
supply. The promotion of self-supply 
involved encouraging water user 
committees to promote well 
chlorination and show other users 
the elements of the improved wells. 
Typical 
improvements, 
cost of wells, 
and level of 
subsidy 
Cement aprons for wells, 
sometimes with an interior lining 
of bricks and cement near the top 
of the well and a metal lid, at a 
typical cost of US$ 100 to US$ 
500. Most of this cost was 
subsidised in the form of free 
cement. Owners contributed US$ 
20 to US$ 50 cash, depending on 
the masons’ rates (which were set 
by the health committee) and 
whether the owner bought a lid. 
Raised upper rim with lid and a 
cement apron with drainage, often 
with a full cement lining so that the 
point can meet national standards 
for a “modern well”. Cost of US$ 800 
to US$ 2000, fully paid by the 
WaterAid project. 
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Figure 7.3. Examples of wells upgraded as part of the UNICEF self-supply pilot  
 
     
 
 
Figure 7.4. Examples of wells upgraded as part of the WaterAid self-supply pilot  
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As described in Chapter Four, case study locations were chosen on the suggestion of key 
informants involved in the two pilot projects as representing good examples of the 
approaches. For the UNICEF project, the health district of Dioila was selected, where three 
municipalities piloted self-supply (Banco, Massigui, Ngolobougou). The villages of Bogola 
and Kola in the municipality of Dialakoroba were chosen as examples of WaterAid’s 
approach. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key informants in the health 
services and each of the three municipalities in Dioila for the UNICEF project, and key 
informant interviews and focus groups were conducted in the two villages in Dialakoroba for 
the WaterAid initiatives. 
 
Based on the case study research, I identify four key findings about the success of promoting 
self-supply in these pilot projects. The first two of these observations relate to the extent to 
which other users take up the idea after piloting, and the challenge of selecting villages 
which might be most suitable for the self-supply approach. The other findings concern water 
quality and water treatment, and the role of the private sector in terms of how likely 
masons are to actively promote improvements to wells. 
 
The first finding is that the take-up in terms of other users copying elements of the 
improved wells was very limited. In the three municipalities in Dioila, it is unclear exactly 
how many wells were improved by users with their own funding after the completion of the 
demonstration improved wells. Limited monitoring was performed by the district health 
services and the health committees, mainly because of a lack of funds to support follow-up 
visits (the project funding was for the initial activities of training masons and making 
demonstrations only). Estimates based on the partial knowledge of the district health 
technician, the health committees, and the masons suggest that around 15 families or 
communities in total funded their own improvements after the pilot project, compared to 
about 50 wells which were improved with the subsidies. These results are shown in Table 
7.16.  
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Table 7.16. Number of households funding improvements to wells after piloting in Dioila 
 
Number of households funding their own improvements to wells after 
piloting self-supply promotion in Dioila, based on estimates by: 
Municipality 
District health 
services 
Local health 
committee 
Local trained masons 
Banco 3 0 3 to 10 
Massigui 8 Don’t know 5 
Ngolobougou 4 2 2 
Total 15 2+ 10-17 
 
 
This is of a similar order to the rates of take-up observed in the promotion of self-supply by 
the health services supported by UNICEF in other areas of Mali (Sutton 2010). In the two 
villages in Dialakoroba where WaterAid’s partner worked, no wells were improved by users 
after the construction of the improved traditional wells. In each village, a number of users 
do have partially improved traditional wells (typically with some brick and cement headwork, 
and sometimes a metal lid), but these improvements had all been done at least 10 years 
previously (interviews 9-25 Mar 2011). 
 
Key informants involved in the UNICEF project stated that the cost of paying for 
improvements to wells was a barrier for many people adopting self-supply (interviews with 
health service representatives 31 Mar 2011, 8 June 2011), although the masons 
demonstrated that basic improvements (e.g. wellhead protection with rocks and some 
cement) can be made for as little as US$ 40 (interviews with masons 30 Mar 2011, 6 Jun 
2011). Given that digging the well typically costs US$ 50 to US$ 300 (Sutton 2010), this 
suggests that initial improvements can be kept to a cost lower than the excavation itself. In 
the WaterAid pilot project, WaterAid’s partner acknowledged that very few families would 
be able to afford upgrading to the same level as the demonstrations, but still hoped that 
some might adopt less expensive elements of the approach (interview 24 Feb 2011).  
 
However, it is difficult to assess the real influence of cost in these examples because in both 
cases, the limited take-up and copying of ideas by other users seems related to the second 
key observation: the characteristics of the villages which were chosen for the initial 
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demonstration and promotion. In both case study areas the villages chosen for promotion 
were probably not those which could potentially benefit most and where users might have 
most incentive to improve their own supplies. In each of the three municipalities in Dioila, 
the majority of wells improved with subsidies during the project were situated in the main 
village at the centre of each municipality. This seems to be related to the use of ASACOs 
(health centre management committees) to promote the initiative; the key members of 
each health committee are generally based in the central village where the main community 
health centre is located. Health promotion to other villages in the municipality is usually 
performed via community health ‘relays’, volunteers from each village who attend meetings 
with the health committee in the central village and then return to their communities to 
pass on the messages.  
 
However, if any links in this chain break down (for example, relays from a particular village 
missing a session, or failing to communicate messages once back in their community), most 
of the population of the municipality will be uninformed. Also, the health committees in this 
initiative generally operated a ‘first-come, first-served’ policy for allocating cement to 
well-owners, which helped prioritise residents of the main village who could come to collect 
cement more easily than those from different villages. Overall, this led to the majority of 
wells which were improved being in these larger central villages which already had 
numerous other improved water sources, rather than more distant villages or hamlets 
where there tends to be a greater reliance on traditional hand-dug wells for drinking, and 
where self-supply of improved wells is thought to have a more important role (Sutton 2010; 
Harvey 2011).  
 
A similar problem was evident in the WaterAid-supported promotion in Dialakaroba, despite 
the villages chosen for the demonstration wells being selected by WaterAid’s local partner 
NGO rather than left to a more ad hoc process as in Dioila. Both villages already had 
multiple improved water points (boreholes fitted with handpumps and “modern wells”), to 
the extent that the population which could be served from improved water points already 
(according to national norms) was more than twice the actual population of each village 
(author calculations). The logic of WaterAid’s partner NGO was that despite this level of 
coverage, and despite all households being comfortably within the official distance (500m) 
of one or more improved water points, users often prefer the convenience of hand-dug 
wells closer to their home (as demonstrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2), even for drinking water, 
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so should be encouraged to improve these for better water quality too (interview 4 May 
2011). Overall, the approaches in Dioila and Dialakoroba both targeted self-supply as a 
supplement to existing improved community water supplies, rather than a complete 
alternative where no community options exist. Therefore these pilots responded to one of 
the justifications for promoting self-supply, but perhaps at the expense of the other reason 
of improving water provision for those with no access to improved sources at all.  
 
The third finding concerns water quality and the extent of effective household water 
treatment. The health services from Dioila performed some follow-up water quality testing 
on samples of improved traditional wells throughout the district (not solely from the three 
municipalities discussed here) in 2009 and 2011. The total faecal coliforms measured in 
water from these improved traditional wells were generally less than 10 FC/100ml, although 
surprisingly the water quality in the wells with a lid tested in 2011 was in general worse than 
the water quality in wells without a lid, perhaps suggesting that lids are often left open and 
contamination still permitted that way. There was evidence of residual chlorine in about a 
quarter of wells tested in 2011, but none in 2009. Tests for chlorine were also performed in 
the existing partially improved traditional wells in the two villages in Dialakoroba in 2011, 
because most well-owners said they sometimes added chlorine (in the form of locally 
available household bleach) (interviews 9-25 Mar 2011). These tests showed zero chlorine 
levels: if users did use chlorine, it was for occasional shock chlorination rather than regular 
treatment. Responses from participants in these surveys and estimates from local health 
workers are also that rates of water treatment in the home are very low, a finding backed 
up by the more extensive household surveys discussed previously.  
 
The fourth and final finding from these pilot projects concerns the capacity of local private 
sector actors. Private sector capacity is an essential element of self-supply and was 
addressed in these initiatives by the training of local masons, although there have been 
concerns in Mali that such training has sometimes focused on the needs of the immediate 
pilot projects rather than longer-term capacity (Sutton 2009b, 2010). Interviews with 
masons who were trained as part of the projects in this case study suggested that improving 
wells is a minor part of their work compared to other activities such as building houses. 
Masons reported that they were unlikely to promote well upgrading themselves without the 
guaranteed support of a subsidised project such as these, since investing time and money 
travelling to other villages to seek work was a risk without knowing if there would actually 
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be demand for their services (interviews with masons 30 and 31 Mar 2011; 8 Jun 2011). A 
similar challenge was identified in WaterAid’s promotion of self-supply in Zambia (Raeside 
2009).  
 
This observation raises the question of what role the private sector could or should play in 
creating demand for self-supply as well as in responding to demand generated by 
promotional activities by other actors such as NGOs or government. Parallels have been 
drawn between promoting self-supply and demand-driven sanitation such as 
Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) or sanitation marketing (Sutton 2009a; Harvey 2011). 
The masons in these self-supply pilots were also trained in making concrete latrine slabs. 
However, promoting the sale of latrine slabs in other villages involved a similar issue of risk 
to travelling to promote well upgrading. WaterAid’s own evaluation of CLTS piloting in the 
two villages of Kola and Bogola recommended supporting the construction of latrine slabs in 
every village (rather than construction and transport from elsewhere) to help promotion 
(workshop 10-12 Feb 2011), although this would still represent a risk for masons if they 
were investing the up-front construction costs. A representative of UNICEF suggested that if 
self-supply were to be further promoted, it could be linked more closely to CLTS and 
sanitation marketing, with additional support given to paid promoters to work alongside 
masons (interview 19 Jan 2011).  
 
Taking these four sets of observations together, it is difficult to assess the potential of 
self-supply as an alternative service delivery model to community management in Mali. The 
selection of villages in these case studies was based on the idea of using self-supply to 
supplement improved community supplies which users perceived as distant, even if they 
were within the access distance specified in national norms. They did not address the 
possibility of using self-supply to improve the water provision of those who had no access at 
all to an improved source. Furthermore, the promotion of self-supply in WaterAid’s work 
was still based on well upgrading known to be too expensive for the majority of users, 
rather than promoting the most basic and affordable forms of well improvements. 
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7.7. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have shown the gaps between policy and practice regarding the role of 
users in contributing to the recurrent costs of rural water services in Mali. In the areas 
where WaterAid works, estimates of user contributions to operation and maintenance and 
capital maintenance costs of handpumps are up to US$ 0.2 (about 100 FCFA) per person per 
year. Taking these figures together with those presented in Chapter Six from a detailed 
study of four municipalities, we can conclude that user contributions to recurrent costs are 
typically up to US$ 0.1 to US$ 0.2 per person per year. These contributions are at least five 
to nine times lower than national policy intends.  
 
Communities which do succeed in raising more funds for user contributions than average 
represent examples of “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver 2012), the process through which 
institutions emerge based partly on local social and cultural practices and partly on more 
bureaucratic arrangements introduced from elsewhere. Two aspects of institutional 
bricolage are particularly relevant to the observations of community fundraising in these 
case studies. Firstly, as Cleaver argues, institutional bricolage entails combining existing 
practices with ideas from other contexts into a new institutional form which is an adaptation 
of elements from both sources. For example, in the village of Tacko in the municipality of 
Dandougou Fakala, the system of raising money for the water management committee is 
that women pay a monthly tariff during the six months of the year when they are able gain 
income from selling fish. This represents an adaptation of the practices of the existing 
women’s group with the introduction of more formal saving, accounting and payment 
practices which are intended by national policy to be part of how water committees operate. 
This case study also represents an example of a second feature of institutional bricolage, 
that local institutions tend to serve multiple purposes rather than the single-purpose 
committees typically set up by NGOs.  
 
WaterAid’s partners actively support these processes of bricolage, by trying to work closely 
with different communities to find ‘best fit’ solutions rather than imposing what Mosse 
(2004) might call an “unimplementable” national policy. This observation shows that 
WaterAid’s partners implicitly adopt a critical institutionalist approach to supporting the 
development of local institutions rather than a more mainstream and rigid approach. They 
acknowledge and accept that institutions form through local improvisation and are 
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embedded in the existing practices and social structures of a community. This finding 
contrasts slightly with the evidence in Chapter Six showing that at municipal levels 
WaterAid’s approach exhibits features of both mainstream and critical institutionalist 
thinking in relation to how they seek institutional change with local government partners.  
 
In this chapter, survey data has shown that one in six households report using an 
unimproved water point as their principal source of drinking water, even though there are 
sufficient improved water points in the case study villages to provide access for 100% of 
households. This finding demonstrates the common preference for the convenience of a 
hand-dug well close to the home over the likely higher quality of water from a borehole 
fitted with a handpump. Given this preference, and the suggestion from interviews and 
participatory exercises that users’ willingness to pay for drinking water is low in comparison 
to other items of household expenditure, the chapter has also presented analysis of projects 
promoting the idea of self-supply i.e. users being encouraged to upgrade their own 
household wells. This approach has been tried as an alternative to community supplies in 
some areas but these pilot projects have had limited impact. In these cases, this lack of 
impact appears primarily due to poor selection of target villages, but this observation also 
means that it is difficult to draw conclusions about whether the overall approach might have 
had more success given better targeting. 
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Chapter Eight - Conclusions 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I set out the conclusions of this thesis: the empirical findings, the conceptual 
and methodological contributions, and the recommendations for practice and policy. I also 
suggest directions for future research which could build on the work in this thesis.  
 
I begin by drawing together the analysis from Chapters Five, Six and Seven to summarise 
answers to the key questions posed under the first research theme described in Chapter 
One: how the recurrent costs of rural water services are shared between different actors 
where WaterAid works in Mali, and the associated levels of services received by users. This 
evidence represents the key quantitative findings of this study. I concisely explain these 
results by drawing on the qualitative data and analytical framework developed, before 
discussing the conceptual issues in greater depth in the subsequent section. 
 
In Section 8.3 I discuss further how the theory used in this thesis helps explain the empirical 
evidence, and then summarise how the research findings contribute to extending existing 
frameworks for political economy analysis and theories of institutional change. In this part 
of the chapter I therefore try to make the links between how I use academic theory to 
explain the empirical results, and how these results help extend the theory.  
 
In Section 8.4 I summarise the recommendations for WaterAid and other organisations 
which I propose based on the results of this thesis. These recommendations concern 
WaterAid’s own programmes and approaches to service delivery, and suggestions for how 
the organisation and others can link their own experiences to promote national policy 
debate in key areas. In the final section of this chapter I suggest directions for future 
research. 
 
 
8.2. Empirical findings and implications for approaches to service delivery 
 
As explained in Chapter Two, costs data in this thesis is presented according to the 
components of the life-cycle costs approach proposed by the WASHCost project (Fonseca et 
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al. 2011). In this section I recap the cost-sharing arrangements and associated service levels 
found in this research, and highlight the implications for approaches to service delivery.  
 
 
Expenditure on operation and minor maintenance 
 
This research concludes that user contributions to the recurrent costs of rural water services 
provided by boreholes fitted with handpumps in the areas where WaterAid works in Mali 
are up to US$ 0.1 to US$ 0.2 per person per year (about 50 to 100 FCFA). This finding is 
based on drawing together the evidence presented in Chapter Six (a detailed study of four 
key case study municipalities, where user contributions to recurrent costs were less than 
US$ 0.1 per person per year during 2008-2011) and Chapter Seven (a wider survey of all 
water points in 15 rural municipalities, where estimates of user contributions were up to 
US$ 0.2 per person per year where reported). These figures apply to boreholes fitted with 
handpumps only because user contributions to the recurrent costs of “modern wells” were 
extremely rare and insufficient data was available to draw conclusions regarding 
expenditure relating to small piped systems. 
 
The user contributions observed in this study are therefore at least five to nine times lower 
than the contributions required according to national policy guidelines, which state that 
users should contribute about US$ 0.9 per person per year (about 450 FCFA) to cover 
operating and minor maintenance expenditure (about US$ 0.4 per person per year) and 
capital maintenance expenditure (about US$ 0.5 per person per year). The user 
contributions observed can therefore cover some operation and minor maintenance costs, 
typically basic spare parts and the fees for occasional visits by a technician. However, these 
contributions are not enough to include any day-to-day management fees or the annual 
contribution required for capital maintenance expenditure.  
 
The communities which are most successful at raising funds for user contributions to 
recurrent costs represent examples of “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver 2012), where 
communities draw on traditional ways of organising and fundraising, as well as more formal 
ideas about how water management committees can function. I discuss the relevance of 
these findings to debates about institutions and institutional change in more detail in 
Section 8.3. However, even communities identified by WaterAid’s partners as examples of 
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success do not raise the sums of money demanded by national policy. 
 
There are two key reasons behind these differences between policy and practice. The first is 
that many users are willing to use alternative unimproved water sources, where available (I 
comment on this further when discussing the functionality and usage of water points below). 
The second reason is that there is ambiguity in policy (in how roles and responsibilities are 
set out in the legal framework and national guidelines) and practice (in how different actors 
interpret these responsibilities) concerning in what circumstances local government, NGOs 
or central government should intervene to help communities pay capital maintenance costs. 
I explain this reason in greater depth in Section 8.3 of this chapter which details the 
conceptual contributions of this thesis and how they help explain the evidence observed.  
 
 
Expenditure on capital maintenance 
 
In the previous section I explained that user contributions to recurrent costs do not cover 
capital maintenance as national policy intends. Instead, WaterAid (through its partner NGOs 
and local governments) and central government are the key actors paying for capital 
maintenance expenditure in the case study areas, as discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. 
Across the four municipalities studied, expenditure on capital maintenance during 
2008-2011 ranged from approximately US$ 0.1 to US$ 1.6 per person per year (about 50 to 
800 FCFA).  
 
The level of expenditure varied so much because it was highly dependent on the timing of 
donor and government projects to rehabilitate old infrastructure: the only municipality with 
capital maintenance expenditure of more than US$ 0.7 per person per year during 
2008-2011 had received an extensive government-run and donor-funded handpump 
rehabilitation project in 2010. In the three other municipalities, which did not receive a 
major rehabilitation project during this period, the figures observed for capital maintenance 
expenditure are between two to thirty times lower than the bottom end of the international 
benchmark suggested by the WASHCost project of US$ 1.5-2 per person per year 
(WASHCost 2012).  
 
Although WaterAid and its partner NGOs and municipal Technical Units in principle align 
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themselves with the national policy that users are responsible for capital maintenance 
expenditure, they respond differently in practice. As shown in Chapter Seven, the staff of 
WaterAid’s partners share a common view that most communities are unwilling or unable 
to pay the amounts of money needed for capital maintenance. However, due to the 
ambiguity in national policy they interpret their responsibility to intervene in different ways. 
Most of WaterAid’s partners used informal discussions with communities on a case-by-case 
basis to determine relative contributions. These contributions were also dependent on the 
partner’s available budget at the time. One of the partners, the municipal Technical Unit of 
Dandougou Fakala, has developed a more structured approach by clarifying the maximum 
amount that users are expected to pay and in what circumstances the Technical Unit will 
intervene. However, this approach is dependent on financing which is part of the wider 
budget support from WaterAid to the municipality. A key question for WaterAid or other 
actors seeking to provide similar forms of support is how long this can continue, which I 
address in Section 8.4. 
 
 
Expenditure on direct support 
 
The final component of recurrent costs at local levels is the expenditure required for direct 
support to community management, such as monitoring, technical advice and 
administrative support, conflict resolution, refresher training and support to communities’ 
own fundraising. This research examined the model of support that WaterAid promotes - 
water and sanitation Technical Units within local governments - and compared this 
approach to the STEFI (Technical and Financial Monitoring) system, which is the key model 
of direct support suggested by government policy in Mali (Faggianelli et al. 2009; Smits et al. 
2011).  
 
In the four municipalities supported by WaterAid analysed for this study, the Technical Units 
cost from US$ 0.5 to US$ 1.4 per person per year (about 250 to 700 FCFA). The costs per 
user are sensitive to the population of the municipality since the absolute cost of each 
Technical Unit is similar, and dominated by staff salaries and overheads (transport and office 
costs). In the four municipalities these costs are currently funded through direct budget 
support to the municipalities from WaterAid (or in one of the case study municipalities, still 
through a local NGO partner). In contrast, the STEFI system costs US$ 0.34 per person per 
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year, a lower figure than the Technical Units because of its more limited mandate and less 
intensive form of support. This cost is financed from part of the user tariff for water with 
further contributions from the municipalities and government (Smits et al. 2011), but has 
not yet been extended to support handpumps as well as small piped systems.  
 
Recent international benchmarks proposed by the WASHCost project suggest that 
expenditure of US$ 1-3 per person per year is required for the direct support necessary for 
sustainable basic rural water services (WASHCost 2012). Therefore in the smaller 
municipalities where WaterAid’s approach was used in this study (costs up to US$ 1.4 per 
person per year) the expenditures for the WASH Technical Units are within the observed 
international benchmarks. The costs of the STEFI system are below the proposed WASHCost 
benchmarks, but, as discussed above, the STEFI approach has a more limited mandate than 
a more comprehensive system of direct support which encompasses all the possible 
activities. These findings highlight the tension between the different levels of direct support 
that can be provided to communities, how much the different approaches cost and how this 
can be financed. Comparing the approaches above shows that, according to “the 3Ts” 
framework (OECD 2009), the model of water and sanitation Technical Units is currently 
dependent on ‘transfers’ (funding from international donors, in this case WaterAid). It is 
unclear over what timescale it might be feasible for similar support to be financed from 
within the Mali sector itself i.e. from taxes and tariffs.  
 
 
Functionality and usage of water points 
 
This research sought to answer two questions related to the service levels that water users 
receive which are associated with the cost-sharing arrangements observed. Firstly, what are 
the levels of functionality of the infrastructures in question - do they work or not? Secondly, 
what water sources do people actually use - improved or unimproved water points? As 
discussed in Chapter Four, examining service levels in detail (including details of dimensions 
such as water quality, quantity or accessibility in terms of time taken per day to obtain 
water) was outside the scope of this study.52 However, using a definition of a “basic” level of 
service which includes the requirement that the user accesses water from “an improved 
source which functions at least 350 days a year without a serious breakdown” (WASHCost 
                                                 
52
 Regarding water quality, this research has a similar limitation to the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring 
Programme in taking the type of source (improved or unimproved) as a proxy for water quality. 
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2012), this research is still able to draw conclusions regarding service levels by responding to 
these two questions. 
 
Overall, the functionality rates across the areas studied (the four municipalities studied in 
detail and the 11 others included with wider survey data) suggest that the levels of 
expenditure and arrangements for recurrent expenditures observed in the period 
2008-2011 do not lead to a sustainable basic service level. The overall functionality rate of 
boreholes fitted with handpumps in the 15 municipalities was 73%, similar to the Mali 
average, which is estimated at 69% (DNH 2008a; WaterAid 2010). In the four municipalities 
studied in detail, the functionality rates varied. The functionality rates observed were higher 
in the municipalities of Dandougou Fakala and Dialakoroba (both about 90% functional) 
than in the other two municipalities, which were both below 80%. As I explained in Chapter 
Six, the particular approaches taken to capital maintenance expenditure during 2008-2011 
may help explain the higher rates of functionality in the two municipalities. Although these 
approaches provide interesting lessons of how funding from NGOs and central government 
can be used, neither yet represents a sustainable and scalable financing solution.  
 
Further community-level research in 16 villages in the four key case study municipalities 
provided additional detail on the services actually received by users. Approximately one in 
six households chose to use an unimproved water point as their principal source of drinking 
water, even though there were sufficient improved water points in all these case study 
villages to provide access for 100% of households. Of the ten villages where focus group 
discussions reported that some households used unimproved water sources for drinking, 
nine of these said it was because the alternative points were closer to the home. 
 
 
8.3. Conceptual and methodological contributions 
 
In this section I highlight how this research makes conceptual and methodological 
contributions to the literature in two key related areas. Firstly, this thesis has extended 
existing frameworks for political economy analysis used by donors and think tanks by i) 
combining this type of approach with further insights from the literature on institutions and 
institutional change across different scales, and ii) demonstrating how to put this into 
practice through close engagement with the staff of an international NGO and its partners. 
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Secondly, the thesis has used these detailed analyses of institutions concerning the 
financing of rural water services at community and municipal levels to extend the literature 
on institutional change. In particular, the research has shed further light on the potential 
and limits for i) processes of “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver 2012) and “practical hybridity” 
(Booth 2012) to lead towards local institutions which deliver more effective public services, 
and ii) the ability of external organisations to influence these processes. 
 
 
Extending political economy analysis 
 
In developing the extended political economy analysis framework I have tried to build on 
existing work to address challenges posed by authors from the perspectives of both policy 
and academia. The framework demonstrates how a “problem-driven” approach to political 
economy analysis can incorporate analytical concepts from more detailed theoretical 
literature relevant to the particular problem, in line with the proposal outlined by Harris 
(2013). The approach which I have developed also responds to Cleaver’s (2012) argument 
for academic researchers to find ways of placing their detailed analyses of local-level 
institutional change within wider frameworks. This step helps demonstrate to practitioners 
and policymakers the relevance of analysis in specific local contexts. 
 
By investigating these relationships between actors and institutions across different scales, I 
have shown how WaterAid’s partners develop local interpretations of national policy on 
financing rural water services, in a similar way to how Mosse (2004) and Eyben (2010) 
examine the responses of development workers to “unimplementable” policies or processes. 
Through considering this argument within a wider political economy framework, I have also 
demonstrated the effect of structural factors on how these arrangements emerged. At a 
national level, these factors include the influence of Mali’s aid dependency and 
decentralisation reforms on how policies affecting rural water services have developed. At 
local levels, structural factors include environmental issues such as the availability of 
alternative water sources which affect users’ willingness to pay for water from improved 
sources.  
 
The way I have put this extended political economy approach into practice through the 
partnership with WaterAid demonstrates one way of considering within a PEA framework 
227 
what Copestake and Williams (2012) call the “micro-politics” of aid agencies, by trying to 
understand the day-to-day decisions of development workers such as the staff of 
WaterAid’s partners. As I concluded in Chapter Four, my experience supports an argument 
for collaborative researchers, including doctoral students, to act at times like an employee 
of the partner organisation in order to help their understanding of “why agencies do what 
they do” (Carr, in Simon et al. 2011: 2797). However, this is not just an argument intended 
to benefit academic research. I have tried to use this process to support the analysis and 
learning carried out by the staff of WaterAid’s partners themselves. As Carter (2013) points 
out, research in the WASH sector should certainly not just be done by academics. I hope to 
have shown one way in which these different forms of research can be mutually beneficial.  
 
 
Understanding institutional change 
 
I now summarise how the use of the extended political economy framework in practice has 
helped both to explain the emergence of the institutions observed and to contribute to 
extending theories of institutional change. Chapters Six and Seven presented analysis of the 
approaches to influencing institutional change adopted - both explicitly and implicitly - by 
WaterAid and its partner organisations at municipal and community levels. The evidence 
shows that WaterAid’s approach contains elements of both mainstream and critical 
institutionalist thinking (following Cleaver 2012).  
 
At local government level, WaterAid primarily promotes formal institutional arrangements: 
municipal Technical Units for water and sanitation, and processes such as the creation of 
Sector Development Plans and the use of these plans by local government representatives 
as tools to seek further financing from donors (a process called ‘marketing’ by WaterAid). 
However, these processes exhibit the challenge of “reforms as signals” (Andrews 2013), 
where institutional reforms appear to happen but lack the intended function. For example, 
interviews and observations at workshops with local government representatives showed 
that the majority were unfamiliar with the sector plans for their own municipalities. The 
development of the plans had often been donor-led and implemented by consultants rather 
than municipal representatives, and plans were not always handed over from outgoing to 
incoming representatives after local elections. Furthermore, the process of ‘marketing’ 
Sector Development Plans to donors as a way of municipal fundraising involves tension 
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between creating competition as a way of rewarding municipalities which have proactive 
and committed elected representatives, and promoting equity between different 
municipalities which have varying funding needs.  
 
However, I have also shown that some parts of WaterAid’s approach at municipal levels do 
implicitly exhibit a viewpoint of critical institutionalism, where WaterAid’s partners are 
sensitive to the fact that institutional changes typically happen through gradual processes of 
“bricolage” (following Cleaver 2012 and Andrews 2013) which build on what already exists 
locally rather than the idealised implementation of reforms exactly as suggested on paper. 
For example, although the way the Sector Development Plans were created matches the 
characteristics of the idea of “reforms as signals” discussed above, some local government 
interviewees reported that the Sector Development Plans had started to help improve 
coordination between the municipality and different NGOs working in their areas, as I 
described in Chapter Six. This represents a small but worthwhile step away from the 
widespread and less coordinated “project-based” mode of local governance (Olivier de 
Sardan 2011). 
 
Furthermore, one of WaterAid’s partners, the Technical Unit in the municipality of 
Dandougou Fakala, demonstrates an approach close to what Booth (2012) calls “practical 
hybridity” in the way it has developed a local system of cost-sharing between communities 
and local government in response to an unworkable national policy. However, this differs in 
a key respect to Booth’s observations of examples of practical hybridity. Booth argues that 
practical hybridity generally relies on mobilising local resources, in the absence of 
government or donor funds. In contrast, the approach adopted by the Technical Unit in 
Dandougou Fakala is possible specifically because of the additional discretionary funds that 
WaterAid has made available to the municipality. Although in one sense this represents a 
less optimistic take on the potential for developing local solutions than the work of Booth, it 
does also extend the idea of practical hybridity by providing an example of how an external 
actor such as an NGO might be able to support such processes.  
 
At community level, this research has also demonstrated both the usefulness of these 
theories of institutional change and how this study contributes to extending the theories. 
Through case studies of different villages, I have shown how institutions for financing the 
recurrent costs of water services emerge through institutional bricolage (Cleaver 2012), as a 
229 
mix of both traditional arrangements and imported ideas. In particular, two elements of the 
idea of bricolage help explain the findings in this study: the way that existing practices are 
combined with ideas from other contexts by adapting aspects of each, and the observation 
that local institutions often exist for several different purposes rather than being 
single-purpose committees. These findings support the theory of Cleaver and the ‘critical 
institutionalist’ school of thought.  
 
More importantly, this research helps show how external organisations can support 
processes of bricolage. The work of WaterAid’s partners in different communities 
demonstrates an implicit critical institutionalist approach through which they try to 
gradually work with local actors to find ways of ‘best fit’ for financing rural water services 
which adapt existing local practices into new arrangements. However, there are also limits 
to this approach. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter Seven, even communities identified as 
more successful in terms of fundraising rarely achieve the sums of money suggested as 
necessary by national policy. Secondly, working with communities in this way is a 
time-intensive process requiring frequent visits and follow-up. Both these factors therefore 
mean that greater finances are needed at local government level, to make up the gap in 
financing for operating and minor maintenance and capital maintenance costs, and for the 
costs supporting communities through visits and facilitation. I discuss these implications in 
more detail in Section 8.4. 
 
Overall, I draw together the observations about the role of WaterAid and its partners in 
institutional change (regarding the form of the institutional arrangements that they 
promote) and the potential and limits of these processes in terms of service delivery (the 
function that results) in Figure 8.1. This diagram builds on Figure 3.1, presented in Chapter 
Three, which I used to conceptualise the institutional arrangements and outcomes for public 
services described in the three areas of literature on institutions used in the analytical 
framework. Figure 8.1 sets out key examples from the work of WaterAid and its partners 
observed in this research in comparison to the concepts identified in the literature.  
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Figure 8.1 therefore demonstrates how different elements of WaterAid’s work reflect 
different approaches and results. On the left of the diagram are those which represent 
aspects of “reforms as signals” (Andrews 2013), where institutional arrangements have a 
bureaucratic form but lack the intended function. On the right are parts of WaterAid’s work 
which approach the ideas of “practical hybridity” (Booth 2012) through supporting 
institutional arrangements which are more socially embedded, but in this case where the 
potential for locally-driven solutions to effectively deliver services is limited by wider 
constraints such as funding (in contrast to the more optimistic observations of Booth and 
the APPP). The diagram provides a way of thinking about what forms of institutional change 
external organisations such as WaterAid are able to support - can they help promote 
changes further along the dotted arrow?53 
 
  
8.4. Recommendations for WaterAid and other NGOs 
 
In this section I draw out recommendations from the findings of this research. These 
suggestions are targeted at WaterAid, but I emphasis where there is wider relevance for 
other organisations. This includes other NGOs in the water and sanitation sector, as well as 
those working on other issues of public services and local governance. I split the 
recommendations into two parts. I firstly set out those that are primarily concerned with 
WaterAid’s own programme approaches in Mali. I then turn to recommendations which link 
to wider sector issues and which have implications for WaterAid’s policy and advocacy work.  
 
 
For programme approaches 
 
The first programmatic recommendation for WaterAid and its partners is to incorporate 
simple ways of tracking expenditure on different cost components and the service levels 
received by users into their own monitoring processes, especially for capital maintenance 
                                                 
53
 There is a similarity between the upper part of the left-hand axis of Figure 8.1 and the way de 
Koning (2011) describes the three possible outcomes for institutional arrangements that can occur 
when an external organisation tries to introduce new institutions to a community. These three 
possibilities are aggregation (accepting the new ideas by blending them with existing local norms), 
alteration (partial blending) or articulation (rejecting the new institutions). However, I suggest that 
Figure 8.1 provides an additional way of thinking about the role of external organisations in 
influencing institutional change because it emphasises the outcomes in terms of the resulting 
function as well as the form of the institutional arrangements. 
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expenditure and direct support costs. Having this information available would enable 
WaterAid and its partners to discuss the cost-effectiveness of their ongoing work compared 
to other possible approaches, without the need for retrospective studies such as this one. A 
similar key message emerged from the six other country programmes where WaterAid 
undertook research on financial sustainability during 2012. Discussions following that 
research concluded that WaterAid could not specify how much it was contributing to 
recurrent costs in the areas where it worked and should therefore “take steps to ensure that 
data on costs and service levels is continually available from WaterAid’s own processes” 
(Jones 2013a: 12). This could possibly be as part of the introduction of WaterAid’s 
Post-Intervention Monitoring Surveys (PIMS), a process for monitoring the results of the 
work of WaterAid and its partners up to ten years after the initial intervention. 
 
At the final workshop discussing the results and implications of the Sustainability 
Framework studies in Mali in November 2011, WaterAid’s partners agreed to seek ways of 
integrating different possible elements of monitoring into their work from the 2012-13 
financial year onwards. This would include the monitoring of water point functionality and 
usage required for their own work, for updating the national water point database in Mali 
and for WaterAid’s own Post-Intervention Monitoring Surveys. Improved monitoring of 
expenditures on different cost components was intended to form part of this if possible, 
building on simple tools already developed by the Technical Unit of Dandougou Fakala. 
However, progress on this was difficult in 2012 due to the coup d’état and staff changes 
within WaterAid, which I explain further at the end of this section.  
 
The second recommendation is for WaterAid to discuss how local cost-sharing 
arrangements might realistically be expected to change within the time periods that 
WaterAid currently uses for planning (yearly plans, three-year planning and budget cycles 
and five-year strategies) and beyond. For example, I have shown that the model of 
municipal water and sanitation Technical Units promoted by WaterAid is currently not 
affordable for local governments. It would be helpful for WaterAid to discuss over what 
timeframe they think municipalities will continue to rely on funds from WaterAid (or a 
combination of funds from WaterAid and other donors), or if there are lower cost 
approaches which could be used until a future point where local governments are able to 
access sufficient revenue from taxes and central government transfers. I discuss this point in 
the next section related to WaterAid’s advocacy. WaterAid has committed to work with the 
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same local government partners in Mali until at least 2015 because of the time period of its 
current country strategy and the Local Millennium Development Goal Initiative. Cotton et al. 
(2013), in an evaluation of the work of seven other WaterAid country programmes, suggest 
that WaterAid in general needs to do more work on developing exit strategies. However, 
given the additional challenges in Mali since the coup and the extremely uncertain context, 
it seems difficult to put a timeframe on an exact exit strategy. As a point of comparison, at 
the conference of international donors discussing new aid packages to Mali in Brussels in 
May 2013, Oxfam was lobbying for aid commitments to be for a period of at least 15 years 
(Oxfam 2013).  
 
A key internal challenge for both these ideas is staff turnover of the WaterAid team in Mali. I 
explained in Chapter Four the difficulties posed to the continuity of some of the research by 
the departure of members of the programmes and policy team during the process.54 Cotton 
et al. (2013) note that high turnover and lack of technical expertise is a widespread problem 
in WaterAid country programmes, partly due to the relatively small pool of suitable staff in a 
typical developing country’s WASH sector, a problem which also affects Mali (Koestler and 
Toubkiss 2010). An example of the effect of this difficulty came from one of WaterAid’s 
Technical Unit partners, who told me that they had planned to hold meetings in their 
municipality in 2012 in order to discuss and clarify local cost-sharing and monitoring 
responsibilities, as agreed in principle by all WaterAid’s partners after the sustainability 
workshops in 2011. However, due to the key point of contact in WaterAid leaving the 
organisation, the partner did not receive the funding required for these activities (pers. 
comm., 15 March 2013).  
 
 
For policy and advocacy 
 
The recommendations in this section are intended for WaterAid and other NGOs, building 
on the programmatic recommendations to suggest what areas could be priorities for 
external advocacy and how it might be possible to open up national policy debates.  
 
The first recommendation is to promote national debate about what support is really 
                                                 
54
 Since I first began working with WaterAid in Mali in 2009 (during the research for my Masters 
dissertation), almost the entire programmes and policy team has been replaced; only one out of eight 
of these members of staff remains. 
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required for community management, how this can be provided and who should contribute 
to paying for it. As I explained in Chapter Five, there have been recent acknowledgements 
from the national water directorate that there is a need to reflect on the progress of 
decentralisation in the water sector (DNH 2012c). This could represent an opportunity for 
discussing more openly the pros and cons of different possible forms of direct support to 
communities, since the existing approaches that I have set out in this thesis differ 
significantly in the activities they undertake, their costs and how they are financed. 
WaterAid’s national-level policy work already includes promoting the model of municipal 
Technical Units as a way for local governments to fulfil their legal responsibility to ensure 
rural water supply. However, this advocacy has a broad objective of helping local 
governments lobby central government and donors for more funding, rather than discussing 
the details of how this funding might best be used to both deliver new investment and 
support existing services. If WaterAid is able to work with local actors to develop simple 
monitoring of service levels, as discussed above, this can also help feed into the debate 
about the relative merits of different approaches to service delivery and financing.  
 
One specific possibility to discuss as part of this debate is the idea of sharing the costs of 
support provided by Technical Units (or a similar model) between different municipalities to 
benefit from economies of scale, while still providing a greater level of support to 
communities than the STEFI system. This approach is known as “intercommunalité” in Mali 
and is recognised as an option in policy (DNH 2007). WaterAid has already trialled this in 
two adjacent municipalities, which share a coordinator for the WASH Technical Unit.  
 
The second recommendation is for WaterAid and others to use their advocacy work to 
promote national-level discussions which begin the process of clarifying the policy on capital 
maintenance and how it should be implemented. As a recent global review of financing 
practices for capital maintenance of rural water supply systems concludes, a key first step in 
improving capital maintenance is to clarify responsibility and the long-term financial 
implications (Fonseca et al. 2013). Where there is a lack of structured existing approaches 
and a country’s sector is aid-dependent, Fonseca et al. suggest building on current ad hoc 
practices to develop a better-planned ‘front-loading’ approach. This entails any project for 
capital investment allocating a certain percentage of its funds to capital maintenance of 
existing infrastructure in the geographic area in question. This should be co-ordinated 
through pooling funds from different donors. Mali already adopts elements of this approach; 
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the national water directorate plans for a certain number of infrastructure rehabilitations to 
be undertaken every year, in addition to new construction. However, greater clarity on what 
WaterAid’s partners termed “major repairs” is required i.e. those infrequent repairs which 
are not complete rehabilitations but are rarely funded by user contributions as intended in 
policy.  
 
 
8.5. Directions for future research 
 
I conclude this thesis with suggestions for three areas of future research which could build 
on the work undertaken here. These are: applying the extended political economy analysis 
framework to the post-coup context; analysing approaches to influencing institutional 
change in other sectors and by other organisations; and assessing the recurrent costs of 
rural water services in different geographic contexts and for different technologies in Mali.  
 
Firstly, I propose using the extended political economy analysis framework developed here 
to analyse in greater depth the changes in Mali since the coup d’état, such as the weakening 
of the government and the arrival of new NGOs and donors, and what these factors might 
mean for the future of the rural water sector. It may be that the political crisis represents a 
potential moment for outsiders to influence institutional change (Green 2008; Hickey 2009a; 
Andrews 2013). For example, the potential launch of new donor-funded programmes for 
the sector at a time when there are likely to be large numbers of water infrastructures 
requiring rehabilitation might represent an opportunity to discuss longer-term approaches 
to capital maintenance, as suggested in the recommendations. Such analysis could be 
undertaken as a collaboration between WaterAid’s policy team and other actors, involving 
further interviews and discussions at sector level in Mali. 
 
Secondly, the framework for understanding institutional change used in this thesis could be 
applied to other sectors and/or organisations, mapping other approaches and outcomes in a 
similar way to the method I presented in Figure 8.1. One example of direct relevance to 
WaterAid could be the adoption of the Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) approach in 
the sanitation sector in Mali. CLTS has been promoted in Mali since 2008 and is now an 
approach officially endorsed by the sanitation directorate. WaterAid itself has piloted CLTS 
in selected villages since 2008 and undertaken initial evaluations of the process in 2010. 
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WaterAid and its partners explicitly state that they have “contextualised” CLTS, using 
elements of the CLTS approach together with aspects of marketing particular sanitation 
products such as concrete latrine slabs (workshop 10-12 Feb 2011). This strategy is in 
contrast to the national policy and the work of other actors in the sector, who use 
approaches much closer to the original form of CLTS (The Bamako CLTS Consensus 2010). 
The example of CLTS suggests that in this case WaterAid and its partners are more open 
about how their own local-level work involves adapting sector reforms, and could provide 
an interesting topic for analysing institutional change in another part of the WASH sector.  
 
A third possibility for future research would be to investigate the recurrent costs and 
cost-sharing arrangements of rural water supply in different geographic areas of Mali and 
for different types of water infrastructure. This could include areas where there are fewer 
alternative unimproved sources of drinking water available (for example, areas where the 
hydrogeological characteristics mean there are fewer hand-dug wells), and therefore more 
reliance on improved sources. In terms of technology type, research could be extended to 
consider costs and cost-sharing for small piped systems (for villages with a population of 
over 2,000). I have discussed these systems in this thesis in reference to the STEFI model of 
direct support, which so far has focused on small piped systems. However, insufficient data 
was available from WaterAid’s areas of work about the costs of operation and minor 
maintenance and capital maintenance expenditure of such systems.  
 
Two factors make this a relevant topic for future research. Firstly, the rate of installation of 
small piped systems is increasing in Mali relative to the development of new point sources 
such as boreholes fitted with handpumps (DNH 2012b). Secondly, the WASHCost project 
concludes that the recurrent costs of such systems are generally higher than for point 
sources such as handpumps (Burr et al. 2012). Understanding the likely additional costs (and 
hopefully higher service levels) is therefore important in the Mali context. Although I 
suggested in Section 8.4 that WaterAid should give priority to ongoing costs monitoring over 
further retrospective studies, an exception could be made for small piped systems. There 
are two reasons for this: most information will need to come from outside WaterAid’s own 
areas of work (but could inform their future planning), and useful data should already be 
available from the organisations operating the STEFI system. This may require some further 
analysis to categorise expenditures according to the WASHCost system, but not extensive 
additional fieldwork. 
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Appendix 1 - List of all research activities 
 
A1.1. List of interviews 
 
Note: 
- All interviewees have been anonymised. 
- Repeat interviews with the same person are marked with a *. 
 
 
Interviews as follow-up to Masters research: 
 
Date Position / affiliation of interviewee(s) Gender Location 
23 Sept 2010 Former Deputy Mayor M Yelekebougou 
23 Sept 2010 Community member M Yelekebougou 
23 Sept 2010 Former councillor M Yelekebougou 
23 Sept 2010 Informal handpump attendants MM Yelekebougou 
23 Sept 2010 Matron, clinic F Yelekebougou 
23 Sept 2010 Community member M Yelekebougou 
23 Sept 2010 Community member M Yelekebougou 
27 Sept 2010 WASH coordinator, AMEPPE NGO M Bamako 
30 Sept 2010 President and members of water management 
committee 
MMF Fansiracoro 
01 Oct 2010 WASH field agent, AMEPPE NGO M Bamako 
02 Oct 2010 President of water management committee M Guily 
16 Oct 2010 Community member M Guily 
16 Oct 2010 Members of water management committee MM Fansiracoro 
17 Oct 2010 Handpump mechanic M Sanankoro 
 
 
Initial interviews for sector context, discussion of research ideas and case study selection: 
 
Date Position / affiliation of interviewee(s) Gender Location 
01 Oct 2010 WASH coordinator, municipal Technical Unit M Commune III, 
Bamako 
04 Oct 2010 WASH coordinator, AMASBIF NGO M Bamako 
07 Oct 2010 President of water management committee M Point G, 
Commune III 
12 Oct 2010 WASH coordinator, JIGI NGO M Bamako 
14 Oct 2010 WASH coordinator, municipal Technical Unit M Kolokani 
15 Oct 2010 Innovations for Poverty Action MF Bamako 
17 Oct 2010 Deputy President of Women's Association F Sanankoro 
20 Oct 2010 WASH coordinator, AMPDR NGO* M Bamako 
25 Oct 2010 Treasurer of water management committee F Kati 
26 Oct 2010 WASH coordinator and Director, ALPHALOG NGO MM Bamako 
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Interviews on national sector issues and self-supply: 
 
Date Position / affiliation of interviewee(s) Gender Location 
13 Jan 2011 WASH technical advisor, Direction National de 
l'Hydraulique 
M Bamako 
19 Jan 2011 WASH manager, UNICEF M Bamako 
14 Feb 2011 WASH technical advisor, Danish Embassy M Bamako 
 
 
Interviews on national sector issues after the coup d’état (undertaken remotely): 
 
Date Position / affiliation of interviewee(s) Gender Location 
21 Nov 2012 WASH Coordinator, Helvetas M Bamako 
21 Nov 2012 WASH Coordinator, GWI M Bamako 
28 Nov 2012 Coordinator, CAEPHA M Bamako 
3 Dec 2012 Coordinator, CN-CIEPA M Bamako 
 
 
Interviews on self-supply with key informants at national and regional levels: 
 
Date Position / affiliation of interviewee(s) Gender Location 
02 Dec 2010 WASH field agent, municipal Technical Unit* M Kolokani 
03 Dec 2010 Hygiene officers MM Kolokani 
09 Dec 2010 WASH field agent, AMPDR NGO M Dialakoroba 
05 Jan 2011 Chief of water section, Direction National de la 
Sante* 
M Bamako 
24 Feb 2011 WASH field agent, AMPDR NGO M Dialakoroba 
03 Mar 2011 WASH coordinator, AMPDR NGO* M Bamako 
29 Mar 2011 Hygiene and Sanitation Officer, Regional Health 
Centre* 
M Dioila 
10 June 2011 Hygiene and Sanitation Officer, Regional Health 
Centre* 
M Dioila 
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Interviews on self-supply implementation at municipal and community levels: 
 
 
In two villages in the municipality of Dialakoroba where WaterAid and its partner NGO AMPDR 
piloted self-supply: 
 
Date Position / affiliation of interviewee(s) Gender Location 
09 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Kola 
09 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Kola 
09 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Kola 
09 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Kola 
09 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Kola 
10 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Bogola 
10 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Bogola 
10 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Bogola 
24 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Kola 
24 Mar 2011 Well-owner F Kola 
25 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Bogola 
25 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Bogola 
25 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Bogola 
25 Mar 2011 Well-owner M Bogola 
13 Apr 2011 Mason M Kola 
 
 
In three municipalities where UNICEF and the health services piloted self-supply: 
 
Date Position / affiliation of interviewee(s) Gender Location 
30 Mar 2011 Mason M Massigui 
30 Mar 2011 Former President, ASACO (health centre 
committee) 
M Massigui 
31 Mar 2011 President, ASACO (health centre committee) M Ngolobougou 
31 Mar 2011 Councillor M Sirakoro Djedala 
31 Mar 2011 Masons MM Ngolobougou 
08 June 2011 Presidents, ASACO (health centre committee) MM Banco 
08 June 2011 Well-owner M Yaya, Tibougou 
08 June 2011 Mason M Banco 
09 June 2011 President, ASACO (health centre committee) MM Ngolobougou 
09 June 2011 Well-owner M Djigibougou 
09 June 2011 Village chief M Bafina 
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Interviews on community fundraising: 
 
Date Position / affiliation of interviewee(s) Gender Location 
24 Mar 2011 Record-keeper, village fund M Kola 
07 Apr 2011 Involved with village fund M Kola 
07 Apr 2011 Involved with village fund M Kola 
07 Apr 2011 Involved with agricultural association fund M Kola 
07 Apr 2011 Involved with village fund M Kola 
08 Apr 2011 Involved with agricultural association fund M Bogola 
08 Apr 2011 Involved with agricultural association fund M Bogola 
08 Apr 2011 Involved with village fund M Bogola 
12 Apr 2011 Involved with agricultural association fund M Bogola 
12 Apr 2011 Village Chief M Bogola 
21 Apr 2011 Deputy Mayor with responsibility for WASH M Dialakoroba 
04 May 2011 WASH coordinator, AMPDR NGO M Bamako 
24 May 2011 Member of family which often completely funds 
repairs to the handpump near its home 
M Kola 
 
Date Position / affiliation of interviewee(s) Gender Location 
24 Aug 2011 WASH field agent, municipal Technical Unit* M Kolokani 
26 Aug 2011 WASH field agent, municipal Technical Unit* M Tioribougou 
 
 
Structured interviews and questionnaire on household finances: 
 
Household 
code 
Date interview 1: 
male household head 
re assets and 
financial instruments 
Date interview 2: 
male household head 
re income and 
expenditure 
Date interview 3: 
female household 
head re assets, 
instruments, income 
and expenditure 
Location 
B7 22 June 2011 08 July 2011 - Bogola 
B5 22 June 2011 08 July 2011 17 Aug 2011 Bogola 
B4 22 June 2011 22 July 2011 19 Aug 2011 Bogola 
B8 22 June 2011 08 July 2011 22 July 2011 Bogola 
B18 22 June 2011 15 July 2011 22 July 2011 Bogola 
K12 23 June 2011 07 July 2011 21 July 2011 Kola 
K31 23 June 2011 07 July 2011 18 Aug 2011 Kola 
K1 23 June 2011 15 July 2011 18 Aug 2011 Kola 
K28 23 June 2011 21 July 2011 19 Aug 2011 Kola 
K5 06 July 2011 06 July 2011 18 Aug 2011 Kola 
K15 23 June 2011 07 July 2011 21 July 2011 Kola 
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Interviews and data collection on recurrent costs and municipal financing: 
 
Date Position / affiliation of interviewee(s) Gender Location 
08 Aug 2011 WASH field agent, AMPDR NGO* M Dialakoroba 
01 Oct 2011 Deputy Mayor with responsibility for finances 
(previously WASH) 
F Dialakoroba 
 Councillor and former Mayor M Dialakoroba 
03 Nov 2011 Deputy Mayor with responsibility for WASH M Kolokani 
04 Nov 2011 Handpump mechanic M Tioribougou 
04 Nov 2011 General Secretary of municipality (civil servant) M Tioribougou 
11 Nov 2011 Involved with multi-village fund M Kola 
15 Nov 2011 Registrar for Expenditure of municipality (civil 
servant) 
M Dialakoroba 
22 Nov 2011 Mayor M Tioribougou 
 Deputy Mayor with responsibility for WASH M Tioribougou 
 WASH field agent, municipal Technical Unit* M Tioribougou 
 Registrar for Expenditure of municipality (civil 
servant) 
M Tioribougou 
22 Nov 2011 WASH field agent, municipal Technical Unit* M Tioribougou 
 Registrar for Expenditure of municipality (civil 
servant) 
M Tioribougou 
22 Nov 2011 Handpump mechanic M Kolokani 
 Handpump mechanic M Kolokani 
23 Nov 2011 Deputy Mayor with responsibility for WASH M Kolokani 
 Deputy Mayor with responsibility for education M Kolokani 
 General Secretary of municipality (civil servant) M Kolokani 
 WASH field agent, municipal Technical Unit* M Kolokani 
23 Nov 2011 WASH field agent, municipal Technical Unit* M Tioribougou 
23 Nov 2011 Former Deputy Mayor with responsibility for WASH M Yelekebougou 
23 Nov 2011 Former Mayor M Yelekebougou 
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A1.2. List of participatory exercises and group discussions 
 
In the two communities of Bogola and Kola in the municipality of Dialakoroba: 
 
Village Date Type and topic of exercise Participants 
Bogola 01 Mar 2011 
Kola 02 Mar 2011 
Participatory exercise: Mapping water 
points and discussing usage 
Water management 
committee 
Bogola 08 Mar 2011 
Kola 09 Mar 2011 
Discussion: sanitation access and 
community fundraising 
Water management 
committee 
Bogola 10 Mar 2011 
Kola 24 Mar 2011 
Participatory exercise: typical household 
income and expenditure 
Water management 
committee 
Bogola 21 April 2011 
Kola 21 April 2011 
Discussion: sharing the recurrent costs 
of WASH with other actors 
Community members 
Bogola 25 May 2011 
Kola 24 May 2011 
Participatory exercise: categorising 
essential and desirable household assets 
Community members 
Bogola 11 Nov 2011 
Kola 15 Nov 2011 
Community fundraising Women's group 
 
In eight communities considered good examples of collective fundraising by WaterAid’s partners 
in four municipalities (on water point mapping, water usage and community fundraising): 
 
Village Municipality Focus group by 
WaterAid’s 
partners 
Follow-up group interviews by me 
with water management 
committees and women’s groups 
Torokoroni Kolokani 09 Oct 2011 03 Nov 2011 
Yorobougou Kolokani 07 Oct 2011 03 Nov 2011 
Kanekebougou Tioribougou 05 Oct 2011 04 Nov 2011 
Bamabougu Tioribougou 07 Oct 2011 04 Nov 2011 
Tacko Dandougou Fakala 07 Oct 2011 n/a 
Konio Peulh Dandougou Fakala 30 Sept 2011 n/a 
Odioumabougou Dialakoroba 03 Oct 2011 n/a 
Freintoumou Dialakoroba 05 Oct 2011 n/a 
 
For security reasons I was not able to travel personally to Tacko and Konio Peulh. Follow-up visits 
were not arranged in Odioumabougou and Freintoumou because I decided additional research 
where community fundraising only took place after breakdowns would not be useful.  
 
In eight further communities in four municipalities (on water point mapping and water usage): 
 
Village Municipality Focus group by 
WaterAid’s partners 
Tongoye Kolokani 09 Oct 2011 
Mpella Kolokani 06 Oct 2011 
Soninkoro Tioribougou 09 Oct 2011 
Doribougou Tioribougou 08 Oct 2011 
Bougoula Dandougou Fakala 07 Oct 2011 
Konio Marka Dandougou Fakala 02 Oct 2011 
Sanambele Dialakoroba 03 Oct 2011 
Sonkoria Dialakoroba 04 Oct 2011 
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A1.3. List of workshops and events attended 
 
As participant and observer: 
 
Date Event Location Key links to research 
23-25 Nov 
2010 
Six-Monthly Review of 
WaterAid and its 
partners 
Bamako • Getting to know WaterAid’s partners 
and key current issues of concern. 
31 Jan - 4 
Feb 2011 
WaterAid West Africa 
Local Millennium 
Development Goal 
Initiative Conference 
Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso 
• Presenting results of the Masters 
research and follow-up. 
• Learning more about approaches 
from other WaterAid country 
programmes and other organisations 
in the West Africa region. 
10-12 Feb 
2011 
WaterAid workshop 
on Community-Led 
Total Sanitation 
Segou • Understanding the debates within 
WaterAid and its partners related to 
financing rural sanitation. 
27-29 
April 2011 
Annual Review of 
WaterAid and its 
partners 
Bamako • Understanding the initial introduction 
of the Sustainability Framework to 
WaterAid’s partners, before the 
workshop in Liberia.  
1-3 June 
2011 
WaterAid West Africa 
Sustainability 
Workshop 
Monrovia, 
Liberia 
• Understanding where the research 
related to common issues in the West 
Africa region.  
• Supporting WaterAid in developing 
ideas for using the Sustainability 
Framework to help analysis of their 
work in Mali.  
28-30 Sept 
2011 
WaterAid workshop 
on sanitation 
marketing 
Bamako • Understanding the debates within 
WaterAid and its partners related to 
financing urban sanitation. 
• Contributing to debates on how to 
analyse willingness to pay for WASH 
services.  
5-7 Oct 
2011 
WaterAid workshop 
on 'marketing' Sector 
Development Plans 
Bamako • Understanding the training and 
process for municipalities seeking 
funding from donors.  
15 Oct 
2011 
WaterAid workshop 
on water point 
mapping 
Bamako • Supporting the consultants 
undertaking the mapping survey in 
developing the data collection forms 
and training.  
16-18 Nov 
2011 
Forum of Mayors Bamako • Understanding how WaterAid 
approaches national-level advocacy.  
 
 
263 
As joint facilitator for at least some sessions: 
 
Date Event Location Key links to research 
12-13 Sept 
2011 
Initial workshop 
on Sustainability 
Framework with 
WaterAid's 
partners 
Bamako • Discussing the initial responses of WaterAid’s 
partners to a questionnaire on sustainability 
(including challenges defining and monitoring 
functionality; defining different recurrent costs 
and financing responsibilities; and evaluating 
users’ willingness to pay). 
• Planning the field research to be undertaken 
based on the Sustainability Framework. 
 
12-14 Oct 
2011 
Six-Monthly 
Review of 
WaterAid and its 
partners 
Bamako • Presenting the results of the Sustainability 
Framework research based on initial analysis. 
• Discussing underlying reasons for the 
challenges identified and initial ideas for 
addressing them. 
• Presenting lessons on monitoring and 
cost-sharing from the municipality of 
Dandougou Fakala.  
 
7-8 Dec 
2011 
Final workshop on 
Sustainability 
Framework with 
WaterAid's 
partners 
Bamako • Agreeing actions to be taken by WaterAid’s 
partners and WaterAid itself based on the 
results of the analysis, to be included in the 
planning for the next financial year (2012-13). 
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Appendix 2 - Copies of research tools 
 
Note: 
- All research tools have been translated into English from the original French versions. 
- Minor formatting changes have been made to fit the requirements of the thesis layout. 
 
 
A2.1. Outlines of semi-structured interviews 
 
 
Outline of semi-structured interviews with key informants on self-supply 
 
Introductions 
Informed consent 
Name, position, contact details 
Brief explanation of my research 
How long have you been in this position? 
What are your main activities? 
What is the structure of the NGO/Technical Unit here? 
 
Water supply situation in the commune 
What documentation exists on water supply in the commune now (numbers and locations 
of different types ie. forages, PT, PTA, PGD)? 
How many people access drinking water from an improved source compared to those who 
use an unimproved source? 
What documentation exists on the history of water supply? 
What is the functionality level of handpumps?  
 
Self-supply projects 
What projects have taken place regarding self-supply? When? How many? 
What has this involved?  
Paying for demonstration wells? Or part-payment? Typical costs and sharing? How 
many? 
Training masons? What level? How many? 
Promoting just self-supply? 
Making chlorine or javel available? 
Who was involved? NGO/Technical Unit? CSCOM? ASACO? Municipality? 
What happened afterwards? 
Did some people pay for their own wells or improvements? 
Did some people come to the NGO/Technical Unit/municipality to ask for help? 
Were some communities more active than others? 
What water quality monitoring was involved? And what still goes on? 
Was it linked to any sanitation activities such as marketing latrine slabs? 
What were the successes? 
What were the difficulties? 
What ideas could address the difficulties? 
What is going on now with self-supply? 
Does the NGO/Technical Unit/municipality have any budget for self-supply? 
What are the general hygiene promotion activities done by the NGO/Technical Unit? 
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Outline of semi-structured interview with owners of improved or partially improved 
hand-dug wells 
 
Introductions 
Informed consent 
Brief explanation of my research 
 
Household identification 
Name of head of concession 
Name of head of ménage 
Name of interviewee 
Gender of interviewee 
 
Quality and reliability 
What is your opinion of the quality of the water from the well? Better or worse than other 
sources? 
What is your opinion of the reliability of the water from the well? Does it dry up? If so, for 
how many months? Better or worse than other sources? 
 
Reasons for having a family well, costs and financing 
When was the well first dug? Why?  
What source did you use before? 
Who in the household made the decision? 
When was the well improved? Why? 
Who in the household made the decision? 
How did you choose what improvements to make to the well? (own idea, copied 
demonstration project, copied someone else). 
What advice did you seek/receive? (e.g. NGO project or promotion). 
Was this done in stages? 
Who did the work at each stage? 
What was the cost of each stage? (materials and labour for each element) 
Who paid? (head of household, someone else) 
Did anyone else contribute? (other member of household, someone else e.g. other users) 
How was the money raised? (saved, sold something, took loan).  
Was it paid all at once or in instalments? 
If needed, could you take a loan from someone in the community? (individual or group) 
Who? 
 
Maintenance of well and treatment of water 
What maintenance do you do to the well? (cleaning, deepening, repairing cement) 
How often? How much does this cost? 
Do you treat the water in the well? Why/why not?  
When did you begin treating the water?  
What prompted you to begin treating it? 
What do you use? 
When was the last time you treated the water? 
How much and how often? (in the last 2 years) 
Where do you buy it? 
How much does it cost per purchase?  
How much does it cost per month/year? 
Has the water quality ever been officially tested (for example, by an NGO)? 
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Do you treat the water for drinking in the house? (boiling, filter, solar, chemical) 
 
Changes before/after improvements to well 
Did the number of people/households who use the well change after/before the 
improvements? 
Did the uses of the water change before/after the improvements? 
What are the benefits to the family of the well/the improvements? 
What are the benefits to other users of the well/the improvements? 
 
Other people’s views 
Do other people want to have wells like this? Why/why not? 
Have you ever given advice to anyone about how to do this? 
Why do you think that not everyone in the community has their own well like this? 
 
Future plans 
Do you plan to make any further improvements in future? What? Why/why not? (quality, 
reliability, cost). 
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Outline of semi-structured interview with masons on self-supply 
 
Introductions 
Informed consent 
Name, position, contact details 
Brief explanation of my research 
 
Key activities 
Do you work just as a mason or do you have other livelihoods (agriculture, livestock, small 
business)? 
What are your main activities as a mason? (mud brick houses, cement brick houses, cement 
plastering, well-improving, making latine slabs) 
How much time you do you spend as a mason? 
How many days did you do mason work in the previous month? 
What do you do in the rainy season? 
Do you work only in this village or in other villages too? 
Do you do other work such as digging wells or latrines? 
 
Training 
Have you been trained by NGOs? What? When? 
What further training would you like? 
Have you been paid by NGO projects? What? When? 
 
Self-supply projects [questions draw on Sutton (2009)] 
What do you think of the demonstration wells and what further improvements do they 
think could be made? 
Is the cost of prototypes proving affordable to individuals/communities? 
Could costs be reduced? 
Could credit be accessed by well-owners? If so, where? 
How many requests have there been to come and improve other wells? How many of these 
have already been implemented? 
Has anybody else copied some of the features (if not all) of the demonstration wells since 
these were constructed? If so what, and how many? 
 
Payment 
How much do you typically get paid per day?  
Is payment always in cash or sometimes in-kind? 
Does this change for different activities? 
Is there a market for improving traditional wells? Would it be profitable for you? What price 
would you charge people for improving their well? How would you promote it? 
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Outline of semi-structured interview with key informants and community groups on 
collective fundraising 
 
Introduction 
Informed consent 
Questions for us? 
 
Name, position, how long held 
 
How does the group function? 
- Members – number and criteria 
- Committee and meetings 
- When was it set up and by who? 
- What is the current support from NGOs or the municipality? 
- Have the activities changed over time? 
 
Mechanisms of raising money 
- Types of mechanism 
- How much per time 
- How much per season/year 
- Regularity or not 
- Actual money available at the moment 
- Money flowing in and out in last year [checking previous focus group figures] 
- Anything in-kind? 
 
Types of expenditure – water/other 
- Examples 
- Loans / gifts / saving and amounts of these 
- If loans, what are the rates? 
- Financial links to individuals 
- Actual written records and if I can see them 
 
Links to other local funds 
- Community fund / chief’s fund / youth fund / agricultural association / others. 
- In general, what is the most common need for a lump sum of money? 
- What is the village’s most common way of getting together a lump sum of money?  
 
For water management committee only, for further background: 
- Composition of committee (M/F) 
- When was the committee formed? How? Were there previous committees or groups? 
- How does the committee function now? What the key activities? How often does it have 
meetings? How are decisions made? How are other villagers or leaders involved? What 
records are kept? 
- Is the committee just for water, or for sanitation too? Are there separate committees? 
- What training have members of the committee received? Who was this? Did other 
members of the community receive training too? 
- What do NGOs do in the village? Construction activities? Training? Awareness? 
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Outline of semi-structured interview with municipal officers on ‘marketing’ to donors 
 
Current position in the municipality 
Position when he or she received the training 
Date of training 
 
Can you describe the marketing training that the municipality has received? 
... and you personally? 
 
What is your definition of marketing? 
 
What were your goals for the marketing process, after the training? 
 
What did you do? 
 
For example: 
- Raising awareness of others in the municipality. 
- Identification of donors, private companies, associations of migrants. 
- Making contact and arranging meetings with potential donors. 
- Promotion or use of the Sector Development Plan. 
- Preparation and submission of project proposals. 
 
What support have you received from WaterAid and its partner NGOs? 
 
Who was involved in the process? 
 
At what levels did you undertake activities? (local / national / collaboration with other 
municipalities) 
 
How much money have you raised? 
 
Have you received in-kind donations as well? 
 
What elements of success did you have? 
 
What were the challenges? 
 
What process of monitoring and follow-up did you use? 
 
Was money raised (if any) used for investment or operating costs? 
 
Do you have any lessons or advice for other municipalities? 
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h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 i
s
 u
s
e
d
 a
s
 a
 s
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 w
a
te
r 
b
y
 t
h
e
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
B
. 
T
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
s
, 
b
u
t 
o
n
ly
 d
u
ri
n
g
 c
e
rt
a
in
 p
e
ri
o
d
s
 o
f 
th
e
 y
e
a
r.
  
C
. 
T
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
s
 b
u
t 
it
 i
s
 n
o
t 
u
s
e
d
 a
s
 a
 s
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 w
a
te
r 
b
y
 t
h
e
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 (
fo
r 
e
x
a
m
p
le
 f
o
r 
re
a
s
o
n
s
 o
f 
d
is
ta
n
c
e
 o
r 
ta
s
te
).
  
D
. 
T
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
d
o
e
s
 n
o
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 h
a
s
 n
o
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
e
d
 f
o
r 
a
t 
le
a
s
t 
o
n
e
 m
o
n
th
. 
 
E
. 
T
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
d
o
e
s
 n
o
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
, 
b
u
t 
b
e
c
a
m
e
 n
o
n
-f
u
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
w
it
h
in
 t
h
e
 l
a
s
t 
m
o
n
th
. 
 
 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
r 
n
a
m
e
 o
f 
w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
(t
o
 c
o
rr
e
s
p
o
n
d
 
w
it
h
 t
h
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 
m
a
p
) 
N
e
ig
h
b
o
u
rh
o
o
d
 
Y
e
a
r 
o
f 
in
s
ta
ll
a
ti
o
n
 
S
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
fi
n
a
n
c
in
g
 f
o
r 
c
a
p
it
a
l 
in
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e
 v
il
la
g
e
 
(S
p
e
c
if
y
 t
h
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
a
n
d
 i
f 
th
e
 
c
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 w
a
s
 c
a
s
h
 o
r 
in
-k
in
d
) 
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 :
 
A
, 
B
, 
C
, 
D
 o
r 
E
 
(s
e
e
 c
a
te
g
o
ri
e
s
 
a
b
o
v
e
) 
If
 t
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
is
 
n
o
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
o
r 
n
o
t 
u
s
e
d
 f
o
r 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 
w
a
te
r,
 w
h
y
?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
 o
v
e
rl
e
a
f 
if
 n
e
c
e
s
s
a
ry
) 
 
2
7
6
 
3
(b
).
 O
p
in
io
n
 o
f 
th
e
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
n
 ‘
m
o
d
e
rn
’ 
w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 
 In
 g
e
n
e
ra
l,
 w
h
a
t 
is
 t
h
e
 o
p
in
io
n
 o
f 
th
e
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
n
 t
h
e
 m
o
d
e
rn
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 r
e
g
a
rd
in
g
 t
h
e
 f
o
llo
w
in
g
 f
a
c
to
rs
?
 I
f 
th
e
re
 a
re
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
s
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 t
h
e
 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
, 
y
o
u
 c
a
n
 n
o
te
 t
h
e
m
 i
n
 t
h
e
 s
p
a
c
e
s
 f
o
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
: 
 
P
e
rc
e
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
w
a
te
r 
q
u
a
li
ty
 
 [ 
 ]
  
 G
o
o
d
 =
 p
o
ta
b
le
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t,
 a
n
d
 f
o
r 
o
th
e
rs
 u
s
e
s
 t
o
o
 
[ 
 ]
  
 A
v
e
ra
g
e
 =
 f
o
r 
c
o
o
k
in
g
 a
n
d
 o
th
e
r 
d
o
m
e
s
ti
c
 u
s
e
s
 b
u
t 
n
o
t 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 
[ 
 ]
  
 N
o
t 
g
o
o
d
 =
 f
o
r 
o
th
e
r 
u
s
e
s
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 o
r 
c
o
o
k
in
g
 
P
e
rc
e
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
w
a
te
r 
q
u
a
li
ty
 –
 o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
  
A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
il
it
y
 i
n
 t
e
rm
s
 o
f 
d
is
ta
n
c
e
 
 [ 
 ]
  
 A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
ili
ty
 i
s
 g
o
o
d
 f
o
r 
a
ll 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
 
[ 
 ]
  
 A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
ili
ty
 i
s
 g
o
o
d
 f
o
r 
s
o
m
e
 h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
a
ll 
 
[ 
 ]
  
 A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
ili
ty
 i
s
 d
if
fi
c
u
lt
 f
o
r 
a
ll 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
il
it
y
 i
n
 t
e
rm
s
 o
f 
d
is
ta
n
c
e
 –
 o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 
 
R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 a
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 s
e
a
s
o
n
a
l 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
 [ 
 ]
  
 A
d
e
q
u
a
te
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e
 w
h
o
le
 y
e
a
r 
[ 
 ]
  
 A
d
e
q
u
a
te
 o
n
ly
 d
u
ri
n
g
 c
e
rt
a
in
 s
e
a
s
o
n
s
 o
r 
p
e
ri
o
d
s
 
R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 a
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 s
e
a
s
o
n
a
l 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 –
 o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 
 
R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 a
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 f
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
b
re
a
k
d
o
w
n
s
 
 [ 
 ]
  
 B
re
a
k
d
o
w
n
s
 a
re
 r
a
re
 a
n
d
 r
e
p
a
ir
s
 a
re
 m
a
d
e
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
d
e
la
y
 
[ 
 ]
  
 B
re
a
k
d
o
w
n
s
 a
re
 r
a
re
 b
u
t 
re
p
a
ir
s
 a
re
 n
o
t 
m
a
d
e
 q
u
ic
k
ly
 
[ 
 ]
  
 O
ft
e
n
 b
ro
k
e
n
 d
o
w
n
 
R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 a
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 f
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
b
re
a
k
d
o
w
n
s
 –
 o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 
 
T
y
p
e
s
 o
f 
u
s
e
s
 (
ti
c
k
 a
ll 
th
a
t 
a
p
p
ly
) 
 [ 
 ]
  
 D
ri
n
k
in
g
 
[ 
 ]
  
 C
o
o
k
in
g
 
[ 
 ]
  
 O
th
e
r 
d
o
m
e
s
ti
c
 u
s
e
s
 (
e
.g
. 
b
a
th
in
g
, 
w
a
s
h
in
g
 c
lo
th
e
s
) 
[ 
 ]
  
 P
ro
d
u
c
ti
v
e
 u
s
e
s
 (
e
.g
. 
w
a
te
ri
n
g
 a
n
im
a
ls
, 
g
a
rd
e
n
s
) 
T
y
p
e
s
 o
f 
u
s
e
s
 –
 o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 
  
2
7
7
 
4
(a
).
 L
is
t 
o
f 
p
ri
n
c
ip
a
l 
a
lt
e
rn
a
ti
v
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 (
tr
a
d
it
io
n
a
l 
w
e
ll
s
, 
s
tr
e
a
m
s
, 
p
o
n
d
s
) 
 N
o
te
 o
f 
d
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s
 o
f 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
lit
y
: 
 
A
. 
T
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 i
s
 u
s
e
d
 b
y
 t
h
e
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
B
. 
T
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
s
, 
b
u
t 
o
n
ly
 d
u
ri
n
g
 c
e
rt
a
in
 p
e
ri
o
d
s
 o
f 
th
e
 y
e
a
r.
  
C
. 
T
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
s
 b
u
t 
it
 i
s
 n
o
t 
u
s
e
d
 b
y
 t
h
e
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 (
fo
r 
e
x
a
m
p
le
 f
o
r 
re
a
s
o
n
s
 o
f 
d
is
ta
n
c
e
 o
r 
ta
s
te
).
  
D
. 
T
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
d
o
e
s
 n
o
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 h
a
s
 n
o
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
e
d
 f
o
r 
a
t 
le
a
s
t 
o
n
e
 m
o
n
th
. 
 
E
. 
T
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
d
o
e
s
 n
o
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
, 
b
u
t 
b
e
c
a
m
e
 n
o
n
-f
u
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
w
it
h
in
 t
h
e
 l
a
s
t 
m
o
n
th
. 
 
 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
r 
n
a
m
e
 o
f 
w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
(t
o
 c
o
rr
e
s
p
o
n
d
 
w
it
h
 t
h
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 
m
a
p
) 
N
e
ig
h
b
o
u
rh
o
o
d
 
Y
e
a
r 
o
f 
in
s
ta
ll
a
ti
o
n
 
S
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
fi
n
a
n
c
in
g
 f
o
r 
c
a
p
it
a
l 
in
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e
 v
il
la
g
e
 
(S
p
e
c
if
y
 t
h
e
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
a
n
d
 i
f 
th
e
 
c
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 w
a
s
 c
a
s
h
 o
r 
in
-k
in
d
) 
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 :
 
A
, 
B
, 
C
, 
D
 o
r 
E
 
(s
e
e
 c
a
te
g
o
ri
e
s
 
a
b
o
v
e
) 
If
 t
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
t 
is
 
n
o
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
o
r 
n
o
t 
u
s
e
d
 f
o
r 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 
w
a
te
r,
 w
h
y
?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
 o
v
e
rl
e
a
f 
if
 n
e
c
e
s
s
a
ry
) 
2
7
8
 
4
(b
).
 O
p
in
io
n
 o
f 
th
e
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
n
 t
h
e
 a
lt
e
rn
a
ti
v
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
  
 In
 g
e
n
e
ra
l,
 w
h
a
t 
is
 t
h
e
 o
p
in
io
n
 o
f 
th
e
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
n
 t
h
e
 m
o
d
e
rn
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 r
e
g
a
rd
in
g
 t
h
e
 f
o
llo
w
in
g
 f
a
c
to
rs
?
 I
f 
th
e
re
 a
re
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
s
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 t
h
e
 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
, 
y
o
u
 c
a
n
 n
o
te
 t
h
e
m
 i
n
 t
h
e
 s
p
a
c
e
s
 f
o
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
: 
 
P
e
rc
e
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
w
a
te
r 
q
u
a
li
ty
 
 [ 
 ]
  
 G
o
o
d
 =
 p
o
ta
b
le
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t,
 a
n
d
 f
o
r 
o
th
e
rs
 u
s
e
s
 t
o
o
 
[ 
 ]
  
 A
v
e
ra
g
e
 =
 f
o
r 
c
o
o
k
in
g
 a
n
d
 o
th
e
r 
d
o
m
e
s
ti
c
 u
s
e
s
 b
u
t 
n
o
t 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 
[ 
 ]
  
 N
o
t 
g
o
o
d
 =
 f
o
r 
o
th
e
r 
u
s
e
s
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 o
r 
c
o
o
k
in
g
 
P
e
rc
e
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
w
a
te
r 
q
u
a
li
ty
 –
 o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
  
A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
il
it
y
 i
n
 t
e
rm
s
 o
f 
d
is
ta
n
c
e
 
 [ 
 ]
  
 A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
ili
ty
 i
s
 g
o
o
d
 f
o
r 
a
ll 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
 
[ 
 ]
  
 A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
ili
ty
 i
s
 g
o
o
d
 f
o
r 
s
o
m
e
 h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
a
ll 
 
[ 
 ]
  
 A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
ili
ty
 i
s
 d
if
fi
c
u
lt
 f
o
r 
a
ll 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
il
it
y
 i
n
 t
e
rm
s
 o
f 
d
is
ta
n
c
e
 –
 o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 
 
R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 a
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 s
e
a
s
o
n
a
l 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
 [ 
 ]
  
 A
d
e
q
u
a
te
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e
 w
h
o
le
 y
e
a
r 
[ 
 ]
  
 A
d
e
q
u
a
te
 o
n
ly
 d
u
ri
n
g
 c
e
rt
a
in
 s
e
a
s
o
n
s
 o
r 
p
e
ri
o
d
s
 
R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 a
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 s
e
a
s
o
n
a
l 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 –
 o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 
 
R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 a
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 f
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
b
re
a
k
d
o
w
n
s
 
 [ 
 ]
  
 B
re
a
k
d
o
w
n
s
 a
re
 r
a
re
 a
n
d
 r
e
p
a
ir
s
 a
re
 m
a
d
e
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
d
e
la
y
 
[ 
 ]
  
 B
re
a
k
d
o
w
n
s
 a
re
 r
a
re
 b
u
t 
re
p
a
ir
s
 a
re
 n
o
t 
m
a
d
e
 q
u
ic
k
ly
 
[ 
 ]
  
 O
ft
e
n
 b
ro
k
e
n
 d
o
w
n
 
R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 a
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 f
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
b
re
a
k
d
o
w
n
s
 –
 o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 
 
T
y
p
e
s
 o
f 
u
s
e
s
 (
ti
c
k
 a
ll 
th
a
t 
a
p
p
ly
) 
 [ 
 ]
  
 D
ri
n
k
in
g
 
[ 
 ]
  
 C
o
o
k
in
g
 
[ 
 ]
  
 O
th
e
r 
d
o
m
e
s
ti
c
 u
s
e
s
 (
e
.g
. 
b
a
th
in
g
, 
w
a
s
h
in
g
 c
lo
th
e
s
) 
[ 
 ]
  
 P
ro
d
u
c
ti
v
e
 u
s
e
s
 (
e
.g
. 
w
a
te
ri
n
g
 a
n
im
a
ls
, 
g
a
rd
e
n
s
) 
T
y
p
e
s
 o
f 
u
s
e
s
 –
 o
th
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 
  
2
7
9
 
5
. 
U
s
a
g
e
 o
f 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 
 
A
p
p
ro
x
im
a
te
ly
 h
o
w
 m
a
n
y
 h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
 u
s
e
 m
o
d
e
rn
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 a
s
 
th
e
ir
 p
ri
n
c
ip
a
l 
s
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 w
a
te
r?
 
 
A
p
p
ro
x
im
a
te
ly
 h
o
w
 m
a
n
y
 h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
 u
s
e
 a
lt
e
rn
a
ti
v
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 a
s
 
th
e
ir
 p
ri
n
c
ip
a
l 
s
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 w
a
te
r?
 
 
If
 t
h
e
re
 a
re
 h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
 w
h
ic
h
 u
s
e
 a
lt
e
rn
a
ti
v
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 a
s
 t
h
e
ir
 
p
ri
n
c
ip
a
l 
s
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 w
a
te
r,
 w
h
y
 d
o
 t
h
e
y
 u
s
e
 a
lt
e
rn
a
ti
v
e
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 o
v
e
r 
m
o
d
e
rn
 w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
?
 
 
[ 
  
] 
  
C
h
e
a
p
e
r 
[ 
  
] 
  
C
lo
s
e
r 
to
 t
h
e
 h
o
m
e
 
[ 
  
] 
  
P
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 b
e
tt
e
r 
q
u
a
lit
y
 
[ 
  
] 
  
G
re
a
te
r 
re
lia
b
ili
ty
 
[ 
  
] 
  
O
th
e
r 
- 
s
p
e
c
if
y
 :
 
  P
a
y
m
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 f
u
n
d
ra
is
in
g
 
 
D
e
s
c
ri
b
e
 t
h
e
 s
y
s
te
m
 o
f 
p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 o
r 
fu
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N
e
ig
h
b
o
u
rh
o
o
d
 
 
C
o
d
e
 o
f 
m
é
n
a
g
e
 
 
  
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
m
a
n
 w
h
o
 k
n
o
w
s
 m
o
s
t 
a
b
o
u
t 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 f
in
a
n
c
e
s
 
 
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
w
o
m
a
n
 w
h
o
 k
n
o
w
s
 m
o
s
t 
a
b
o
u
t 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 f
in
a
n
c
e
s
 
 
G
e
n
e
ra
l 
a
v
a
ila
b
ili
ty
 a
n
d
 w
ill
in
g
n
e
s
s
 f
o
r 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s
 
 
N
a
m
e
s
 o
f 
p
e
rs
o
n
s
 i
n
te
rv
ie
w
e
d
 t
o
d
a
y
 
 
  
2
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2
. 
In
c
o
m
e
 –
 p
a
s
t 
y
e
a
r 
a
n
d
 l
a
s
t 
tw
o
 w
e
e
k
s
 
 
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
in
c
o
m
e
 
D
e
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
in
c
o
m
e
 
A
m
o
u
n
t 
(F
C
F
A
) 
W
h
o
 w
a
s
 
in
v
o
lv
e
d
 i
n
 
c
re
a
ti
n
g
 t
h
is
 
in
c
o
m
e
?
 
In
 l
a
s
t 
y
e
a
r 
a
n
d
/o
r 
la
s
t 
tw
o
 
w
e
e
k
s
?
 
T
y
p
ic
a
l 
fr
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
o
f 
th
is
 
in
c
o
m
e
 
W
h
a
t 
w
a
s
 d
o
n
e
 w
it
h
 t
h
e
 m
o
n
e
y
?
 
- 
C
a
s
h
 s
a
v
e
d
 (
w
h
e
re
?
) 
- 
S
p
e
n
t 
(o
n
 w
h
a
t?
) 
- 
O
th
e
r 
P
a
id
 e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
(a
g
ri
c
u
lt
u
ra
l 
w
o
rk
, 
o
th
e
r 
w
o
rk
 i
n
 v
ill
a
g
e
 
in
c
. 
s
e
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t,
 
w
o
rk
 o
u
ts
id
e
 v
ill
a
g
e
) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
A
g
ri
c
u
lt
u
ra
l 
in
c
o
m
e
 
(m
a
in
 c
ro
p
s
, 
g
a
rd
e
n
 
p
ro
d
u
c
e
, 
s
e
lli
n
g
 
a
n
im
a
ls
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
th
e
r 
s
m
a
ll
 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
(s
e
lli
n
g
 w
o
o
d
, 
k
a
ri
té
, 
s
o
a
p
 e
tc
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
e
m
it
ta
n
c
e
s
 o
r 
g
if
ts
 (
fr
o
m
 v
ill
a
g
e
, 
D
ia
la
k
o
ro
b
a
, 
B
a
m
a
k
o
, 
a
b
ro
a
d
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
th
e
r 
(d
o
w
ry
, 
re
n
ti
n
g
 o
r 
s
e
lli
n
g
 la
n
d
, 
s
o
c
ia
l o
r 
N
G
O
 w
e
lf
a
re
, 
in
-k
in
d
 i
n
c
o
m
e
 o
r 
g
if
ts
, 
o
th
e
r)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
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3
. 
E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
 –
 p
a
s
t 
y
e
a
r 
a
n
d
 l
a
s
t 
tw
o
 w
e
e
k
s
 
 
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 
D
e
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 
A
m
o
u
n
t 
(F
C
F
A
) 
W
h
o
 w
a
s
 i
n
v
o
lv
e
d
 
in
 t
h
e
 d
e
c
is
io
n
, 
a
n
d
 w
h
o
 t
o
o
k
 t
h
e
 
fi
n
a
l 
d
e
c
is
io
n
?
 
In
 l
a
s
t 
y
e
a
r 
a
n
d
/o
r 
la
s
t 
tw
o
 
w
e
e
k
s
?
 
T
y
p
ic
a
l 
fr
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
th
is
 e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 
H
o
w
 p
a
id
?
 
- 
C
a
s
h
 s
a
v
e
d
 (
w
h
e
re
?
) 
- 
L
o
a
n
 (
fr
o
m
 w
h
o
?
) 
- 
G
if
t 
(f
ro
m
 w
h
o
?
) 
- 
S
o
ld
 s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 (
w
h
a
t?
) 
- 
O
th
e
r 
A
g
ri
c
u
lt
u
ra
l 
in
p
u
ts
  
(s
e
e
d
s
, 
fe
rt
ili
s
e
rs
, 
la
n
d
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
, 
la
b
o
u
r,
 
a
n
im
a
ls
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
e
d
ic
a
l 
 
(c
o
n
s
u
lt
a
ti
o
n
 f
e
e
s
, 
tr
a
d
it
io
n
a
l 
/ 
m
o
d
e
rn
 
m
e
d
ic
in
e
s
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
o
o
d
  
(s
ta
p
le
s
, 
e
x
tr
a
s
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
  
(f
u
e
l,
 p
h
o
n
e
 c
re
d
it
, 
e
le
c
tr
ic
a
l 
g
o
o
d
s
, 
h
o
u
s
e
 
re
p
a
ir
s
, 
o
th
e
r)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
A
S
H
  
(w
a
te
r 
p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
 /
 
c
o
ti
s
a
ti
o
n
 /
 w
o
rk
, 
e
a
u
 
d
e
 j
a
v
e
l,
 s
o
a
p
 f
o
r 
d
is
h
e
s
, 
s
o
a
p
 f
o
r 
b
a
th
in
g
, 
to
ile
t 
/ 
e
m
p
ty
in
g
) 
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T
y
p
e
 o
f 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 
D
e
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 
A
m
o
u
n
t 
(F
C
F
A
) 
W
h
o
 w
a
s
 i
n
v
o
lv
e
d
 
in
 t
h
e
 d
e
c
is
io
n
, 
a
n
d
 w
h
o
 t
o
o
k
 t
h
e
 
fi
n
a
l 
d
e
c
is
io
n
?
 
In
 l
a
s
t 
y
e
a
r 
a
n
d
/o
r 
la
s
t 
tw
o
 
w
e
e
k
s
?
 
T
y
p
ic
a
l 
fr
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
th
is
 e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 
H
o
w
 p
a
id
?
 
- 
C
a
s
h
 s
a
v
e
d
 (
w
h
e
re
?
) 
- 
L
o
a
n
 (
fr
o
m
 w
h
o
?
) 
- 
G
if
t 
(f
ro
m
 w
h
o
?
) 
- 
S
o
ld
 s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 (
w
h
a
t?
) 
- 
O
th
e
r 
S
o
c
ia
l 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
 
(m
a
rr
ia
g
e
, 
b
a
p
ti
s
m
, 
fu
n
e
ra
l,
 o
th
e
r)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
 
(f
e
a
s
t,
 a
s
s
o
c
ia
ti
o
n
 e
tc
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
if
ts
 t
o
 o
th
e
rs
 
(e
.g
. 
fo
r 
th
e
ir
 s
o
c
ia
l 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
ra
n
s
p
o
rt
 
(m
o
to
 f
u
e
l,
 o
th
e
r 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
x
  
(n
a
ti
o
n
a
l,
 l
o
c
a
l)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
le
a
s
u
re
s
 (
te
a
, 
c
ig
a
re
tt
e
s
 e
tc
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
th
e
r 
s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
  
(a
s
 d
e
fi
n
e
d
 b
y
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
e
e
) 
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4
. 
S
h
o
c
k
s
 a
n
d
 e
v
e
n
ts
 c
a
u
s
in
g
 u
n
e
x
p
e
c
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 o
f 
in
c
o
m
e
 o
r 
e
x
tr
a
 e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 i
n
 t
h
e
 l
a
s
t 
y
e
a
r 
 
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
s
h
o
c
k
 o
r 
e
v
e
n
t 
D
e
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
s
h
o
c
k
 o
r 
e
v
e
n
t 
A
p
p
ro
x
 
d
a
te
 
A
m
o
u
n
t 
lo
s
t 
o
r 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 
in
c
u
rr
e
d
 
(F
C
F
A
) 
W
h
a
t 
w
a
s
 t
h
e
 r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 t
a
k
e
n
?
 
- 
U
s
e
d
 c
a
s
h
 s
a
v
e
d
 (
w
h
e
re
?
) 
- 
L
o
a
n
 (
fr
o
m
 w
h
o
?
) 
- 
G
if
t 
o
r 
h
e
lp
 (
fr
o
m
 w
h
o
?
) 
- 
S
o
ld
 s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 (
w
h
a
t?
) 
- 
O
th
e
r 
e
.g
. 
re
d
u
c
e
d
 o
th
e
r 
e
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
 o
r 
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
ti
o
n
, 
in
c
re
a
s
e
d
 w
o
rk
 
W
h
o
 
d
e
c
id
e
d
 
th
e
 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
?
 
W
h
a
t 
w
a
s
 t
h
e
 
im
p
a
c
t 
o
n
 t
h
e
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 
fi
n
a
n
c
e
s
?
  
(l
it
tl
e
 e
ff
e
c
t,
 
s
o
m
e
 e
ff
e
c
t,
 
s
e
v
e
re
 e
ff
e
c
t)
 
H
o
w
 l
o
n
g
 
d
id
 i
t 
ta
k
e
 
th
e
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 
to
 r
e
c
o
v
e
r 
fr
o
m
 t
h
is
 
s
h
o
c
k
?
 
A
g
ri
c
u
lt
u
ra
l 
s
h
o
c
k
 
(c
ro
p
 f
a
ilu
re
, 
d
e
a
th
 /
 i
lln
e
s
s
 /
 
th
e
ft
 o
f 
liv
e
s
to
c
k
 e
tc
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
th
e
r 
in
c
o
m
e
 l
o
s
s
 
(j
o
b
 l
o
s
s
, 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 f
a
ilu
re
, 
re
m
it
ta
n
c
e
 s
to
p
p
e
d
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Il
ln
e
s
s
, 
in
ju
ry
 o
r 
d
e
a
th
 
(i
n
c
o
m
e
 l
o
s
s
 a
n
d
/o
r 
e
x
tr
a
 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
e
p
a
rt
 o
f 
m
e
m
b
e
r,
 d
iv
o
rc
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
o
c
ia
l 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
 (
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
, 
b
a
p
ti
s
m
, 
fu
n
e
ra
l,
 o
th
e
r)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 e
x
p
e
n
s
e
 (
fe
a
s
t,
 
p
u
m
p
 r
e
p
a
ir
 e
tc
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 o
r 
th
e
ft
 o
f 
p
ro
p
e
rt
y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
th
e
r 
s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
s
h
o
c
k
 
(a
s
 d
e
fi
n
e
d
 b
y
 i
n
te
rv
ie
w
e
e
) 
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5
. 
U
s
e
 o
f 
fi
n
a
n
c
ia
l 
in
s
tr
u
m
e
n
ts
 -
 p
a
s
t 
y
e
a
r 
a
n
d
 l
a
s
t 
tw
o
 w
e
e
k
s
 
 
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
in
s
tr
u
m
e
n
t 
In
s
tr
u
m
e
n
t 
W
h
o
 i
n
 h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 
u
s
e
s
 i
t?
 
M
o
n
e
y
 f
lo
w
in
g
 i
n
/o
u
t 
o
f 
th
is
 
in
s
tr
u
m
e
n
t 
in
 t
h
e
 l
a
s
t 
y
e
a
r 
M
o
n
e
y
 f
lo
w
in
g
 i
n
/o
u
t 
o
f 
th
is
 
in
s
tr
u
m
e
n
t 
in
 t
h
e
 l
a
s
t 
tw
o
 w
e
e
k
s
 
S
a
v
in
g
  
(b
a
n
k
 a
c
c
o
u
n
t,
 t
o
n
ti
n
e
 
e
tc
, 
o
th
e
r)
 
 
  
 
 
T
a
k
in
g
 l
o
a
n
s
  
(b
a
n
k
, 
m
ic
ro
-c
re
d
it
, 
to
n
ti
n
e
 e
tc
, 
v
ill
a
g
e
 c
a
is
s
e
, 
fr
ie
n
d
 o
r 
fa
m
ily
, 
p
u
rc
h
a
s
e
 
o
n
 c
re
d
it
, 
o
th
e
r)
 
 
 
 
 
G
iv
in
g
 l
o
a
n
s
  
(t
o
n
ti
n
e
 e
tc
, 
v
ill
a
g
e
 
c
a
is
s
e
, 
fr
ie
n
d
 o
r 
fa
m
ily
) 
 
 
 
 
  6
. 
F
u
rt
h
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 a
n
d
 d
is
c
u
s
s
io
n
 
 
A
re
 t
h
e
re
 a
n
y
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
it
e
m
s
 o
f 
in
c
o
m
e
 o
r 
e
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
 w
h
ic
h
 w
e
 h
a
v
e
 n
o
t 
d
is
c
u
s
s
e
d
?
 
   
A
re
 t
h
e
re
 a
n
y
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
it
e
m
s
 w
h
ic
h
 a
re
 
‘in
-k
in
d
’ 
ra
th
e
r 
th
a
n
 c
a
s
h
?
 
 
 
F
u
rt
h
e
r 
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
?
 
 
 
 • 
D
o
 y
o
u
 h
a
v
e
 a
n
y
 q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
s
 f
o
r 
u
s
?
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F
o
rm
 f
o
r 
q
u
e
st
io
n
n
a
ir
e
 a
n
d
 s
e
m
i-
st
ru
ct
u
re
d
 i
n
te
rv
ie
w
 w
it
h
 f
e
m
a
le
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 h
e
a
d
 o
n
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 f
in
a
n
ce
s 
 • 
In
tr
o
d
u
c
ti
o
n
s
. 
•
 
R
e
m
in
d
e
r 
o
f 
p
u
rp
o
s
e
 o
f 
s
tu
d
y
 –
 u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
 h
o
w
 p
e
o
p
le
 m
a
n
a
g
e
 f
in
a
n
c
e
s
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
a
 p
ro
je
c
t.
 
•
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
s
 w
ill
 b
e
 a
n
o
n
y
m
o
u
s
 a
n
d
 c
a
n
 d
e
c
lin
e
 a
n
y
 q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
, 
o
r 
le
a
v
e
 t
h
e
 s
tu
d
y
 a
t 
a
n
y
 t
im
e
. 
•
 
W
e
 w
ill
 r
e
tu
rn
 l
a
te
r 
fo
r 
d
is
c
u
s
s
io
n
s
 w
it
h
 t
h
e
 w
o
m
e
n
’s
 g
ro
u
p
 
•
 
A
re
 t
h
e
re
 a
n
y
 q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
s
 f
o
r 
u
s
?
 
 1
. 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 i
d
e
n
ti
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
 
  
D
a
te
 
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
e
 
 
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
h
e
a
d
 o
f 
c
o
n
c
e
s
s
io
n
 
 
T
im
e
 
 
V
ill
a
g
e
 
 
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
h
e
a
d
 o
f 
m
é
n
a
g
e
 
 
R
e
g
io
n
 
 
H
a
m
le
t 
 
C
o
d
e
 o
f 
c
o
n
c
e
s
s
io
n
 
 
C
e
rc
le
 
 
N
e
ig
h
b
o
u
rh
o
o
d
 
 
C
o
d
e
 o
f 
m
é
n
a
g
e
 
 
  
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
m
a
n
 w
h
o
 k
n
o
w
s
 m
o
s
t 
a
b
o
u
t 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 f
in
a
n
c
e
s
 
 
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
w
o
m
a
n
 w
h
o
 k
n
o
w
s
 m
o
s
t 
a
b
o
u
t 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 f
in
a
n
c
e
s
 
 
G
e
n
e
ra
l 
a
v
a
ila
b
ili
ty
 a
n
d
 w
ill
in
g
n
e
s
s
 f
o
r 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s
 
 
N
a
m
e
s
 o
f 
p
e
rs
o
n
s
 i
n
te
rv
ie
w
e
d
 t
o
d
a
y
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2
. 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 a
s
s
e
ts
 –
 w
h
e
re
 t
h
e
 w
o
m
a
n
 w
a
s
 i
n
v
o
lv
e
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 d
e
c
is
io
n
 A
N
D
 /
 O
R
 r
a
is
in
g
 t
h
e
 m
o
n
e
y
 
 
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
a
s
s
e
t 
A
s
s
e
t 
N
u
m
b
e
r  
E
s
t.
 
v
a
lu
e
 
if
 s
o
ld
 
(F
C
F
A
) 
 
A
p
p
ro
x
 
c
o
s
t 
w
h
e
n
 
b
o
u
g
h
t 
(F
C
F
A
) 
W
h
o
 w
a
s
 
in
v
o
lv
e
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
d
e
c
is
io
n
 t
o
 b
u
y
 
th
e
 a
s
s
e
t,
 a
n
d
 
w
h
o
 t
o
o
k
 t
h
e
 f
in
a
l 
d
e
c
is
io
n
?
 
H
o
w
 b
o
u
g
h
t?
 
- 
C
a
s
h
 s
a
v
e
d
 (
w
h
e
re
?
) 
- 
L
o
a
n
 (
fr
o
m
 w
h
o
?
) 
- 
G
if
t 
(f
ro
m
 w
h
o
?
) 
- 
S
o
ld
 s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 (
w
h
a
t?
) 
- 
O
th
e
r 
A
n
im
a
l 
 
(c
o
w
, 
s
h
e
e
p
, 
g
o
a
t,
 d
o
n
k
e
y
, 
c
h
ic
k
e
n
, 
o
th
e
r)
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
T
ra
n
s
p
o
rt
  
(c
a
r,
 m
o
to
rb
ik
e
, 
b
ic
y
c
le
, 
c
a
rt
, 
o
th
e
r)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E
le
c
tr
ic
a
l 
 
(r
a
d
io
, 
T
V
, 
m
o
b
ile
 
p
h
o
n
e
, 
c
a
r 
b
a
tt
e
ry
, 
s
o
la
r 
p
a
n
e
l,
 o
th
e
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Appendix 3 - Additional documentation on process and analysis 
 
A3.1. Summary of the process of using the Sustainability Framework with WaterAid 
 
[Originally written as an example for other WaterAid country programmes] 
 
 
Using WaterAid’s Sustainability Framework to analyse the 
challenges for sustainable water services at local government 
levels in Mali 
 
Stephen Jones, Royal Holloway, University of London  
(PhD student collaborating with WaterAid in Mali on sustainability and local financing) 
stephenjones27@gmail.com 
 
January 2012 
 
1. Overview 
 
This Briefing Note summarises the progress made by WaterAid in Mali and its partner 
NGOs and local governments (municipalities) in rural areas of Mali during 2011 
towards: 
• Understanding WaterAid’s Sustainability Framework, as shown below. 
• Using the Sustainability Framework to help analyse the challenges faced in 
achieving sustainable water services in each of these rural municipalities. 
• Developing approaches at commune levels to respond to these challenges. 
 
WaterAid’s conceptual framework for sustainable rural water supply services: 
 
 
(WaterAid (2011). Sustainability framework.) 
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2. First steps in using the Sustainability Framework in Mali 
 
WaterAid Mali and its partners undertook the following key activities during 2011 to 
analyse the elements affecting the sustainability of rural water services in their zones 
of intervention: 
 
a) An initial analysis of sustainability issues facing the whole rural water 
sector in Mali, and a more detailed analysis of one case study commune 
where WaterAid works. Representatives of WaterAid and the case study 
commune took this preparatory study to a WaterAid West Africa workshop in 
Liberia. This enabled peer review and development of a broad action plan for the 
country programme to address issues of sustainability at levels of service-delivery 
and policy levels. The remaining activities described here focus on issues at local 
service-delivery levels. 
 
b) A desk review and workshop with all WaterAid’s partners in rural areas to 
discuss the existing data on sustainability, current approaches, and how the 
Sustainability Framework could be used to help their analysis and planning. 
Some tools were adapted from those created for the workshop in Liberia. Others 
were developed specifically for the Mali context based on the data initially 
collected. 
 
c) Field research by each rural partner to i) use the Sustainability Framework 
and interviews with key stakeholders to analyse sustainability overall in 
their commune, using a simple ‘traffic-light system’ to assess each element 
of the framework, and ii) perform case study research in four villages in their 
commune.  The village case studies focused on community fundraising and 
cost-sharing of recurrent costs, which had been identified as key themes. In each 
commune, partners chose two villages which represented positive examples of 
sustainability and two examples known to be more challenging. 
 
d) A workshop to review the progress made and identify the key areas which 
may require further resources and support from WaterAid and can be 
considered during the next planning cycle in early 2012.  
 
 
3. Summary of the factors which show most success and greatest difficulties: 
 
Factors of the Sustainability Framework where WaterAid’s partners have most 
success: 
Establish demand, need and relevant service level 
Full user participation 
Initial demand, 
participation and 
contribution 
Capital contribution by users 
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Factors of the Sustainability Framework where WaterAid’s partners have most 
difficulties: 
Environmental aspects Monitoring, especially of 
environmental aspects 
Monitoring system, especially of environmental issues 
Appropriate tariff structure 
Revenues collected, recorded and accounted for 
Tariffs and revenues 
(from users) and sharing  
recurrent costs (with 
other actors) Cost sharing 
Maintenance Preventive maintenance 
and support to supply 
chains Support to supply chains and service providers 
Externalities Support around externalities 
 
The challenges regarding monitoring and cost-sharing are widespread among 
WaterAid’s partners and have led to the key actions described below. The need for 
better support to supply chains is a particular issue in municipalities which are further 
from urban centres. The challenge of support in coping with external trends and 
shocks has not yet been addressed. 
 
 
4. Challenges in mainstreaming the Sustainability Framework in WaterAid’s 
work 
 
• Internal marketing – all WaterAid and partner staff understanding and 
committing to the principles of sustainability – is a slow process, especially 
given the other demands on people’s time. For example, it was difficult to 
gather all WaterAid programme staff together at the same time with all the 
coordinators and field staff of WaterAid’s partners for the workshops and 
discussion required, so reaching common understandings and agreements was 
slow. 
 
• Data collected is not always consistent and comparable across different 
municipalities. This problem also emerged because of the difficulty of bringing 
people together to discuss and reach common interpretations of different elements 
of the Sustainability Framework. 
 
• Over-reliance on particular individuals as ‘champions’. For example, the 
coordinator of the WASH Technical Unit of WaterAid’s partner commune of 
Dandougou Fakala had shown great initiative and commitment in analysing costs, 
setting up cost-sharing mechanisms and supporting local mechanics in order to 
achieve near-100% rates of water point functionality in the commune. Throughout 
this process he was encouraged to share his ideas and approaches with other 
partners. However, it may be unrealistic to expect all local governments or NGOs 
to have staff with such high levels of initiative. 
 
• Internal planning, monitoring and reporting systems are not yet aligned to 
sustainability. However, the adoption of a system of Post-Implementation 
Surveys will help address this, and the last workshop in this process aimed to 
ensure that the areas of the Sustainability Framework identified as key challenges 
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would be addressed and allocated appropriate funds in the budgeting process for 
2012-13. 
 
• Lack of engagement so far on wider policy issues concerning sustainability. 
Although the initial action plan developed after the workshop in Liberia included 
elements of engaging with other actors on national policy issues, the time needed 
to gather evidence from WaterAid’s work and staff turnover issues in the Policy 
team have delayed this engagement. 
 
 
5. Actions resulting from the sustainability analysis 
 
Actions taken so far: 
 
• Sharing of the simple approach and tools for monitoring functionality and costs 
developed by one partner (the commune of Dandougou Fakala) with all other 
partners. 
 
• Research on how recurrent costs (operation, maintenance, rehabilitation) are 
shared between users, local government and NGOs, and how this sharing could 
be improved to help sustainability. 
 
• Research on methods of community fundraising and how this can be taken into 
account when estimating the ability and willingness to pay of users. 
 
• Updating the GPS and functionality data for all water points in the rural 
municipalities. 
 
Note that full analysis of the data from the research on recurrent costs and community 
fundraising is ongoing during January-April 2012. 
 
Actions provisionally identified for 2012-13, to be planned in detail during the 
budgeting process with each partner: 
 
1. Developing a long-term monitoring system which fulfils the needs of local actors, 
the national water point database, and WaterAid’s own post-intervention 
monitoring procedures, and includes a consideration of environmental issues. 
 
2. Supporting a mechanism for ensuring that the key elements of sustainability and 
the up-to-date mapping and functionality data are taken into account: 
a. In the direct activities of WaterAid’s partners. 
b. In the next revisions of the Local Sector Development Plans for WASH, 
to inform the activities of other actors. These must take into account the 
issues identified in the analysis as particularly relevant in that 
commune (such as distance to spare parts providers). 
 
3. Developing an improved tool for predicting the life-cycle costs of water services in 
each commune, and for analysing the ability and willingness of users to pay their 
contribution. 
 
4. Developing more detailed approaches to improve preventative maintenance and 
support to supply chains which are appropriate to the geographic context of each 
commune. 
3
0
8
 
A
3
.2
. 
E
xp
la
n
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
so
u
rc
e
s 
o
f 
d
a
ta
 a
n
d
 c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
re
cu
rr
e
n
t 
co
st
s 
 [A
 v
er
si
o
n
 o
f 
th
is
 e
xp
la
n
at
io
n
 w
as
 o
ri
gi
n
al
ly
 w
ri
tt
en
 f
o
r 
W
at
er
A
id
 in
 M
al
i a
t 
th
ei
r 
re
q
u
es
t]
 
 Th
e 
ta
b
le
s 
b
el
o
w
 s
h
o
w
 h
o
w
 t
h
e 
co
st
 p
er
 p
er
so
n
 p
er
 y
ea
r 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 t
yp
e 
o
f 
lif
e-
cy
cl
e 
co
st
 c
o
m
p
o
n
en
t 
(a
cc
o
rd
in
g 
to
 t
h
e 
W
A
SH
C
o
st
 d
ef
in
it
io
n
s)
 w
as
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 in
 f
o
u
r 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s,
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 d
at
a 
fr
o
m
 W
at
er
A
id
 in
 M
al
i a
n
d
 it
s 
p
ar
tn
er
s.
 T
h
e 
p
ro
ce
ss
 w
as
: 
 A
) 
C
o
lle
ct
 t
h
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 f
ro
m
 e
ac
h
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y,
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r 
w
h
er
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 is
 a
va
ila
b
le
. 
B
) 
N
o
te
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ye
ar
s 
fo
r 
w
h
ic
h
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 is
 a
va
ila
b
le
. 
C
) 
C
al
cu
la
te
 t
h
e 
to
ta
l c
o
st
 f
o
r 
th
e 
w
h
o
le
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y 
in
 t
h
e 
p
er
io
d
 f
o
r 
w
h
ic
h
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 is
 a
va
ila
b
le
. 
D
) 
N
o
te
 t
h
e 
to
ta
l p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y 
fo
r 
re
fe
re
n
ce
. 
E)
 
N
o
te
 t
h
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 c
o
ve
re
d
 b
y 
al
l “
m
o
d
er
n
” 
w
at
er
 p
o
in
ts
 (
po
in
ts
 d
’e
a
u
 m
o
d
er
n
e)
 a
cc
o
rd
in
g 
to
 n
at
io
n
al
 n
o
rm
s 
A
N
D
 t
h
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
co
ve
re
d
 b
y 
h
an
d
p
u
m
p
s 
an
d
 “
m
o
d
er
n
” 
w
el
ls
, e
xc
lu
d
in
g 
sm
al
l p
ip
ed
 s
ys
te
m
s 
(i
n
 b
o
th
 c
as
es
 a
cc
o
rd
in
g 
to
 c
al
cu
la
ti
o
n
s 
w
h
ic
h
 w
er
e 
m
ad
e 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
G
P
S 
su
rv
ey
 
o
f 
al
l w
at
er
 p
o
in
ts
 in
 W
at
er
A
id
’s
 r
u
ra
l z
o
n
es
 o
f 
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
 in
 2
0
11
).
 T
h
is
 d
is
ti
n
ct
io
n
 is
 m
ad
e 
b
ec
au
se
: 
•
 
O
p
er
at
in
g 
an
d
 m
in
o
r 
m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 (
O
p
Ex
) 
an
d
 c
ap
it
al
 m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 (
C
ap
M
an
Ex
) 
ar
e 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 f
o
r 
h
an
d
p
u
m
p
s 
an
d
 “
m
o
d
er
n
” 
w
el
ls
 (
al
th
o
u
gh
 O
p
Ex
 w
as
 n
o
t 
in
 f
ac
t 
re
p
o
rt
ed
 f
o
r 
“m
o
d
er
n
” 
w
el
ls
).
 
•
 
Ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 d
ir
ec
t 
su
p
p
o
rt
 (
Ex
p
D
S)
 is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 o
n
 t
h
e 
b
as
is
 o
f 
su
p
p
o
rt
in
g 
se
rv
ic
es
 f
ro
m
 a
ll 
ty
p
es
 o
f 
w
at
er
 p
o
in
ts
, s
in
ce
 s
o
m
e 
o
f 
W
at
er
A
id
’s
 
p
ar
tn
er
s’
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
in
cl
u
d
e 
su
p
p
o
rt
 t
o
 t
h
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
o
f 
sm
al
l p
ip
ed
 s
ys
te
m
s 
to
o
. H
o
w
ev
er
 it
 w
as
 n
o
t 
p
o
ss
ib
le
 t
o
 d
is
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 d
ir
ec
t 
su
p
p
o
rt
 b
et
w
ee
n
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
ty
p
es
 o
f 
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
.  
F)
 
C
al
cu
la
te
 t
h
e 
to
ta
l c
o
st
 p
er
 p
er
so
n
 p
er
 y
ea
r 
in
 F
C
FA
 b
y 
d
iv
id
in
g 
th
e 
to
ta
l c
o
st
 (
C
) 
b
y 
th
e 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 c
o
ve
re
d
 (
E)
 a
n
d
 b
y 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ye
ar
s 
fo
r 
w
h
ic
h
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 is
 a
va
ila
b
le
 (
B
).
 
G
) 
C
al
cu
la
te
 t
h
e 
to
ta
l c
o
st
 p
er
 p
er
so
n
 p
er
 y
ea
r 
in
 U
SD
 b
y 
d
iv
id
in
g 
th
e 
to
ta
l c
o
st
 (
C
) 
b
y 
th
e 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 c
o
ve
re
d
 (
E)
 a
n
d
 b
y 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ye
ar
s 
fo
r 
w
h
ic
h
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 is
 a
va
ila
b
le
 (
B
) 
an
d
 b
y 
5
10
 (
th
e 
ap
p
ro
xi
m
at
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 r
at
e 
is
 5
10
 F
C
FA
 : 
1
 U
SD
).
 
H
) 
Ex
p
re
ss
 t
h
e 
co
st
s 
p
er
 p
er
so
n
 p
er
 y
ea
r 
as
 a
n
 a
p
p
ro
xi
m
at
e 
ra
n
ge
 f
o
r 
al
l t
h
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s,
 in
 li
n
e 
w
it
h
 g
u
id
an
ce
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
W
A
SH
C
o
st
 p
ro
je
ct
 (
B
u
rr
 e
t 
al
. 2
01
2)
.  
  
3
0
9
 
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 a
n
d
 m
in
o
r 
m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
 e
xp
e
n
d
it
u
re
 (
O
p
E
x)
 -
 O
p
er
at
in
g 
co
st
s,
 m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 a
n
d
 r
ep
ai
rs
 w
h
ic
h
 t
yp
ic
al
ly
 o
cc
u
r 
at
 le
as
t 
o
n
ce
 a
 y
ea
r 
at
 a
 c
o
st
 o
f 
u
p
 t
o
 U
S$
 
1
00
 p
er
 in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
, f
o
r 
h
an
d
p
u
m
p
s 
an
d
 “
m
o
d
er
n
” 
w
e
lls
 (
al
th
o
u
gh
 O
p
Ex
 w
as
 n
o
t 
in
 f
ac
t 
re
p
o
rt
ed
 f
o
r 
“m
o
d
er
n
” 
w
el
ls
).
  
 
M
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
 
S
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
Y
e
a
rs
 f
o
r 
w
h
ic
h
  
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
w
a
s 
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
 
T
o
ta
l 
co
st
s 
o
f 
O
p
E
x 
in
 
p
e
ri
o
d
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
 
T
o
ta
l 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
(f
o
r 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 
o
n
ly
) 
E
st
im
a
te
d
 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
co
v
e
re
d
 b
y
 a
ll
 
“m
o
d
e
rn
” 
w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 
a
cc
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 
n
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
n
o
rm
s 
E
st
im
a
te
d
 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
co
v
e
re
d
 b
y
 
h
a
n
d
p
u
m
p
s 
a
n
d
 “
m
o
d
e
rn
” 
w
e
ll
s 
a
cc
o
rd
in
g
 
to
 n
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
n
o
rm
s 
C
o
st
 o
f 
O
p
E
x 
p
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
 
co
v
e
re
d
 
p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
 
(F
C
FA
) 
 
C
o
st
 o
f 
O
p
E
x 
p
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
 
co
v
e
re
d
 
p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
 
(U
S
D
) 
A
p
p
ro
xi
m
a
te
 
ra
n
g
e
 p
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
 
se
rv
e
d
 p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
 
(t
o
 1
 d
.p
.,
 i
n
 
li
n
e
 w
it
h
 B
u
rr
 
e
t 
a
l.
 2
0
1
2
) 
D
a
n
d
o
u
g
o
u
 
Fa
k
a
la
 
R
ec
o
rd
s 
o
f 
C
o
-o
rd
in
at
o
r 
o
f 
Te
ch
n
ic
al
 U
n
it
 
3
.7
5
 y
ea
rs
 
(2
0
08
 –
 S
ep
t 
2
01
1
) 
2
98
,5
00
 F
C
FA
 
9
,7
70
 
9
,3
99
 
7
,8
99
 
1
0
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 0
.0
2
 
K
o
lo
k
a
n
i 
Es
ti
m
at
es
 a
n
d
 
so
m
e 
re
co
rd
s 
ke
p
t 
b
y 
p
u
m
p
 
m
ec
h
an
ic
s 
4
 y
ea
rs
  
(2
0
08
 –
 2
01
1)
 
5
,6
36
,0
00
 
FC
FA
 
3
9
,7
2
2
 
3
5
,5
1
8
 
2
4
,0
1
2
 
5
9
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 0
.1
2
 
T
io
ri
b
o
u
g
o
u
 
R
ec
o
rd
s 
ke
p
t 
b
y 
p
u
m
p
 
m
ec
h
an
ic
s 
4
 y
ea
rs
  
(2
0
08
 –
 2
01
1)
 
6
61
,0
80
 F
C
FA
 
1
4
,2
5
1
 
1
3
,2
6
4
 
8
,7
22
 
1
3
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 0
.0
3
 
<
 U
S
$
 0
.1
 
D
ia
la
k
o
ro
b
a
 
N
o
 in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
va
ila
b
le
 
1
8
,7
4
6
 
1
8
,7
4
6
 
1
4
,8
6
5
 
N
o
 in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
va
ila
b
le
 
 
 
3
1
0
 
C
a
p
it
a
l 
m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
 e
xp
e
n
d
it
u
re
 (
C
a
p
M
a
n
E
x)
 -
 C
o
st
s 
w
h
ic
h
 g
o
 b
ey
o
n
d
 r
o
u
ti
n
e 
m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 o
r 
sm
al
l r
ep
ai
rs
, t
yp
ic
al
ly
 o
cc
u
rr
in
g 
le
ss
 f
re
q
u
en
tl
y 
th
an
 e
ve
ry
 y
ea
r 
an
d
 c
o
st
in
g 
m
o
re
 t
h
an
 U
S$
 1
00
 p
er
 in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
, f
o
r 
h
an
d
p
u
m
p
s 
an
d
 “
m
o
d
er
n
” 
w
el
ls
. I
n
cl
u
d
es
 t
h
e 
co
st
s 
o
f 
re
n
ew
al
, r
ep
la
ce
m
en
t 
an
d
 r
eh
ab
ili
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
. T
h
es
e 
co
st
s 
ar
e 
h
ig
h
ly
 d
ep
en
d
en
t 
o
n
 t
h
e 
ti
m
in
g 
o
f 
d
o
n
o
r 
an
d
 g
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
p
ro
je
ct
s 
to
 r
eh
ab
ili
ta
te
 o
ld
 in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
. 
 
M
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
 
S
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
Y
e
a
rs
 f
o
r 
w
h
ic
h
  
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
w
a
s 
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
 
T
o
ta
l 
co
st
s 
o
f 
C
a
p
M
a
n
E
x 
in
 p
e
ri
o
d
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
 
T
o
ta
l 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
(f
o
r 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 
o
n
ly
) 
E
st
im
a
te
d
 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
co
v
e
re
d
 b
y
 a
ll
 
“m
o
d
e
rn
” 
w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 a
cc
o
rd
in
g
 
to
 n
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
n
o
rm
s 
E
st
im
a
te
d
 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
co
v
e
re
d
 b
y
 
h
a
n
d
p
u
m
p
s 
a
n
d
 “
m
o
d
e
rn
” 
w
e
ll
s 
a
cc
o
rd
in
g
 
to
 n
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
n
o
rm
s 
C
o
st
 o
f 
C
a
p
M
a
n
E
x 
p
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
 
co
v
e
re
d
 
p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
(F
C
FA
) 
 
C
o
st
 o
f 
C
a
p
M
a
n
E
x 
p
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
 
co
v
e
re
d
 
p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
(U
S
D
) 
 
A
p
p
ro
xi
m
a
te
 
ra
n
g
e
 p
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
 
se
rv
e
d
 p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
 
(t
o
 1
 d
.p
.,
 i
n
 
li
n
e
 w
it
h
 B
u
rr
 
e
t 
a
l.
 2
0
1
2
) 
D
a
n
d
o
u
g
o
u
 
Fa
k
a
la
 
R
ec
o
rd
s 
o
f 
C
o
-o
rd
in
at
o
r 
o
f 
Te
ch
n
ic
al
 U
n
it
 
3
.7
5
 y
ea
rs
 
(2
0
08
 –
 S
ep
t 
2
01
1
) 
4
80
,0
00
 
FC
FA
 
9
,7
70
 
9
,3
99
 
7
,8
99
 
1
6
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 0
.0
3
 
K
o
lo
k
a
n
i 
R
ec
o
rd
s 
o
f 
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y 
4
 y
ea
rs
  
(2
0
08
 –
 2
01
1)
 
6
,7
09
,9
00
 
FC
FA
 
3
9
,7
2
2
 
3
5
,5
1
8
 
2
4
,0
1
2
 
7
0
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 0
.1
4
 
T
io
ri
b
o
u
g
o
u
 
R
ec
o
rd
s 
o
f 
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y 
an
d
 p
u
m
p
 
m
ec
h
an
ic
s;
 
m
ap
p
in
g 
su
rv
ey
 
4
 y
ea
rs
  
(2
0
08
 –
 2
01
1)
 
1
1
,9
8
5
,3
0
0 
FC
FA
 
1
4
,2
5
1
 
1
3
,2
6
4
 
8
,7
22
 
3
15
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 0
.6
2
 
D
ia
la
k
o
ro
b
a
 
Es
ti
m
at
es
 b
y 
p
ar
tn
er
 N
G
O
 
4
 y
ea
rs
  
(2
0
08
 –
 2
01
1)
 
4
8
,4
0
0
,0
0
0 
FC
FA
 
1
8
,7
4
6
 
1
8
,7
4
6
 
1
4
,8
6
5
 
8
14
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 1
.6
0
 
U
S
$
 0
.1
 t
o
 1
.6
  
  
3
1
1
 
E
xp
e
n
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 d
ir
e
ct
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 (
E
xp
D
S
) 
–
 T
h
es
e 
ar
e 
th
e 
co
st
s 
o
f 
a 
W
A
SH
 T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 U
n
it
 o
f 
1
-2
 s
ta
ff
 (
sa
la
ri
es
, t
ra
n
sp
o
rt
, o
ff
ic
e 
ex
p
en
se
s)
 t
o
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 t
h
e 
p
la
n
n
in
g,
 
im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g 
o
f 
W
A
SH
 s
er
vi
ce
s,
 e
it
h
er
 a
s 
p
ar
t 
o
f 
th
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y’
s 
st
af
f 
(w
h
er
e 
W
at
er
A
id
 p
ro
vi
d
es
 d
ir
ec
t 
b
u
d
ge
t 
su
p
p
o
rt
) 
o
r 
as
 lo
ca
l N
G
O
 
p
ar
tn
er
 s
ta
ff
. E
ac
h
 W
A
SH
 T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 U
n
it
 h
as
 s
im
ila
r 
ab
so
lu
te
 c
o
st
s,
 s
o
 t
h
e 
co
st
s 
p
er
 p
er
so
n
 p
er
 y
ea
r 
ar
e 
se
n
si
ti
ve
 t
o
 t
h
e 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y.
 T
h
es
e 
co
st
s 
co
ve
r 
su
p
p
o
rt
 t
o
 t
h
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
o
f 
h
an
d
p
u
m
p
s,
 “
m
o
d
e
rn
” 
w
el
ls
 a
n
d
 s
m
al
l p
ip
ed
 s
ys
te
m
s.
  
 
M
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
 
S
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
T
o
ta
l 
co
st
s 
o
f 
d
ir
e
ct
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 
(s
a
la
ri
e
s 
a
n
d
 o
v
e
rh
e
a
d
s 
o
f 
T
e
ch
n
ic
a
l 
U
n
it
 o
r 
p
a
rt
n
e
r 
N
G
O
) 
fo
r 
FY
 2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
1
 
T
o
ta
l 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
(f
o
r 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 
o
n
ly
) 
E
st
im
a
te
d
 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 c
o
v
e
re
d
 
b
y
 “
m
o
d
e
rn
” 
w
a
te
r 
p
o
in
ts
 a
cc
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 
n
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
n
o
rm
s 
C
o
st
 o
f 
d
ir
e
ct
 
su
p
p
o
rt
 p
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
 c
o
v
e
re
d
 
p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
(F
C
FA
) 
C
o
st
 o
f 
d
ir
e
ct
 
su
p
p
o
rt
 p
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
 
co
v
e
re
d
 p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
(U
S
D
) 
A
p
p
ro
xi
m
a
te
 
ra
n
g
e
 p
e
r 
p
e
rs
o
n
 s
e
rv
e
d
 
p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
 
(t
o
 1
 d
.p
.,
 i
n
 
li
n
e
 w
it
h
 B
u
rr
 
e
t 
a
l.
 2
0
1
2
) 
D
a
n
d
o
u
g
o
u
 
Fa
k
a
la
 
6
,5
00
,0
00
 F
C
FA
 
9
,7
70
 
9
,3
99
 
6
54
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 1
.2
8
 
K
o
lo
k
a
n
i 
3
9
,7
2
2
 
3
5
,5
1
8
 
2
44
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 0
.4
8
 
T
io
ri
b
o
u
g
o
u
 
•
 
1
7
,3
5
9
,5
9
3 
FC
FA
 f
o
r 
K
o
lo
ka
n
i a
n
d
 T
io
ri
b
o
u
go
u
 
co
m
b
in
ed
. 
•
 
Th
er
ef
o
re
 8
,6
79
,7
97
 F
C
FA
 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y 
if
 t
h
e 
co
st
s 
ar
e 
sh
ar
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
th
em
. 
1
4
,2
5
1
 
1
3
,2
6
4
 
5
85
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 1
.1
5
 
D
ia
la
k
o
ro
b
a
 
W
at
er
A
id
 M
al
i 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 d
at
a 
fo
r 
FY
 
2
01
0
-2
01
1
 
1
1
,0
3
6
,9
6
7 
FC
FA
 
1
8
,7
4
6
 
1
8
,7
4
6
 
6
92
 F
C
FA
 
U
S$
 1
.3
6
 
 
U
S
$
 0
.5
 t
o
 1
.4
 
   
